1974

PARLIAMENT OF TASMANIA

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSIONER ON TASMANIAN URBAN PUBLIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT 1974

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by His Excellency's Command

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REPORT OF
THE ROYAL COMMISSIONER
ON
TASMANIAN URBAN PUBLIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT

(The Honourable Francis Mervyn Neasey a Judge of the Supreme Court of Tasmania)

GROUP CAPTAIN I. P. A. ALLEN, A.F.C., SECRETARY

HOBART, 15 January 1974

IN THE MATTER of Letters Patent under the Public Seal of the State of Tasmania dated the sixth day of February 1973

and

IN THE MATTER of the Evidence Act 1910.

To His Excellency the Honourable SIR STANLEY CHARLES BURBURY, Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Governor in and over the State of Tasmania and its Dependencies in the Commonwealth of Australia.

SIR,

I have the honour to present a Report on the subject of Tasmanian Urban Public Passenger Transport, a matter entrusted to me as a Royal Commissioner by Letters Patent under the Public Seal of the State dated the sixth day of February 1973.

I have the honour to be Sir,

Your obedient servant,

F. M. NEASEY, Commissioner.

Dated at Hobart, in Tasmania, this fifteenth day of January 1974.

I. P. ALLEN, Secretary.

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(i) Bridgewater and the Northern extension area
(ii) Rokeby
(iii) Kingston and Blackmans Bay

(d) Whether M.T.T. services should be extended in the Launceston area—

(i) Ravenswood

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(e) Possible extension of M.T.T. services on the North-West Coast

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PART A

1. TERMS OF REFERENCE AND TIME FOR REPORTING

By Letters Patent under the Public Seal of the State, I was on 6 February 1973 appointed a Royal Commissioner to inquire into and report upon certain matters concerning urban public passenger transport facilities in Tasmania. The terms of reference were as follows:—

(1) Ways and means of improving in the public interest the efficiency of, and facilities for, passenger transport available to the public on demand and on payment of prescribed charges in the Hobart and Launceston metropolitan areas, and on the North-West Coast, having particular regard to—

(*a*) practicable alterations which could be made to existing passenger transport operations in the areas indicated to provide improved services and greater co-ordination;

(*b*) the desirability, in the public interest, of integrating bus and rail passenger transport services (including privately operated services) where practicable in the Hobart metropolitan area;

(*c*) existing operations of the Metropolitan Transport Trust and whether these operations should be extended and, if so, to which areas;

(*d*) possible involvement of the Commonwealth Government in urban passenger transport; and

(*e*) possible need for future development of passenger transport services.

(2) Whether the Metropolitan Transport Trust should be incorporated within the Transport Commission and operate as a Branch of the Commission. And all matters and things connected therewith or incidental to or in any way relating to the foregoing grounds of inquiry.

The time for reporting specified in the said Letters Patent, namely the second day of July 1973, was subsequently extended to 31 January 1974.

PART B

INTRODUCTORY

2. PUBLIC NOTIFICATION OF SITTINGS OF THE COMMISSION

Public notification of the appointment of the Royal Commission, the terms of reference, and the time and place of its formal opening, were given by notices published in ' The Mercury ', ' The Examiner ', and ' The Advocate ' newspapers on 12 February 1973. By the same notices persons wishing to submit either written or oral evidence on any term of reference were asked to write in the first instance to the Secretary to the Commission. Those persons who did write were subsequently interviewed or communicated with by Counsel assisting the Commission and their evidence fully briefed.

Subsequently, further notification of sittings of the Commission for the purpose of taking evidence was madle in the same newspapers on 12 March 1973 and 7 May 1973. A notice of the time and place of each sitting of the Commission was published each sitting day in ' The Mercury ' and ' The Examiner ' newspapers.

3. PROCEDURE

3.1 General

In addition to giving notification to persons interested in giving evidence, as above stated, the Commission actively sought submissions and oral evidence from public departments and instrumentalities, local authorities, school parents' and friends' associations, private operators, progress associations, other like bodies, and individuals who it was thought would be able to assist the Commission.

It is pleasing to record that a reply was received in almost every instance, and a large number of submissions were sent in as a result.

3.2 Sittings in Public

The Commission sat in public in the auditorium of the State Public Building at No. 10 Murray Street, Hobart, in the No. 2 Court in the Magistrates' Court Buildings, 73 Charles Street, Launceston, and in the Supreme Court Building, Alexander Street, Burnie. My thanks are due to the Public Service Commissioner, Mr Jillett; and to the Senior Magistrate in Launceston, Mr J. R. Rex, and his colleagues, for permission to sit at those places at Hobart and Launceston. The sittings of the Commission were open to the public at all times. No evidence was heard in camera.

3.3 Mode of Taking Evidence

By Sections 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act 1910, Royal Commissions and Boards of Inquiry are given power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, and to take evidence on oath. In the case of this Commission, however, it was not necessary to exercise powers of compulsion; but as has become customary in such inquiries, evidence was taken on oath.

I have taken the best advantage I could of written material submitted in evidence and also collected for me by the Clerk to Counsel assisting the Commission, with the assistance of officers of the State Library and the University Library, to all of whom I am duly grateful. A list of written materials consulted besides those submitted in the course of hearings appears in Appendix ' D '.

Proceedings were kept reasonably informal, and witnesses freely availed themselves of permission to have technical officers sitting with them for consultation whilst giving evidence. In one or two instances, two or even three witnesses were sworn together and gave evidence simultaneously, questions being answered by one or other as they found convenient.

In this kind of inquiry, surprise had no place whatever and adversary procedures were kept to a minimum. It was no doubt inevitable that the forensic spirit should occasionally assert itself in cross-examination, but generally speaking both witnesses and Counsel maintained an atmosphere of inquiry rather than disputation.

At a preliminary meeting which I convened with Counsel assisting the Commission and representing the principal parties proposing to give evidence, it was agreed that in the first instance all evidence would be submitted in written form, to be supplemented by the witness's oral evidence whenever desired by the witness himself, by other parties, or by me. It was also agreed that written submissions should be made available to all parties a reasonable time before the hearing. That course was followed throughout, resulting in very considerable saving in hearing time. Final addresses were also submitted primarily in writing.

I wish to record my particular appreciation of the time and trouble taken by the Commissioner for Transport, Mr G. T. Webb, and his officers in preparing and submitting many papers on various subjects relevant to the terms of reference, all of which papers proved most helpful.

3.4 Application of Rules of Evidence

It was made plain from the beginning that the rules of evidence would not be applied in this Commission, and that the sole category governing admissibility of all material submitted, both oral and written, would be sufficient relevance to a term of reference. That rule was applied throughout.

3.5 Submissions, Witnesses, Exhibits, Inspections

3.5.1 Appendices will indicate the mass of written material placed before the Commission. Submissions by the major witnesses were uniformly comprehensive and of a high standard, and I have already made reference to the extent of assistance provided by the Transport Commission.

3.5.2 I wish to make particular mention of the evidence of one expert whose assistance was sought, and who readily and generously supplied it. Frequently in the early hearings of the Commission reference was made by witnesses to the high quality of the public passenger transportation system in Adelaide, and of the assistance which might be provided to the Commission by the Director General of Transport in South Australia, Dr Derek Scrafton. Accordingly, Dr Scrafton was contacted, and he agreed to make a written submission and give oral evidence, and did so. Dr Scrafton is one of the leading experts in Australia in this field, and his evidence proved most valuable and helpful.

3.5.3 The course was taken during the hearings of taking in written submissions as evidence and listing submissions and exhibits by an appropriate number—see Appendices.

References in this Report to written submissions will appear as, for example, ' Sub. No. ', and so on. Exhibits will be referred to by number—e.g., ' Ex. R.C.1 ', and reference to the transcript simply by page number—e.g. ' p. '.

3.5.4 I was invited by the Metropolitan Transport Trust (hereafter usually referred to as ' the M.T.T.') to make an inspection of its operations and facilities, and I did so on 10 August 1973.

I also took various sample rides on buses of the M.T.T. and private operators and trains, inspected buses and bus routes, stops, shelters and the like, and toured various localities.

A list of witnesses who gave oral evidence appears in Appendix ' C '.

The terms of reference covered urban public transport operations in the three main centres of the State; and accordingly the rule was followed, as far as possible, that all oral evidence should be heard in the centre to which it related.

4. APPEARANCES BY COUNSEL

It was a matter of great assistance to the proceedings of the Commission that all of the main parties whose interests were potentially affected by the terms of reference were represented by Counsel. The advantage of this was that Counsel assisting the Commission was not placed in the position of having both to brief the evidence of witnesses and to test it by cross-examination, a matter which can cause difficulty.

In addition to Mr D. R. Coatman of the Solicitor-General's Department, assisting the Commission, the following Counsel appeared:—

Mr H. E. Cosgrove of Counsel for the Metropolitan Transport Trust. After Mr Cosgrove took up appointment as Crown Advocate, Mr P. G. Underwood took his place.

Mr F. N. Joughin and Mr S. D. Sharma of Counsel for the Transport Commission; and at a later stage Mr W. J. E. Cox.

Mr W. C. Hodgman, Q.C., with Mr C. P. R. Hill of Counsel for Messrs M. D. and N. D. Cresswell, proprietors of Ace Bus Service and Northern Suburbs Services.

Mr K. Levis of Counsel for Mr C. D. Ayers, proprietor of Tasmanian Coach Lines Pty Ltd.

Mr J. W. Wilson of Counsel for Messrs Brendan Manion's Transport, Stoward Motors and Red Line Coaches.

Mr D. F. Peters of Counsel for the Launceston City Council.

5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I was particularly fortunate throughout the course of this Commission and the preparation of the Report to have the assistance of a very able, hard working and enthusiastic team.

My special thanks are due to Mr D. R. Coatman, and to my Associate, Group Captain I. P. A. Allen, A.F.C. Mr Coatman pursued his task of collecting and collating evidence with persistence and success, and his quiet and penetrating method of questioning witnesses had a marked effect in drawing them out and getting the best from them. Group Captain Allen, who acted as Secretary of the Commission, worked extremely hard and ably throughout. The assistance which he provided in noting and indexing both written and oral evidence and collating materials during the preparation of the Report was most valuable to me. I cannot speak too highly of their work.

My grateful thanks are also due to Mr Adrian Abbott of the Solicitor-General's Department for his work in assisting Mr Coatman, and in superintending correction of the transcript; to Mrs B. C. McElwee for her patience and enthusiasm in typing drafts, collation of materials and general assistance; to the shorthand writers, Mrs D. Burdon, Mrs M. Burridge and Mrs S. Reddin for their expert production of transcript, often under difficulties; and last but certainly not least, to my attendant Mr K. C. Heeney for coping with all manner of problems with his usual courtesy and efficiency.

PART C

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING TASMANIAN PUBLIC URBAN PASSENGER TRANSPORT

6. THE CENTRAL FACTOR—THE MOTOR CAR

The motor car is everyman's modern chariot. Since soon after the end of the Second World War, with establishment of local manufacture, steady growth in availability of cars and easy credit to purchase them, the increase in their use by Australians has been phenomenal. This is a matter of universal common knowledge. The obvious advantage of the motor car is that it is easily the most convenient way to move from one place to another. If anyone walks more than a quarter of a mile nowadays, his main purpose is usually for health or recreation or the like. It used to be that the suburban millions, who include most of us, sought to own a house and a car in that order as their main economic aims in life. Now the order is reversed, because practically every young person wants a car as soon as possible, long before he wants a house; and having achieved possession of a car is, by and large, never without one for the rest of his life.

So far as the suburban working commuter is concerned, who creates most of the peak hour transport congestion, a car frees him from other people's time-tables. He does not have to wait for a bus on an often cold and windy street. It gives him privacy, comfort, and (a not inconsiderable factor) warmth in winter, because most cars have heaters. Furthermore, it gets him where he wants to go quicker than a bus will.

Of course, it is more than a matter of comfort or convenience. The motor car has a unique ability to bolster an individual's ego. Driving a car, a person feels in control of his destiny, free to move at will in a world where most of the time he moves at someone else's bidding. It extends his personality. Without one, he feels a loss of status. If he has one, it is an outward and visible sign that he is not too much of a loser in the race with his fellows. It is no wonder that the massed citizenry of all modern affluent societies adores the motor car.

The transportation problems created by proliferating car use are, of course, augmented by parallel growth in commercial vehicle numbers on Australian roads.

7. LOCAL COMMUNITY PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF CONTINUAL GROWTH IN AUTOMOBILE USE

7.1 Traffic Congestion

Hobart and Launceston, in proportion to their sizes, share a world-wide problem of affluent societies—congestion caused by ' the rising tide of motor cars '. The difficulties thus created are proportionate to city size, and so our problems are less acute than elsewhere; but nevertheless the problems are there and are increasing.

7.2 Planning to Meet the Problem of Traffic Congestion

In considering the public issues created by the automobile swarming into the cities, it is necessary to bear in mind the context in which planning of solutions to the problem must be approached. The following points are inescapable:—

(*a*) The problem is ongoing and developing, and therefore the process of planning and executing solutions must be a continuing process. What we do today to meet the problem, and will do in the future, are inevitably to a large extent products of what we planned and did in

the past. To take an example, the Northside Freeway proposal can only be considered against the background of the effects of the Brooker Highway, the Tasman Bridge, and the Southern Outlet.

(*b*) That is not to say that transportation planning, or any other kind, is an immutable process. It is well accepted that all good planning must undergo continual modification in order to meet the divergence of actual trends from those predicted by the planners.

(*c*) Nevertheless, the execution of planned developments in stages over a period of time does carry with it a certain momentum which is difficult to arrest or substantially divert. Planners become committed to their plans, and governments have to rely upon their planners' expert advice. One sizeable development executed carries with it irreversible consequences which must be coped with by subsequent action. Some consequences are unexpected, and they must be coped with also.

Even preparatory steps taken in the course of a planned development may carry a certain momentum. For example, if a course of acquisition by public authority of properties along the route of a planned highway takes place over a period of years, it takes courage in the end to say that highway will not be built because, for example, developing trends show it is no longer required.

(*d*) It is very difficult for the public to be well-informed on the complex issues involved in these matters, and consequently the provision of information for the public in an acceptable form is a vital need if democratic processes are to work.

(*e*) Traffic congestion is not an isolated problem, but on the contrary is one which is the product of many factors, including patterns of behaviour (i.e., the overwhelming preference of the public for the motor car as against other forms of transport), and in particular of land use and building patterns. It follows that the pursuit of solutions to the problem should be part of an overall planning context.

7.3 **Has Past Planning Favoured Central Hobart Unduly?**

(*a*) One of the principal points made in evidence by the geographer, Professor Scott, was that maintaining a high level of accessibility for the private motor vehicle into the core of the city involves huge public cost; and that greater benefits to the community can flow at lower long-term cost from flexible land use planning made possible by wide ownership and use of the private vehicle. (Sub. No. 48, p. 2). A basic criticism made by Professor Scott of our past planning is that the sectional interests of the Hobart City Council and the local business community to enhance the economic well-being of the central Hobart area were allowed to dominate the 1964 and 1970 transportation studies.

(*b*) There may be substance in these criticisms, and yet, three comments suggest themselves:—

(i) The 1964 H.A.T.S. study was planned and carried out at a time when people in many parts of the world were talking about ' the dying heart of the city '—when the belief was general that the inner city needed and deserved help *to maintain* its economic status as against the growing suburbs.

(ii) The inner city may still need such help. The centre of Hobart, in particular, has been given substantial economic assistance by the three radial avenues into the city, but the continued commercial growth of the suburbs apparently has not been retarded—witness the proliferation of suburban shopping centres. (See the Gelling Report, Ex. R.C. 18, p. 24).

(iii) It *is* important to the State as a whole that the inner cores of Hobart and Launceston be kept prosperous and thriving.

Tasmanians find their city centres just as attractive as people elsewhere find theirs, and in addition the city centres are very important to the tourist industry and to the provision of job opportunities. The key issue is to keep the amount of public expenditure devoted to their advancement proportionate to the general welfare—i.e., not too favourable to the sectional interests involved.

Mr Calver, the Chief Planning Officer for the Southern Metropolitan Master Planning Authority, in his evidence was as critical as Professor Scott of what he said has been a pronounced tendency of the recent studies to ' treat the motor car as king ', and to cater at all cost for its convenience; but he was not critical of facilitating the entry of the shopping motorist into Hobart. On the contrary, he favoured the provision of parking facilities to encourage that entry to the fullest extent. His emphasis was upon the value of the facilities which the central city can provide, and upon improving the quality of life of people who come into

the city to work, shop, or do business, and be entertained. He regards suburban shopping complexes as providing ' convenience shopping ' in the main, whereas the central city area provides more specialised shopping, entertainment facilities, and most of the job opportunities. (Sub. No. 5, p. 6). Thus, his evidence had a different thrust from that of Professor Scott, although it must be said that all the professional witnesses in the time available to them concentrated upon matters which they wished most to emphasise. I must say, however, that I favour Mr Calver's view, which is supported also by Mr Gelling. (See Sub. No. 18, para. 9).

7.4 **Private Vehicle Parking in the Cities**

(*a*) *Hobart*

In Hobart, parking pressures began to be felt in the early 1950's, and Hobart was the first Australian city to introduce parking meters, in 1965—Ex. No. H.C.1, p. 5.

Thereafter, the Hobart City Council has paid considerable attention to providing parking facilities. It commissioned a parking study by Wilbur Smith and Associates in 1964, and received the report in 1965. One major recommendation was the building of the multi-level parking garage in Argyle Street, which came into operation in November 1968. During 1970, the City Council decided to carry out a further survey, which became known as the Parking Updating Study 1971. This survey showed that, although the guiding philosophy had been to provide parking facilities for all who wanted them, demand had grown faster than anticipated. The estimated growth in deficiency had been from 358 parking spaces in 1965 to an average deficiency of approximately 800 spaces in 1971—Ex. H.C.1, p. 9, para. 2.16.

The Hobart Transportation Review 1970 estimated, on the assumption that 80% of the spaces in the central business district would cater for short term parkers in 1990, that the number of parking spaces required in the C.B.D. by that year would be 6 400—H.T.R. 1970, para. 346. H.T.R. 1970 also said that it was considered likely that off-street parking facilities would continue to be provided for short term parkers within and adjacent to the C.B.D. in response to the demand—para. 347. But in fact it seems that the City Council will have great difficulty in keeping up with the projected requirement for short term off-street parking space, particularly if demand continues as in recent years to exceed expectation (see evidence of Lord Mayor Soundy, p. 377). Mr Calver produced evidence indicating that a very substantial section of the inner core of Hobart city, or alternatively a considerable part of the Domain, would be needed to provide for such a shortfall of parking space by 1990—pp. 188-9.

Three comments are prompted:—

(i) This evidence strongly suggests that traffic congestion in the city is going to continue to grow until the limits of tolerability are approached. That means that if further measures are not taken to alleviate congestion, movement about the city by drivers and pedestrians will become more and more uncomfortable.

(ii) It also appears to provide support for the planners' view that the central link of the Northside Freeway will become a necessity in order to relieve congestion.

(iii) It emphasises also the strong desirability of integrating city parking planning into overall planning objectives, although the City Council should retain a strong voice in policy making with regard to parking. (The only present power to City Council has as a parking authority is under the legislation enabling the Council to control metered spaces—see Local Government Act 1962, Sec. 703-708A. Otherwise, control of kerb-side parking is vested in the Transport Commission—Traffic Act 1925, Part VI, para. 31 (*d*) and (*s*), and see Ex. H.C.1, p. 11).

(*b*) *Launceston*

The evidence indicates that provision of off-street parking is not a problem in Launceston and is not expected to be. See the Launceston Central Area Study, and para. 22.5 below.

8. HOW THESE PROBLEMS AFFECT URBAN PUBLIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT

8.1 **Impact of Growing Car Use**

The impact of steadily growing private car usage (with growing commercial vehicle use an allied factor), and the costly effort to keep pace by providing optimum highway and parking facilities, on urban public passenger transport in the post-war years has been devastating. Patronage and revenue on both the M.T.T. bus service and Hobart suburban rail have deteriorated dramatically. Standards of service have also diminished in line with drop in revenue.

The situation has been reached in which a large majority of patrons on the public service are ' captive ', in the sense that for one reason or another they have not available the use of a private car for the particular journey. I refer to people who don't own a car, don't drive one, or don't have the family car available; pensioners, and school children. Both pensioners and school children travel at concession fare rates, which is a substantial revenue-reducing factor. School children and scholars pay 7 cents scholar concession whilst travelling on school days, and otherwise 10 cents irrespective of distance travelled. Pensioners pay 4 cents per journey irrespective of distance travelled—Ex. T.C. 25 Schedule D.

8.2 **Patronage and Revenue Decline in Metropolitan Transport Trust**

In the decade since 1962-63, passenger journeys on the M.T.T. services in the Hobart area have fallen from 17·5 to 13·9 million per year—a decline of 20%—Ex. T.C. 23, para. 3.1.

At the same time, route mileage travelled has increased from 86·5 miles in 1962-63 to 102 miles in 1971-72, an increase of 18%—Ex. T.C. 23, Schedule B.

The latest statistics available as to passenger distribution are—

(*a*) adult fare paying passengers 51·11%;
(*b*) children 37·84%; and
(*c*) pensioners 11.05%.

In 1962-63, the Metropolitan Transport Trust deficit in Hobart was $448 148, in 1971-72 it was $987 215. In 1970-71, the deficit was $1 068 793. The decrease in loss between 1970-71 and 1971-72 was due to a substantial fare increase—Ex. T.C. 23, Schedule E.

In 1970-71 the deficit in Launceston was $328 611, and for that area in 1971-72, $312 217.

In Burnie, the comparative figures are deficits of $22 858, and $10 722, respectively—Ex. R.C. 5.

8.3 **Passenger and Revenue Decline on Hobart Suburban Rail**

The decline in passenger usage of Hobart suburban rail has been far steeper even than that experienced by the M.T.T. In 1947-48, when the population of Hobart and suburbs was 76 860 (Ex. T.C.1, App. N), the number of passengers carried by Hobart suburban rail was 1 802 687 (Ex. T.C.1, App. M). Between 1948-49 and 1959-60 the number of passengers carried per annum exceeded 2 000 000 in each year. The highest annual total was 1953-54, when 2 508 801 passengers were carried—Ex. T.C. 1, App. M. There has, however, been a steady decrease from 1953-54 onwards, and that has continued right up to the present day. The year 1960-61 was the first in which the passenger total was reduced below 2 000 000. It was in that year 1 859 340. In 1967-68 the total fell below 1 000 000 for the first time in post-war years. In that year the population of Hobart and suburbs, according to census figures, was 115 932—Ex. T.C. 1, App. N. The drastic fall in passenger usage and revenue has continued up to 1971-72, when the number of passengers carried was 596 566. The latest figures available, for the period July to September 1973, confirm the downward trend—Ex. R.C. 114.

8.4 **The Downward Spiral**

As patronage and revenue fall, services are reduced, plant renewal is restricted, and passenger usage declines further accordingly. This has been the pronounced trend both on the M.T.T. bus services and suburban rail in the last decade or so. It is a downward spiral which in recent years has seemed irreversible.

8.5 **Influence of Fare Structure**

The basic cause of the downward spiral is the overwhelming preference of the public for the private motor car; but the fare structure imposed by Grants Commission restraints has been a substantial contributing factor in relation to the M.T.T. services. The M.T.T. is required to maintain its fare structure generally in line with those in the standard States, Victoria and New South Wales. Thus, during 1970-71, the relative severity of the M.T.T.'s fares in Hobart and Launceston, compared with average fares in Sydney and Melbourne, was $95·53%. That difference resulted in a recommendation by the Grants Commission that there be an unfavourable financial adjustment of $80 000. Largely as a result of that, there was an increase in M.T.T. fares of an average 32%, which brought the relative severity of Tasmanian fares up to 95·84% of the standard State fares. As a result of the fare increase, revenue increased by, not 32% but 15%, between September 1971 and June 1972; and during the same time adult passenger loadings fell by 14%.

This is a good illustration of the way in which increased fares to keep up with the standard States result in an immediate fall in passenger loadings, and an increase in revenue which is not proportionate to the amount of the rise in fares. (Sub. No. 10, p. 55).

A further unfortunate result of across-the-board increases in fares is that the fare structure cannot be kept to multiples of 5 cents, which would be very desirable.

The fundamental reason why fare increases by the M.T.T. in Tasmania do not bring proportionate revenue rises, but in fact cause further steep decline in patronage, is in my opinion that most private car users in Hobart and Launceston have a virtually complete choice as to whether they will bring a car into the city or use public transport, and overwhelmingly they exercise that choice in favour of the car. On the other hand, as is common knowledge, the choice of commuters and shoppers as to whether they will bring a car into the centre of Melbourne or Sydney or use public transport is severely limited by the size of traffic volumes compared with the availability of parking in those cities. I have paid detailed attention to the Grants Commission aspect elsewhere in this Report—see para. 13.

8.6 **Specific Problems for M.T.T. and Private Bus Services created by Traffic Congestion**

City traffic congestion creates many difficulties for the public buses. It tends to limit bus stop space more than is desirable; makes movement of buses out from stops into the traffic stream difficult; causes many delays in getting into and out of town at peak periods, with consequent tendency to slow the passenger journey and cause difficulty in maintaining schedules; tends to increase offences by parking cars on bus stops, thus inhibiting the free flow of the bus journey; increases driver load and frustration, thereby tending to affect driver-public relations adversely. All these effects tend to keep people off the buses and to confirm their preference for the private car.

8.7 **Manifest Tendency for Public Expenditure to Favour the Motor Car Disproportionately as against Public Transport—Need to Restore a Balance**

(*a*) Expenditure of public money has in the post-war period overwhelmingly favoured provision of facilities for the private motorist as against maintaining a high standard of public passenger transport. This was probably inevitable, due to the startling growth of motor car use, but it is plain that too little attention has been paid to the importance of the public transport sector. This is now a well-recognised phenomenon throughout the world, and is clearly so in Tasmania. It has become a cliche in recent years amongst transportation experts to call for a balanced system of public and private transport, but this is the objective we must pursue. The substantive problem, of course, is to say what is a proper balance, and how to achieve it.

(*b*) It clearly is necessary to co-ordinate transport planning, and to integrate it within overall planning (because the difficulties of public transit arise from the general living patterns of the community); to place some further reasonable and graduated restrictions on the private motorist in the cities; and to spend more time and money on attracting passengers to the public services.

PART D

URBAN PUBLIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT IN TASMANIA— HOW IT FUNCTIONS

9. THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT TRUST

9.1 **History of the Trust**

By the early 1950's the municipal tramways systems of Hobart and Launceston, which then included trams, trolley-buses, diesel and petrol buses, were experiencing economic difficulties caused mainly by increased operating costs and decline in passenger loadings. The latter were due to increased use of private motor vehicles. These financial problems were accentuated by the necessity of providing services to new suburban areas outside city limits, for which no rate contribution was made by rate-payers of the municipalities concerned.

It appeared that the City Corporations had reached the limit of capacity to meet the costs of operating the systems from their own resources, so in 1954 the government of the day agreed with the Hobart Corporaton that in principle the Government would take over the existing system and vest it in a Metropolitan Transport Trust. Royal Assent was given to the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954 in December of that year. This Act created machinery for the taking over of both municipal tramways systems, and set up the M.T.T. Agreements being entered into with the Hobart Corporation on 24 December 1954, and with the Launceston Corporation on 29 June 1955, vestings of the two tramway undertakings took place pursuant to the Act. Under these agreements, the Minister on behalf of the State assumed liability for all debts and obligations of the respective Corporations, including loan debt, in respect of the tramway undertakings, and agreed to make financial adjustments with regard to certain real property and accounts represented in the balance sheets.

9.2 Its Composition and Membership

9.2.1 The M.T.T. is a body corporate, and has all the usual powers of such bodies—Metropolitan Transport Act 1954, Act No. 77 of 1954, s. 4.

9.2.2 The Trust under the Act is to consist of not less than three members nor more than five, appointed by the Governor. Of the members of the Trust, one is to be appointed as Chairman, one as Deputy Chairman, one shall be a person nominated by the Hobart City Council, and one nominated by the Launceston City Council—*Ibid.* s. 3 (3). Also, so far as is practicable, of the members of the Trust—

(*a*) one is to be a person who appears to the Governor to have had wide experience and to have shown capacity in the management of a transport undertaking;

(*b*) one is to be a person who appears to the Governor to have had wide experience and to have shown capacity in commercial or industrial matters; and

(*c*) one is to be a person who appears to the Governor to have had wide experience and to have shown capacity in financial matters—*Ibid.* s. (4).

9.2.3 The present composition of the M.T.T. is as follows. (Sub. No. 10, paras. 2-6)—

Chairman—Sir Basil Osborne;

Deputy Chairman—Mr P. T. Williams, a senior officer of the Treasury;

Member—Mr H. T. McGee. For a number of years Mr McGee was actively engaged in the field of transport, from both the Union and management point of view;

Member—Alderman T. D. Room was a senior partner of Messrs Layh, Hart, Room and Hyland, Chartered Accountants, until he retired on 31 December 1972. He has been an Alderman of the Launceston Corporation for over eight years; and

Member—Alderman T. C. Allen, Deputy Lord Mayor of the Hobart City Council, of which he has been an Alderman for seven years.

9.3 Function of the Metropolitan Transport Trust

The Trust's primary function is and has been since its formation, ' to provide, or secure, or promote the provision of, an efficient, adequate, economical and properly integrated system of public transport by road within the metropolitan areas ', in accordance with s.sec. 12 (2) of the 1954 Act—(see Sub. No. 10, para. 2-2). In pursuing this principle function, the Trust has wide powers under s.sec 12 (1) of the Act. Amongst other things, it may ' pay subsidies to the owners of motor vehicles in order to provide services within the metropolitan areas '—Sec. 12 (1) (*j*).

9.4 Territorial Ambit of M.T.T. Operations

(*a*) Under the 1954 Act, the Trust was restricted to operating within the Hobart and Launceston metropolitan areas, which were defined as being the areas within seven miles of the Hobart and Launceston Post Offices, respectively. In the case of Hobart that area included part of the Municipalities of Glenorchy, Clarence and Kingborough; and in Launceston included part of St Leonards, Lilydale, Evandale, Westbury and Beaconsfield.

(*b*) Since 1954, the service area for Trust operations has been widened in the following ways—

(i) by Act No. 18 of 1959, the Trust was empowered to purchase by agreement the road transport undertaking operated by Norton's Motors Pty Ltd, at Burnie; and to conduct road passenger transport services within the Municipality of Burnie, and between Burnie and Wynyard and Burnie and Ulverstone; and

(ii) by Act No. 40 of 1961 the definition of 'Hobart metropolitan area' (i.e., within a seven-mile radius of the G.P.O., Hobart) was supplemented by adding to it the 'Hobart northern extension'. The Hobart northern extension was defined as meaning, in effect, so much of the Municipality of Glenorchy beyond the seven-mile radius as lies between one mile west of the Midlands Highway and the eastern boundary of the Municipality; and the area lying between one mile on either side of the Midland Highway as far as the town of Brighton.

9.5 Power of Regulation by M.T.T. of Private Operators within Metropolitan Areas

Licensing of passenger carrying private operators lies with the Transport Commission, but under the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954 the Trust has certain powers of regulating or preventing competition by private operators within its own territorial boundaries. Section 44 of Metropolitan Transport Act provides in effect that—

(*a*) The Transport Commission may not, except with the written consent of the Trust, grant or renew a license authorising the carrying on of a regular passenger carrying service or passenger and goods carrying service over any route that is wholly within a metropolitan area—Sect. 44 (1) (*b*). In Hobart, this power to refuse consent applies to the Hobart metropolitan area, *including* the northern extension.

Section 44 also provides that there is no right of appeal against a refusal by the Transport Commission to grant or renew a licence in respect of any such service where the Commission certifies in writing that the grant or renewal of the license was refused solely by reason of the refusal of the Trust to consent thereto—Sect. 44 (2).

(*b*) Section 44 of the Act also provides that in issuing a coach licence authorising the carriage of passengers over a route that is partly within a metropolitan area (which for Hobart is defined as *excluding* the northern extension—S. 44 (1c)) the Transport Commission shall, except as agreed by the Trust, impose in relation to that licence a condition prohibiting or restricting in such manner as the Trust may have specified the picking up by the vehicle to which the licence relates of passengers at any point within that metropolitan area, and the putting down of those passengers at any point within that area—Sect. 44 (1A). Again, there is no appeal where the Commission certifies that the condition in question was imposed in order to comply with the requirements of the Trust—Sect. 44 (2).

9.6 Management of Metropolitan Transport Trust

9.6.1 *Decentralised Control*

The Trust has divided itself into three operational branches, which are under the executive control of the General Manager and subject to policy decisions by the Trust. Those branches are: the Hobart Branch, under the direct control of the General Manager; the Launceston Branch, under the immediate control of a Manager; and the Burnie Branch, under the immediate control of a District Superintendent—Sub. No. 10, para.3-1.

The Trust in its written submission said that it chose this form of branch structure because it felt that a decentralised management constituted the most efficient means of servicing Tasmanian requirements. Its principle advantage is that it enables the prompt handling of day to day problems at a local level—*Ibid.*, para. 3-1.

In practice, the Launceston Manager and the Burnie District Superintendent are only required to refer policy questions and questions having a bearing on the overall operations of the Trust to the General Manager. Close liaison is maintained between the three branches. Periodic statistical and accounting returns are submitted to the General Manager by the Northern and North-Western branches—*Ibid.*, para. 2-1.

9.6.2. *Management Techniques*

The Trust claims to be cost conscious (*Ibid.*, para. 3-1), and there is no doubt that it is. The Grants Commission has never so far questioned on the ground of possible inefficiency its management techniques or the annual losses which it has sustained.

The Trust says that it endeavours to apply management techniques used by commercial undertakings whenever they are thought practical and consistent with its statutory duty—*Ibid.*, para. 3-1.

It has installed budgetary control, costing and accrual accounting systems, and claims to exercise effective internal control over tickets and fare revenue—*Ibid.*, para. 3-1.

Buildings, vehicles, stock, plant, etc., are insured with the Tasmanian Government Insurance Office—*Ibid.*, para. 3-1.

9.7 Budget

A detailed income and expenditure budget is approved by the Trust each year on a combined branch basis. The branches are immediately responsible for control of their own parts of the budget. The accounts of the Trust are subject to annual audit by the Auditor-General, and the Trust is obliged to furnish the Minister with an annual report and statement of accounts for presentation to both Houses of Parliament—M.T. Act 1954, S. 43 (1)-(3).

9.8 Standard of Buses

At present the M.T.T. operates in the Hobart area 193 buses, of which 33 are diesel and 159 petrol. None have automatic transmission, eight have semi-automatic, and the remainder are manual. The General Manager of the M.T.T., Mr Boatwright, agreed in evidence that the Trust probably has stayed with petrol buses much longer than was desirable. That, however, has been due to the Trust not being able to afford the more expensive diesel buses—p. 21. The average age of the bus fleet in Hobart is 8·2 years. Of the existing fleet of 193 buses, in the opinion of the Commissioner for Transport, only seventeen (the Hino diesels) could be classed as modern—Ex. T.C. 23, p. 6. I accept that view, and I have no doubt that the management of the Trust agrees with it. In general, the standard of the bus fleets in Launceston and Burnie is comparable with that in Hobart—i.e., generally of poor and out-dated standard—see Sub. No. 23P. In Launceston the Trust operates sixty-six buses on twenty-five routes with a route distance of 127 kilometres. In Burnie it operates twenty-two buses on fifteen routes over a route distance of 94 kilometres—*Ibid.*, p. 9.

A contract presently exists for the supply of sixty new Hino B.T. 51—thirty-nine-seater diesel buses, including the seventeen already in service. The contract is expected to be completed in June 1975.

Approximately twelve of these new vehicles are to be placed in Launceston as part of the replacement programme for that city. The last thirty-six of these buses are to be fitted with automatic transmission—Ex. T.C. 23, p. 6.

9.9 Patronage and Revenue

As already observed—see para. 8.2, the passenger loadings and revenue of the M.T.T. have been steadily declining over the last decade, and show every indication of continuing to do so unless action can be taken to arrest the decline.

10. URBAN RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE

10.1 Serves Hobart Only

The only urban centre in the State serviced by urban passenger rail is Hobart. The Hobart service operates in one direction only, namely to and from the northern suburbs, along the route of the main Hobart-Launceston line.

10.2 Characteristics of the Suburban Route

The first part of the railway route as far as Cornelian Bay, due to historical and topographical reasons, follows the river Derwent; and so the line services no population area of any significance until it reaches New Town Station, a distance by rail from Hobart Station of approximately three miles. No more than approximately half its length passes through heavily built-up areas—i.e., through Moonah and Glenorchy.

10.3 Description of Permanent Way, etc.

Considering the suburban rail service as terminating at Bridgewater, it cover some thirty miles of track, being triple from Moonah to Risdon, double as far as Claremont and single from Claremont to Bridgewater—Ex. T.C. 1, App. A. There are two spur lines, to Cadburys and to the Electrolytic Zinc Co. Ltd, and seventeen suburban stations. ' The stations range in size from those with platforms about 200 feet long and small waiting shelters to those with platforms over 400 feet long and quite large station buildings. The Hobart to Brighton section was constructed as a single line in the early 1870's, and later doubled between 1911 and 1936. The Risdon branch (to the E.Z. Co. Ltd) and the Cadbury's branch were laid mainly in 1912 and

1921 respectively. Some of the station buildings were built at the time of construction of the lines; others are of later construction. The services operate partly with diesel rail cars, running with or without trailers, and partly with X-class diesel locomotives and coaches. There are thirty-four level crossings (including the line to New Norfolk), sixteen of these being on the line between Hobart and Claremont where the traffic is heaviest'. (Ex. T.C. 28, pp. 1 and 2).

10.4 **Condition of Track and Equipment**

The condition of the permanent way, stations, rolling stock and equipment, is generally speaking, poor.

10.5 **Fares on Suburban Rail**

Suburban rail fares have been increased on nine different occasions between 1951 and 1971, but the fares are still substantially lower than M.T.T. and private operator fares for comparable journey distances. The fare structure is based upon three suburban passenger zones of six miles each. The adult fare within one zone is 12 cents; within two zones 25 cents. The maximum fare from Hobart to any station south of Bridgewater Junction is 25 cents, and the fare from Hobart to Bridgewater Junction is 30 cents. Child and pensioner concessions are approximately half of those fares respectively. There are special worker-trip fare schedule, and season tickets of various kinds available. (Ex. T.C. 1, App. G-P).

11. PRIVATE OPERATORS

11.1 **Their Role**

Private operators have always provided all road passenger transport services between country centres and cities, but they also play a substantial role in urban passenger transport, particularly in Hobart. Their future role in the urban sector is an important matter for this Commission to consider.

11.2 **Hobart**

11.2.1 *Two Principal Operators*

The two principal private operators engaged in servicing routes which are wholly or substantially wholly within the present Hobart metropolitan area (i.e., for the purposes of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954) are Northern Suburbs Services Pty Ltd, and Ace Bus Service Pty Ltd together (referred to hereafter as 'Ace Bus Service') and Tasmanian Coach Lines. Together, these two operators provide a substantial portion of the Hobart urban bus services.

11.2.2 *Ace Bus Service*

(*a*) This operation is part of a family business run from the early 1930's by the Cresswell family. The present Managing Director (and, I assume, one of the principal owners) is Mr M. D. Cresswell. In 1962, following amendment of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954 to add the northern extension (see para. 9.4 above), Ace Bus Service was granted a licence by the Transport Commission to operate a northern suburbs bus service to and from Hobart to specified areas between Berriedale Road and Brighton. (Sub. No. 16, p. 2). Over the next two decades service to that area has been expanded along with growth of the northern suburbs and gradual curtailment of the rail passenger services. At the present time the Ace Bus routes are serviced by six coaches, supplemented by a further four during peak periods, and the timetable is comparable with that of the M.T.T. on similar services. (Sub. No. 16, p. 2, and First Schedule).

The fare structure charged by this operator, in common with other private operators, is laid down by the Transport Commission, and is roughly comparable with, though somewhat less, than that charged by the M.T.T.

(*b*) The question whether Ace Bus Service should be permitted to expand its operations in order to service the Bridgewater Housing Sub-division is a major matter for consideration by this Commission.

(*c*) Most of the services referred to in (*a*) above come within the 'Hobart Metropolitan Area', which includes 'the northern extension'. Ace Bus Service also conducts school bus and tourist coach work and charter services. So far as its services in and out of Hobart along the Midland Highway are concerned, the relevant coach licences of Ace Bus Service are subject to conditions (pursuant to S. 44 (1A) of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954) that on journeys to and from Hobart within the Hobart metropolitan area, not inclusive of the northern extension, there shall be no pick up or set down of passengers other than at Hobart itself—Ex. T.C. 8, p. 3.

(*a*) This operation (consisting of a group of companies) has been built up over the period since 1951, principally by its Managing Director, Mr C. D. Ayers. Since 1956 a series of expansions has taken place, mainly by the method of buying out existing operations. Tasmanian Coach Lines now operates over most parts of the State.

(*b*) Its urban passenger transport operations are in the Hobart area. The purchase of Gray's Motor Services in 1963 involved fourteen coaches and covered services from Opossum Bay to Hobart via Lauderdale and Rokeby, Seven Mile Beach to Hobart via Roches Beach, Lauderdale and Rokeby, and Richmond to Hobart—Sub. No. 24, p. 2. A very substantial part of these is within the Hobart metropolitan area (for the purposes of the 1954 Act), since the seven-mile radius takes in the Rokeby area and passes within two miles or so of the Lauderdale and Roches Beach areas— see Map Ex. M.T.T. 10B.

Those services of Tasmanian Coach Lines which substantially involve the Hobart metropolitan area are as follows:—

Blackman's Bay/Kingston Beach, Kingston, Hobart.
Hobart/Rokeby/Lauderdale.
Hobart/Bridgewater.

The seven-mile radius takes in most of the town of Kingston Beach, but does not extend as far as Blackman's Bay. Tasmanian Coach Lines provides a reasonably comprehensive seven day service to these areas—Sub. No. 24, pp. 4 and 5. The same comment applies to its service to the Rokeby and Lauderdale areas, and through Claremont and Austin's Ferry to Granton and Bridgewater.

Tasmanian Coach Lines is an objector to further extension of the Ace Bus services to Bridgewater.

(*c*) Comments already made in respect of Ace Bus Service about the fare structure and restrictions on pick up and set down of passengers also apply to Tasmanian Coach Lines—Ex. AB. 12.

11.3 **Launceston**

11.3.1 *Metropolitan Area*

Two private operators service districts wholly within the Launceston metropolitan area. These are D. R. & C. M. Tucker ('Tucker's'), and G. & E. Morrison ('Morrison's').

Tucker's operates a comprehensive service between Launceston and Ravenswood; and Morrison's services the St Leonards, Elphin Road, Cameron Street, Gleadow Street, and Invermay Road areas. Tucker's also operates sub-contracts for the conveyance of shift-employees of Coates Patons Mills from Mayfield and Waverley to the Mill and return, and for the conveyance of employees of Waverley Woollen Mills from the city to the Mill and return. They estimate that they carry approximately 140 000 passengers per year, and they do so at fares materially lower than those charged by the M.T.T. for services to comparable areas of Launceston. (Sub. No. 44). No specific evidence was given as to details of the service conducted by Morrison's.

11.3.2 *Private Operators Servicing the Tamar Valley*

I received submissions from three private operators who work to and from Launceston into the Tamar Valley, and who are fearful of any extension of operations by the M.T.T. into the Valley—see paras. 17 and 22.5 below.

11.4 **North-West Coast**

(*a*) For the purpose of my terms of reference I have treated the urban areas of the north-west coast as being Burnie and Devonport/Latrobe; the latter being treated as one district. I have then treated services operating within those two districts as being urban services, and have disregarded trunk services which run along the Bass Highway through the north-west coast towns, and also services linking those towns to the respective hinterlands.

(*b*) *Burnie.* No private operator of any significance services the Burnie urban area since the M.T.T. took over the undertaking previously operated by Nortons Motors Pty Ltd—see para. 9.4.

(*c*) *Devonport/Latrobe.* This area is wholly served by private operators. The principal one is Morse's Motor Service, whose operation is wholly within the Devonport/Latrobe urban area—Ex. T.C. 33, para 2.0.

I received no submissions or information from either operators or residents in the Devonport/Latrobe area, notwithstanding adequate notice that submissions were invited. The fact that no evidence was tendered from the area seemed to indicate absence of demand for alteration of the existing system; but I requested the Commissioner for Transport, through his officers, to provide me with further information as to the services provided. This he did—see Ex. T.C. 33.

The Commissioner commented, *inter alia*, that ' the standard of service provided by the Trust in general compares favourably with the services provided by private operators, subject to the reservation that some of the private operators are providing coaches of a superior standard to the M.T.T.'—*Ibid.*

12. THE TRANSPORT COMMISSION

12.1 Constitution, Powers and Functions

12.1.1 *Establishment of the Commission*

The Transport Commission was set up by the Transport Act 1938 (2 & 3 Geo. VI No. 70) as an incorporated State instrumentality. It was given by the Act a general mandate to ' control all or any means of transport by road, rail, water or air within the State ', other than the railways operated by the Emu Bay Railway Co. Ltd, or the Mt Lyell Mining & Railway Co. Ltd, or any tramway or bus service operated by the M.T.T. or by a Municipal Council (Section 9 (1) (*a*)). The primary reason for setting up the Transport Commission was to overcome the chaotic position which had arisen in Tasmania through the rapid decline of the railways in their losing competition with road transport, and the un-coordinated and uneconomic growth of competition between private road hauliers—See the Second Reading Speech of the Premier, Hon. A. G. Ogilvie, K.C., introducing the Bill; delivered in the House of Assembly on 16 November 1938—Ex. R.C. 25.

12.1.2 *Constitution*

The Transport Commission constituted by the 1938 Act consisted of a Transport Commissioner and two Associate Commissioners; the latter being the General Manager of Railways and the Administrator of Road Transport respectively—S. 5 (2) and (2A). The number of Associate Commissioners was increased to three by Act No. 47 of 1972. Under Section 4A of that Act, the three Associate Commissioners are now required to be—

(*a*) a person who has had experience and has shown capacity in the management and operation of railways;

(*b*) a person who has had experience and has shown capacity in public transport operations and in the administration and control of road traffic; and

(*c*) a person who has had experience and has shown capacity in the management and operation of shipping services—S. 4A (2).

The Transport Commissioner holds office for a period of not less than three or more than five years (Section 4 (1)), and Associate Commissioners hold office for a term of not less than one year or more than three years—(Section 4A (3)).

12.1.3 *Principal Roles*

The broad functions of the Transport Commission under the Act are as follows:—

(*a*) To initiate or to carry on road transport services as and when authorised by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament—Part IIIA.

(*b*) To carry on manage and administer the Government Railways of the State, pursuant to the Railway Management Act 1935; which is incorporated and is to be read as one with the Transport Act 1938—Part IV of the latter Act.

(*c*) To administer the provisions of and to act for all purposes under the Traffic Act 1925; which is also incorporated with and to be read as one with the Transport Act—Transport Act, Part V.

12.1.4 *Regulatory Function*

The function of the Transport Commission which most closely affects the operation of urban public passenger transport in Tasmania is the regulatory function of the Commission under the Traffic Act 1925. (These powers do not apply to any vehicle or undertaking used or carried on by the M.T.T.). Two aspects of this role are the most significant in the present context, namely:—

(*a*) The licensing of public vehicles, and in particular, the issuing of coach and omnibus licences (Sect. 15 (1) (*c*)); and to a lesser extent, cab and hire car licences—under Section 15 of the Traffic Act 1925. An omnibus licence authorises the use of a vehicle as a public vehicle for the carriage of passengers within a specified area. A coach licence authorises the use of a

vehicle as a public vehicle for the carriage of passengers between places on such route as may be specified in the licences, and the carriage of such goods as may be so specified (Section 15 (3) (*b*)).

Through this licensing function the Commission controls the carriage of passengers or passengers and goods by private operators including that carried on in urban areas. Under Section 24 of the Traffic Act, it is an offence (*inter alia*) to use or permit to be used as a public vehicle any vehicle in respect of which a licence is not in force, or for any purpose other than a purpose for which it is authorised to be used under that licence.

(*b*) The very wide regulatory powers of making and administering regulations governing the driving of motor vehicles of all kinds; the use of such vehicles on the public roads in relation to driving conduct; and parking and standing by vehicles on the public roads. Under Section 31 of the Traffic Act 1925, all such regulations are made by the Governor, but in practice these regulations are formulated and enacted primarily at the instance of the Transport Commission. Under Section 59 of the Traffic Act, the Commission is also empowered to issue to all or any highway authorities general or particular directions as to the traffic signs to be used in public streets generally or on specified classes of such streets or in any specified cases (S. 59 (1)). In particular, under Section 31 (1) (*b*), the Governor may make regulations ' prohibiting or restricting the use of any vehicle, or any kind or class of vehicle, upon any specified public streets, or within the public streets in any specified area, either generally or within certain hours '.

Thus, as previously observed (para. 7.4), the Transport Commission has in practice the important duty of regulating the parking of motor vehicles within streets in and on the fringes of the cities, save insofar as local authorities have the power of erecting and maintaining parking metered spaces.

12.1.5 *Regulatory Power of Transport Commission over Public Vehicles*

The Transport Commission is given by the Acts mentioned, and the regulations made and able to be made thereunder, very wide powers to regulate the issuing of licences to public vehicles, and to lay down conditions and restrictions under which such licences may be operated. Its powers, however, are not wholly arbitrary, since it is required to observe certain procedures in relation to calling for and determining applications for licences, and is required to observe certain criteria in carrying out its procedures. The following matters are worthy of particular mention:—

(*a*) Under Section 58 (1) of the Traffic Act, the Commission is required to determine in respect of any particular licence or group of licences relating to the same traffic area, route, or place, what special conditions if any shall be imposed; and is required to determine where it thinks it desirable to do so the maximum or minimum fares, freights, or charges to be allowed in respect of any service to be provided under any particular licence or group of licences.

It is also required to advise the Governor on all matters relating to the internal transport of the State and to traffic generally.

(*b*) Under Traffic Act Sect. 58 (2), in the exercise of its functions under the Act the Commission is required to consider all such matters as it may think necessary or desirable for giving effect to the provisions of the Traffic Act; and in particular it is required to have regard to a number of specified criteria in respect of suitability of route, the extent if any to which the needs of the proposed routes, districts etc., are already adequately served, the co-ordination of all forms of transport including transport by rail, the condition of roads to be traversed, and the suitability and fitness of applicants for licences.

(*c*) Under Section 58 (3), the Commission is empowered for any of the above purposes to undertake the survey, in such manner as it thinks best, of any traffic area, route, or locality, and to enquire into the necessity for any proposed service or the transport requirements of any district or part of the State, and with the approval of the Minister to hold public enquiries in relation thereto.

(*d*) Under Traffic Act Section 17, the Commission is empowered, subject to the Act and to conditions prescribed in respect of licences, when issuing any licence to impose such conditions and restrictions in respect thereof as it thinks necessary or desirable with respect to the

matters to which it is required to have regard when considering applications for licences under Section 58, and in particular for ensuring that—

(i) the conditions of service of persons employed by the licensee in relation to the licence shall be consistent with public safety and the efficiency of the service to be carried on thereunder;

(ii) any fares and freights to be charged thereunder shall be reasonable in the circumstances of the particular case;

(iii) wasteful competition with alternative forms of transport operating in the same sphere shall be avoided; and

(iv) any timetables to be observed and any picking up or setting down places to be used in the service to be carried on under the licence shall comply with such requirements as the Commission may specify.

The Commission may also at any time during the currency of any licence require any timetable to be varied as it may direct.

(*e*) The Traffic Act sets up a comprehensive appellate system in relation to appeals against decisions made by the Transport Commission affecting the rights of licensees, applicants for licences, and the like—see generally Ex. T.C. 8.

12.1.6 *The Commission Operates the Suburban Rail Service*

In its capacity as the State authority administering and carrying on the public railway services of the State under the Railway Management Act 1935, the Commission is also the operator of the Hobart suburban rail passenger service.

12.1.7 *Importance of Role in Urban Passenger Transport*

All of the above regulatory powers in relation to motor vehicles on the public roads apply in respect of all parts of the State, but it will be obvious that the Transport Commission both in respect of urban road and suburban rail public passenger transport plays a vital part in conjunction with the M.T.T.

12.1.8 *Branches of Transport Commission*

For administrative purposes, the Transport Commission is divided into five branches, namely, the Secretariat Branch, Railway Branch, Road Transport Branch, Shipping Service Branch, and Accounts Branch—Ex. T.C. 26—Statement by Mr F. N. Joughin, Solicitor to the Transport Commission.

12.2 Relationship of the Transport Commission with the Metropolitan Transport Trust

12.2.1 *Necessity for close Co-ordination of Functions*

It will be seen from earlier parts of the report that the Transport Commission and the M.T.T. are together the controllers and/or operators of all forms of urban public passenger transport in the State. Accordingly, close co-ordination of their respective functions obviously is desirable. This is in part only provided for by Statute, and otherwise happens to some extent in practice; but *in my opinion there should be much closer co-ordination of functions*, and I shall make recommendations to that end later in this report.

12.2.2 *Statutory Basis for Co-ordination*

The statutory basis for co-ordination lies in Section 44 of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954, which enables the M.T.T. to veto the granting of a licence for regular carriage of passengers or passengers and goods over any route *wholly* within a metropolitan area; and which enables the M.T.T. to require a condition to be placed upon any licence for the carriage of passengers or passengers and goods over a route that is partly within a metropolitan area that the private carrier shall not pick up or set down passengers at any point within that area (other than the destination or starting point)—see para. 9.5 above.

12.2.3 *Voluntary Co-operation between Transport Commission and Metropolitan Transport Trust*

The amount of co-operation which occurs on a voluntary basis between the two authorities extends to discussions between Trust officers and economists, traffic officers and other experts of the Commission on subjects of mutual interest from time to time (p. 26). The Commission also consults the Trust as to timetables, routes and the like of private operators in respect of routes partly within metropolitan areas (p. 33). The latter co-operation arises partly out of the statutory requirements of Section 44 as above. Otherwise, the Trust does not consult the Commission or its experts in order to assist in finding solutions to the problems of the Trust to any extent (p. 26).

12.3 **Degree of Control of Private Operators by Transport Commission**

(See Ex. T.C. 8, Statement by Assistant Administrator of Road Transport, Mr C. B. Allanby).

12.3.1 *Administrative Control—Licence Conditions, etc.*

The powers of the Transport Commission in respect of regulatory control upon issue and conditions upon licences, etc., are referred to in para. 12.1.5 above.

The great majority of licences for the carriage of passengers issued to private operators are coach licences, which enable the carriage of goods as well as passengers. For example, of the 104 licences issued to Tasmanian Coach Lines, only one is an omnibus licence, two are mini-coach licences, and the remainder are coach licences—see Ex. T.C. 8, App. 4.

In acordance with Section 16B of the Traffic Act, all new licences are issued to expire on the triennial date next following the date of issue, and licences are re-issued with a tenure of three years.

12.3.2 *Control by Enforcement of Conditions of Licence*

The Transport Commission has not in the past considered it necessary for its officers to maintain constant checks in relation to observance of the conditions imposed on coach licences, but officers of the Commission in association with other duties keep that matter under general observation. Any complaints received from the public in relation to vehicle road-worthiness, overloading, driver behaviour, the handling of passengers, luggage and freight, and the like, are investigated, and action is taken to see that vehicles and services are maintained and provided as required under the terms of the licence. Inspection of licensed vehicles used by private bus operators is carried out by Commission Inspectors of Motor Vehicles to ensure mechanical road-worthiness, suitability of the vehicle and compliance with the regulations relating to construction, equipment, etc. Buses used for the carriage of school children are inspected twice a year. Otherwise, inspections are carried out at least once a year, depending upon circumstances. In addition, all vehicles are inspected prior to the transfer of ownership of a coach licence and prior to any transfer of a replacement vehicle—Ex. T.C. 8, p. 4 of Mr Allanby's statement.

PART E

TERMS OF REFERENCE—TERM 1

' Ways and means of Improving the Efficiency of, and facilities for, passenger transport available to the public on demand and on payment of prescribed charges in the Hobart and Launceston metropolitan areas, and on the North-West Coast '.

13-18. GENERAL PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES TO SOLUTIONS

13. THE GRANTS COMMISSION BACKGROUND TO PUBLIC URBAN PASSENGER TRANSPORT IN TASMANIA

13.1 **Vital Factor**

The principles and procedures used by the Grants Commission in deciding upon the amount of financial assistance it will recommend should be paid by the Commonwealth to Tasmania as a claimant State are and will continue to be vital factors in respect of government-run urban passenger services in the State.

13.2 **Summary of Principles and Procedures**

(*a*) Some exposition in a summary way of these principles and procedures is necessary. The summary is based upon the written and oral evidence given to the Commission by the State Under-Treasurer, Mr K. J. Binns (Sub. No. 37, and pp. 691-708).

(*b*) The basic principle is that a claimant State should receive sufficient financial assistance to enable its Government to provide standards of services equal to those provided in other States without the need to impose a disproportionate financial burden on the residents of the claimant State (Sub. No. 37, p. 1).

(*c*) The practical application of the principle in so far as Tasmania is concerned is that to the extent that the financial resources available to the Tasmanian Government are insufficient to enable it to provide services at the same standards as those enjoyed by the residents of the standard States, New South Wales

and Victoria, the Commission will recommend a grant sufficient to make good the deficiency. This, however, is subject to the principle that the effort made by the Government of Tasmania to raise revenue from taxes and charges is, in general, equal to the effort made by the Governments of the standard States (*Ibid,* p. 2).

(*d*) Having established those principles, the Commission's task is directed towards measuring the amount of financial assistance which must be given to a claimant State to raise it to equality with the standard States. This procedure involves three steps:—

(i) The published Budget results of the standard and claimant States are ' modified ' to make them comparable. This involves adjusting for differences in accounting procedures, financial practice in the standard and claimant States, and the like.

(ii) The claimant States' ' modified ' Budget is then adjusted to remove the effects of differences from the standard States in revenue raising and expenditure policies. The object is to obtain a notional Budget result for the claimant State which would have occurred if that State had provided the same services and made the same revenue-raising effort as the standard States.

(iii) The third step is to look at the ' modified ' Budget results of the two standard States. If those Budget results have resulted in a deficit in either or both of the standard States, the deficit or deficits are expressed as amounts per head and averaged. The principle is then applied that the claimant State will not be assisted by a recommendation of the Grants Commission to obtain a better deficit result than the average deficit in the standard States. In order to follow that principle, the average deficit per head in the standard States is applied to Tasmania's population, and the resultant amount is deducted from the adjusted deficit in the claimant State. The result so obtained becomes the amount of the Special Grant recommended for that year (*Ibid*, p. 2).

(*e*) Thus, the final deficit recommended by the Grants Commission to be funded by the Commonwealth is a resultant of applying three factors to the published Budget result of the claimant State—namely, what have been referred to in the preceding sub-paragraphs as ' modifications ', ' adjustments ', and ' the Deficit Standard '. It follows that any change in the level of these three factors will affect the final deficit with which the State is left after receipt of the Special Grant. (*Ibid*, pp. 3 and 4).

13.3 Application of Grants Commission Procedures to Transport Commission and Metropolitan Transport Trust

13.3.1 *Effect of Losses by Transport Commission and M.T.T.*

The losses made by the Transport Commission and the M.T.T. are reflected in this State's published Budget results. The only ' modification ' presently made by the Grants Commission to the State Budget in respect of accounting or financial practices of the Transport Commission or M.T.T. relates to the fact that in Tasmania the loss of the Transport Commission is made good by State consolidated revenue in the year following that in which the loss is made. In the standard States, the impact falls in the same year as that in which the loss occurrs. To preserve comparability, the Grants Commission therefore modifies the State Budget result to take account of that fact, and the effect is that in times of increasing losses the published deficit is increased, and decreased when losses are falling. (See Sub. No. 37, p. 4).

13.3.2 *' Adjustments ' to State Budget in respect of the Transport Authorities*

Adjustments made to the State Budget deficit in respect of the two transport authorities resolve themselves into—

(*a*) their relative effort to raise revenue from fares, charges, etc.; and

(*b*) wages policy concerning over-award payments.

The Grants Commission makes a mathematical comparison of relative levels of railway fares and freight rates in the case of the Transport Commission, and of the relative levels of bus fares in the case of the M.T.T. (Sub. No. 37, p. 4). Generally speaking, if fares and freight rates are lower in Tasmania than in the standard States, a proportionate short-fall in revenue would be assumed by the Grants Commission, and would be the subject of unfavourable adjustment. Conversely, a favourable adjustment would be made if fares and/or freight rates were higher in Tasmania than in the standard States.

The Grants Commission in deciding the amount of the adjustment to be imposed with respect to the Budgetary impact of the revenue and expenditure policies of the two transport authorities exercises a broad judgnent; but up to now, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary, it has assumed that when fares are increased there will be a corresponding increase in revenue. (*Ibid*, pp. 4 and 5). So far as wages policies concerning over-award payments are concerned, it is understood by the State Treasury and by the Grants Commisson that government policy in this State is that over-award payments shall be equal to the average of those paid in the standard States; and accordingly no adjustments on account of over-award payments have been made or are at present contemplated. This is what I understand to be the effect of Mr Binns' submission. (*Ibil*, at pp. 5 and 6).

13.3.3 *No adjustments on account of rail fares and freights*

There have been no adjustments, favourable or unfavourable, in recent years on account of relative severity of railway fares and freight rates. (*Ibid.*, p. 7).

Mr Binns' impression is that, since up to 1970-71, relative severity of railway freight rates in Tasmania was slightly above that of the standard States, while relative severity of railway passenger fares was significantly below the standard States, these variations have tended to cancel out because the significance of fares revenue in total railway receipts is very much less than the significance of freight revenue. This position, however, may change, because during 1971-72 fares and freight rates rose substantially in both Victoria and New South Wales.

Tasmania also increased fares and freight rates in that financial year but not to the same extent as the average increase in the Standard States. (Sub. No. 37, pp. 7 and 8).

13.3.4 *Grants Commission has not so far questioned efficiency of Metropolitan Transport Trust*

The Grants Commission has never yet seen reason to question the efficiency of the operations of the M.T.T., in respect of any possible unfavourable adjustment of the State Budget Deficit, according to Mr Binns. (Sub. No. 37, p. 6): ' It is apparently satisfied that the Trust is run efficiently and that every economy is being effected. On the other hand, the Commission has been very critical of the operations of the Transport Commission, and particularly so at the present time '. (Sub. No. 37, p. 6).

Also, says Mr Binns, ' . . . the Grants Commission has been not unmindful of the fact that the financial problems of the M.T.T. are in part a self-inflicted wound in so far as the City Council has provided parking facilities for cars, and as a result people have not used public transport; but up until now it has not in the exercise of its broad judgment deemed it expedient or necessary to make allowances for this fact in determining whether or not to accept the full amount of the loss of the M.T.T. which is reimbursed through the special grant '. (pp. 691-692).

Mr Binns at that point in his evidence referred to a leading article in the ' West Australian ' in April 1973, stating the following: ' However much it co-ordinates the operation of buses and trains, the M.T.T. of Western Australia) will not get to grips with the basic problems until it has an effective policy of vehicle parking, which remains the biggest single factor influencing the use of public transport. Decisions of parking location of all car parks and charges made in them are too important to be left in the hands of the Perth City Council '. This reference obviously has relevance to the corresponding problems in Hobart. However, it must not be thought that restriction on city car parking will automatically bring about a proportionate increase in the use of public passenger transport. It may cause many people not to come into the city at all.

13.4 Possible Effects on the Special Grant of Adopting Certain Policies

13.4.1 *Closing down Hobart Suburban Passenger Rail Service*

Presumably, closing down suburban rail would reduce the amount of the annual loss incurred by the Railway Branch of the Transport Commission. Whether it would also reduce the annual deficit of the M.T.T., because of increased passenger loadings resulting from rail closure, it is not possible to say categorically.

The M.T.T. loss may possibly be increased, though by much less than the saving brought about by the rail closure (because the losses on suburban rail are much greater in proportion than those incurred by the M.T.T.). If this occurred, reduction of the rail loss would not favourably effect the Special Grant, even though the Railway Branch deficit had been reduced by a step tending toward efficiency. This is because a claimant State gains no reward from taking steps which because of increased efficiency reduce its deficit. It simply needs less reimbursement. (See Mr Binns' evidence at pp. 703, 706 and his submission, Sub. No. 37, at p. 7).

Such a reduced deficit due to increased efficiency may result in a lower adverse adjustment in appropriate cases, but in any event no such adverse adjustment has been or is currently being made in relation to losses on suburban rail, notwithstanding substantially lower fares than in the standard States, due to the off-setting effect of generally higher freights—as explained above, see para. 13.3.3.

Equally, a reduction in M.T.T. deficit would not favourably affect the Special Grant, and an increase in M.T.T. deficit due to rail closure would not adversely affect the Grant, presumably, unless the increased deficit was thought to be due to inefficiency. The overall result of closing suburban rail would seem to be that the Special Grant would probably not be affected.

13.4.2 *Incorporating Metropolitan Transport Trust in Transport Commission*

(*a*) Mr Binns is not confident that such incorporation would result in savings of any substance, through increased administrative efficiency or otherwise; but even if it did so result, no benefit would accrue to the Special Grant. This is for the reason explained in the preceding sub-paragraph. On the contrary, if such incorporation resulted in increased losses, the adverse adjustment would correspondingly increase—see Sub. No. 37, p. 7; and transcript pp. 698, 700, 708.

(*b*) Nothing written in this paragraph or elsewhere in this report is to be taken as suggesting that reduction of losses incurred by the Transport Commission or the M.T.T. by increasing efficiency is worthwhile only if it results in an increased Special Grant or avoidance of a decreased Special Grant. Money supplied from Commonwealth revenue is money provided by Australian tax-payers, and we are all Australians. That, of course, was Mr Binns' attitude also. (See p. 699).

(*c*) Mr Binns did express the opinion (and I accept it unhesitatingly because he is the State's leading expert in this field, with a great deal of experience in dealing with the Grants Commission) that if the M.T.T. were incorporated within the Transport Commission, the probable result is that the Grants Commission would begin to scrutinize deficits occurred by the Trust, and the reason for them, much more closely than it may have done in the past. This is because, he said, ' The fact of the matter is that, at this point in time, the Grants Commission is extraordinarily critical of the operations of the Transport Commission. It has been for some time, not with respect to its fare structure, not with respect to services or incremental payments, but the policies of the Commission that have and will in the foreseeable future result in a substantially larger loss '. He referred particularly to the capital expenditure on the Bell Bay Railway, and the cost of the Bruny Island Ferry. (p. 698). He continued ' . . . the Grants Commission up till now have accepted the operations of the M.T.T. and have not looked at them, and we hope they will continue to, but once it becomes part of the Transport Commission, you can be quite certain that if they start to look at it, they will be very critical indeed of it '. (p. 698).

13.4.3 *Reducing or altering the fare structure of the Metropolitan Transport Trust*

(*a*) In my opinion there is a good case for rationalizing the M.T.T. fare structure by re-ordering it into multiples of 5 cents (see para. 14.5 below), and also for keeping the present fare levels static as long as possible irrespective of upward movements in the standard States. The first can be done without necessarily altering the comparability of the local fare structure with that of Melbourne and Sydney; but the second cannot, once there is a fare increase in a standard State. One would indeed like to recommend a reduction in the M.T.T. fare schedules, because they are presently higher than e.g., the comparable Canberra fare schedules, and the local private operator fares. Such a reduction, however, does not seem to be a practicable proposition. But to keep the fares down to present levels would be a step which, along with the many other improvements which can be made, would tend to increase passenger loadings. I have referred earlier to the disproportionate drop in passenger usage when the last increase was made—see para. 8.5.

(*b*) However, it must be faced that unless local fares are increased in line with standard States, the result almost certainly will be an adverse adjustment to the Special Grant, even if passenger loadings increase and growth in revenue results. Mr Binns explained the reasons for this at some length. In substance, the reason is that, although Grants Commission thinking is not inflexible (p. 695), it works on certain principles and makes certain assumptions. The relevant *principle*, for present purposes, is that all other things being equal, public transport users in Tasmania ought to pay the same as similar users in other States—p. 695.

Correspondingly, the relevant *assumption* made by the Grants Commission is that an increased fare structure tends to increase revenue proportionately (p. 695). The Commission would tend to believe that if a lower fare structure would increase revenue it would have been adopted in the standard States. Upon that

principle and that assumption, the Commission would be disposed to impose an adverse adjustment; and, although it would be open to argument that static fares had been accompanied by increased revenue, the onus would be very heavily upon the claimant State to substantiate that proposition (p. 695).

(*c*) Furthermore, since it is a fixed principle of the Grants Commission that it does not criticise policy decisions of claimant States (notwithstanding that its own procedures inevitably affect State policy), and will not involve itself in policy decisions as to future State action (p. 695), the M.T.T., if it wanted to try to increase its revenue by, e.g., reducing fares, would have to take the risk not only as to whether such step would in fact increase revenue, but whether the State would be able to convince the Grants Commission retrospectively that that result had occurred.

13.4.4 *The cost of making other improvements to Public Urban Passenger Transport*

(*a*) This report makes a number of recommendations elsewhere as to steps which should be taken to improve the efficiency of and facilities for passenger transport in the State's urban areas. Some would involve capital expenditure, others operating expenditure. Inevitably, those steps will, if implemented, involve some risk of increased losses on the part of the M.T.T., at least in early stages. Assuming such increased losses occur, how will the Special Grant be affected?

(*b*) A great deal depends upon the continued interest in and financial support to be provided for urban transport throughout Australia by the Commonwealth Government. In so far as the improvements involve capital expenditure, which is the only kind of expenditure to which the Commonwealth has so far committed itself, the more the Commonwealth provides the less the State will have to fund. However, it is a general principle followed by the Grants Commission that residents of claimant States should be entitled to generally comparable services with those enjoyed in the standard States, at not significantly greater cost to the claimant States (p. 700).

Accordingly, if the standard States improve their urban transport services mainly through the use of Commonwealth Grants, but in the course of so doing also increase their deficits arising out of urban transport operations, the Tasmanian Special Grant will suffer accordingly; because one of the other Grants Commission principles is that it will not make recommendations which would have the effect of putting a claimant State in a better deficit position than the standard States (p. 703). This is the effect of the application of the Deficit Standard principle mentioned above (see para. 13.2 (*d*) and (*e*)).

(*c*) A very interesting and constructive paper was submitted to the Commission by an officer of the Solicitor-General's Department, Mr J. O. Green, in which he put forward arguments, on the basis of material cited from past Grants Commission Reports, which might persuade the Grants Commission not to make adverse adjustments to the Special Grant by reason of increased losses brought about by expenditure on improving urban passenger transport services. Mr Green pointed out in his paper that in the past the Grants Commission had several times rejected arguments that increased deficits brought about by State developmental projects, and reduced rail passenger and freight fares which had the support of the Commonwealth Government of the day, should not be made the basis of unfavourable adjustments to special Grants in the case of, at one time or another, all the then claimant States—Western Australia, South Australia, and Tasmania. However, there is one instance of a different approach by the Grants Commission in respect of low freight charges levied by the Government of Western Australia in running a shipping service designed to help the development of the North West of that State; that being a policy supported by both the State and the then Commonwealth Government developmental policy. The Grants Commission accepted the argument that it should, in effect, subsidise the losses thus incurred up to a limit which it set as a result of the evidence and its own investigations into the matter. (See Mr Green's submission, Sub. No. 32, para. 3 (*c*)). Mr Green suggested that this precedent should be used in support of a submission that the Grants Commission should be invited not to make an adverse adjustment related to increased losses caused by implementing transport reforms up to an amount of loss to be set by the Commission.

Mr Binns, invited to comment up on this paper, made three comments:—

(i) The Grants Commission is in no sense a quasi-judicial tribunal, and is under no obligation to be consistent in the decisions it makes in regard to particular questions, as distinct from questions of principle—p. 696. That is to say, past decisions on particular questions are not in any sense regarded as precedents.

(ii) There was a special background to the decision in relation to the Western Australian shipping service (p. 696). He stated what this background was, and added that the Grants Commission was faced with the necessity of making an absolute judgment in that particular case, because there was no similar situation with which to compare it (p. 697). That, of course, would not be the case if a similar argument were directed to the urban transport situation in Tasmania.

(iii) Mr Binns thought that the assumption was basic and inherent in Mr Green's paper that, because the Commonwealth had agreed to some particular State programme, it followed that any losses incurred by a State in giving effect to that Commonwealth support programme would automatically be made good from the Special Grant—p. 697. He pointed out that this was not so, and cited examples. The Grants Commission had in fact many times rejected arguments made upon those lines—p. 697. The substance of Mr Binns' comment is right, but with respect I do not agree that Mr Green's paper is based upon such an assumption. On the contrary, it is pointed out therein that in all but one of the cases cited in the paper similar arguments had been rejected.

13.5 **Influence of Grants Commission Procedures on the Future of Tasmanian Urban Transport**

(*a*) It will be seen from the above that the Grants Commission factor influences Tasmanian urban passenger transport in three principal ways:—

(i) It exerts virtually a controlling influence over the M.T.T. fare structure, and to a lesser extent influences suburban rail fares.

(ii) It strongly influences, through the State Treasury, the guiding principles by which the M.T.T. bus operations are conducted. It is clear from the evidence of the General Manager of the M.T.T., Mr Boatwright, as well as from Mr Binns' evidence, that one of the Trust's first considerations, if not the first, is to run an economical operation.

(iii) The Grants Commission factor is a strongly inhibiting influence upon any attempt to make improvements of substance, or innovations, designed to raise the quality of the service provided for the public by the M.T.T., and to halt the rapid desertion of the service by all but ' captive ' patrons. The reason is that improvements—technical and otherwise, innovations, experiments—cost money and involve risk of loss, and therefore of increased deficit. Consequently, they tend generally to be either avoided completely, or at best in a few cases approached in a very tentative fashion. What the Trust has considered its primary duty is to provide for existing demand in the most economical way (see the evidence of Mr Boatwright at e.g., pp. 90, 91, 128, 132).

Mr M. J. Gelling, the Public Works Department engineer who has made a special study of Hobart urban transport problems, did not overstate the position in his excellent report to the Tasmanian Division of the Australian Institute of Urban Studies (Ex. R.C. 18 p. 12) when he said: ' By the very nature of the methods of revenue available to the M.T.T. the inherent attitude of the Trust is to try and reduce the Government subsidy by as much as possible and by all methods. This means cutting out services that prove to be profitless by virtue of route or time, the pruning of staff and equipment requirement and minimum improvements to the existing system '.

(*b*) None of the above comments is intended as criticism of the Grants Commission or of the M.T.T. These constraints on the M.T.T. operation are not primarily cause by Grants Commission procedures but by the fact that Tasmania is a claimant State and depends on the Special Grant for a substantial part of its revenue. The M.T.T., operating within these constraints, does a remarkably good job in its dual role of running an efficient operation and at the same time providing the essentials of service; even if, necessarily, it does the latter at a bare-bones level.

13.6 **Recommendations in Relation to the Grants Commission Factor**

What can be done in the light of the Grants Commission background? I recommend the following:—

(*a*) *Fare structure*

The requirement that the fare structure of the M.T.T. should in overall terms conform with the average in the standard States will be difficult to alter, but I recommend that a strong effort should be made to convince the Commonwealth authorities that this particular policy tends to perpetuate the downward spiral of passenger usage, as evidenced by the disproportionate drop in loadings when the last fare increase was made.

This approach could be made in two ways, i.e.—

(i) through the Grants Commission itself; and

(ii) to the Commonwealth Government through the appropriate department.

As to the Grants Commission, I see no realistic possibility of reducing fares and then trying to persuade the Commission that increased revenue resulted. In the first place, a reduction in fares may not result in increased revenue. Secondly, if it did, it would take a period of years to prove that it had, and in the meantime adverse adjustments would be made. The only possibility reasonably open is to try to *maintain fares at present levels* as long as possible in the face of increases in the standard States. It may be a more feasible proposition to try to convince the Grants Commission that this policy is sound by using two arguments:—

(1) The fact that in Tasmanian urban areas, due to low population density, the public has a very much greater degree of choice whether to use private car or public transport, compared with Melbourne or Sydney. This argument may be a two-edged sword unless it is combined with increasing restraint by the local authorities on the city worker commuting by private car—see para. 13.3.4.

(2) The argument put by Mr Green's paper, i.e., based on the present Commonwealth Government's strong support for the improvement of urban passenger transport, and the acceptance of a similar argument in relation to the Western Australian shipping service.

I accept Mr Binns' argument that it will be a very difficult task to persuade the Grants Commission to alter its established procedures in this respect, but in my opinion the effort is worth making and should be made. This would require a close study of statistics and trends over the next few years particularly, which would be a task suitable for the Transport Planning Group recommended elsewhere in the report. One factor which should assist both an approach to the Grants Commission and to the Commonwealth Government direct would be parallel action taken by other claimant States. This appears to be possible in view of the present stance of the Commonwealth Government in relation to urban public transport. It appears, for example, that South Australia has in mind keeping fares low on public passenger transport in order to encourage greater usage—see Dr Scrafton's submission (No. 38) at p. 19.

The same approach made direct to the Commonwealth Government through the appropriate Federal department would involve an endeavour to persuade it that assistance to urban passenger transport systems should in proper cases, and to some extent, include assistance to operating expenditure as well as capital expenditure. Again, if such an approach could be made jointly with one or more other States it would be more likely to be persuasive. Study, planning and research would be required to support such an approach. A recent reported statement by the Hon. C. K. Jones, the Federal Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation *appears to furnish strong support for such an approach being made to the Commonwealth*—see ' The Australian ', 2 November 1973, p. 5.

(*b*) *Basic Policy Underlying M.T.T. Operation*

Whether the Metropolitan Transport Trust remains in control of its own basic policies or not, the emphasis on quality of service should be raised from a poor second to equal first with running an economical service. Put in another way, financial efficiency and economy should be judged in the light of providing a much better and more attractive service than is now available. It is necessary to make this change if the downward spiral in public usage is to be arrested. There is no need to alter the statutory function laid down for the Trust by Section 12 (2) of the Act. The words are ' efficient, adequate, and economical, and a properly integrated, system '. More emphasis must be placed upon and specific content given to the words ' adequate . . . and properly integrated '.

Bringing about this change will entail the risk of adverse adjustments by the Grants Commission, but this risk must be faced, responsibly and with proper regard to State and Commonwealth finances. Detailed recommendations are made later.

14. THE EFFICIENCY AND FACILITIES OF, AND SERVICE PROVIDED BY THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT TRUST

14.1 General

I have so far been dealing with this question in the Grants Commission context, but I now pass to a full consideration of it.

The first question is, what is the meaning of ' efficiency ' in the context of a public utility service such as the Metropolitan Transport Trust? The provision of means for mass passenger transport in urban areas is an essential community service, as much as is the provision of water, light and power. It is essential because community life in urban areas cannot function adequately without it. It has long been accepted in Australian communities that it is a responsibility of government to see that public passenger transport in such areas is provided.

However, the conditions of modern life are such that means of mass passenger transport cannot be provided at acceptable levels of service and cost to the users except at a financial loss. I am conscious that this assertion is not universally accepted, but I make it without staying to justify it by argument because it is a general proposition which experience to date in all Australian capital cities completely justifies, in my opinion.

Obviously, if financial loss to the State is to be expected, that loss must be kept as low as possible, consistent with the provision of service at a level which complies with that which the public interest justifies and requires.

Translating these general propositions into proposals for action requires balancing of many interests and detailed consideration of the directions in which the public interest lies. It is, of course, the task of this Commission to assist as best it can, within the scope of its terms of reference, delineation of these difficult questions.

14.2 **Financial Efficiency**

The M.T.T. is a financially efficient organisation within the constraints under which it operates. Many witnesses said so, including Mr Binns, who should know as well as anyone. Virtually the only witnesses who said otherwise were the Union Secretary, Mr H. H. McNab, who claimed that the administrative structure of the Trust is over-supplied with ' brass '; and the Transport Commissioner, Mr Webb, who said in effect that while he had no specific criticisms of the Trust's financial efficiency, he was sure that the Transport Commission could manage it better. Mr McNab's criticism has been made before, and he repeated it in evidence before the Commission—see his submission, No. 7, pp. 2 and 3, and transcript p. 146.

Mr Boatwright dealt with this aspect in detail in his evidence (pp. 121-126), and in result I take the view that although there has been justification for Mr McNab's criticism in the past, the situation has been much improved in recent times by a number of executive retirements, allowing improvement and some streamlining in the managerial organisation of the Trust.

I do not intend to devote any more space to dealing with the question of financial efficiency, because the evidence is very strong that, overall, the Trust is efficient in a financial sense. Within the scope of ' financial efficiency ' I include the following matters—

Budgeting;
Accounting and Pay Procedures;
Rostering;
Management-Union Relations; and
Equipment, Repair and Servicing.

In all these fields the evidence shows that the Trust performs remarkably well *within its financial limitations.*

14.3 **Operational Efficiency**

This is a broader question than that of financial efficiency. It involves such matters as the following—

Size and Suitablity of Buses;
Fare Structure;
Fare Collection and Recording;
Route Structure and Route Planning;
Public Relations;
Driver Comfort and Efficiency;
Repair and Servicing Facilities;
Bus Stops and Shelters;
Utilisation of Equipment and Drivers in Off-Peak Periods;
Forward Planning Generally; and
Study and Research.

14.4 Size and Suitability of Buses

(a) Size

Present M.T.T. buses are all one-man operated 39-seaters. The size—39-seaters—is determined as a result of an agreement with the Union when the one-man operation came into effect in Tasmania, which it did earlier than in most other States—p. 20. Mr Boatwright says that this size has proved reasonably satisfactory to date—p. 20.

Mr Webb, the Commissioner for Transport, says in one of his written submissions (M.T.T. ex. 48, p. 7) that the present limit of 39-seated passengers in the M.T.T. buses should be reviewed with the Transport Union (pp. 1056, 1057). He says there appears to be no reason why the Unions should not agree to greater numbers of seated passengers than thirty-nine for one-man operation, as public transport authorities in other capital cities, and private bus operators in Tasmania, all carry more than that number—*Ibid.*, p. 7. That is true. Most of the private operators carry in the vicinity of forty-eight or forty-nine—e.g., Ace Bus, p. 488. Ace Bus, however, also has some 41-seaters—p. 448. Mr Cresswell's view is that the M.T.T. bus size is satisfactory because of the number of hilly routes which have to be covered by M.T.T. buses. I was told that buses in Adelaide are 48-seaters, and I noted that in Canberra the buses were 41 and 43-seaters.

Mr Webb said in evidence that he regarded the question of seating capacity as important, because larger buses would mean less capital investment—p. 373.

In considering bus size in Hobart, it must be remembered that there is no set limit on passengers standing in M.T.T. buses during peak period travel, whereas the passenger carrying capacity of the private operator buses is limited by the Traffic (Public Vehicles) Regulations 1967, regulation 50.

The evidence did not persuade me that there is a good case for increasing the capacity of the M.T.T. buses. I do not make any positive recommendation about the matter. It is a subject which should be studied by the Planning and Research Group.

(b) Poor Quality of Present Fleet

There is no doubt that the majority of the bus fleet operated by the M.T.T. is obsolete in relation to design, comfort and appearance; and inefficient in respect of fare collection and driver operation. Consequently the buses are generally unattractive to the public. Only the seventeen new Hino B.T. 51, 39-seater, medium weight diesel buses can be classed as modern and attractive. The proportion is no better in Launceston or Burnie.

(c) Good Design Essential

As to design, I have looked at many illustrations of modern bus types used elsewhere, and have inspected the Canberra bus system, which by common consent is generally the best and most up-to-date in Australia. I have looked at sample coaches used by the two major private operators in the Hobart area. A well designed bus should have at least the following features:—

It should have a door by which passengers enter directly opposite the driver, instead of to his left rear, as in most of the older Trust buses. The driver then does not have to turn to his left rear in order to receive the fare and give the ticket. The inconvenience compounds when, as is generally the case now, the driver carries his change and tickets on his right. He then has to turn from left rear to right and back again continuously as the passengers file in. This is an absurd situation.

The arrangement of bus entrance and position of ticket machine and coin box should be such that the driver can sit in one position without turning his head or body while all passengers pay fares and enter. This is the case with the Canberra buses, and it both reduces driver fatigue and enables much quicker loading, particularly during peak periods. It follows that ticket machines are essential—see below.

It should have a second door at left or left rear, controllable by the driver, to enable quicker disembarkation. Of the present Hobart fleet, only eight have second doors, and only four in Launceston. However, all the Hino buses to be obtained in the next contract will have two doors.

Many modern buses have square fronts of one-piece fibre-glass construction. In the event of even minor damage in the front, where it often occurs, the panel can then be quickly replaced and the damaged panel repaired without having to take the bus out of service.

All buses in Tasmania should have heating equipment for use in winter, for both passenger and driver comfort. Preferably, the driver's space should be able to be heated separately, since he must sit in the one space for long periods. All the Canberra buses conformed to this standard.

It is also desirable to provide some degree of privacy in the shape of making the driver's space partially enclosed. Again, this is done in Canberra.

All buses should be either automatic or semi-automatic for greater flexibility in heavy traffic, and for driving ease. *The drivers are the first and last contact with the travelling public, and driver satisfaction is therefore an important aspect of public relations.*

Proper provision should also be made for prams or strollers. One attractive feature of the Canberra buses is that at the front right of the passenger compartment there is a seat about eight feet long placed length-wise, and so designed that when pulled across towards the aisle it provides convenient space for strollers. When not so required, the seat back is pushed across and is then usable as an ordinary passenger seat. It is worth observing that in the Canberra bus system, where according to my observation driver satisfaction and morale seem compatible with their general conditions of service, namely very good, drivers generally assist mothers lifting their strollers into the bus, although they are not required to do so.

Wiring and speaker provision for public address is also a useful, though optional feature. If this is done, and so arranged that a portable P.A. amplifier and microphone can be plugged in, a public address system is ready made for charter work, etc.

(*d*) *Appearance*

The appearance of buses, which is to say, mainly the colour scheme, is a very important factor in relation to public appeal. The colour scheme should endeavour to achieve the difficult combination of being generally light rather than drab, striking in the sense that it attracts notice and thus helps to generate public awareness; and is tasteful rather than garish and off-putting. In addition, a narrow band of fluorescent paint around the circumference of the bus, as part of the colour scheme, is a useful feature because it enables a passenger waiting for a bus at night to distinguish the bus from other traffic as it approaches. It is also a feature which helps to generate public awareness.

In my opinion, design of a new colour scheme for a bus fleet is a task requiring advice from an expert designer or colour consultant. The colour scheme of the present M.T.T. fleet, cream and green, is not un-pleasing, but could be much improved. The colour scheme of the new Hino buses, with their band of cream around the lower edge, is an improvement. A fresh colour scheme should be designed for the new fleet of buses which, hopefully, Commonwealth assistance will enable the Trust to acquire over a period.

(*e*) In respect of comfort, the M.T.T. buses are poor, and compare unfavourably with those of private operators. It is essential that new buses be designed and built to provide a much better standard of comfort for both driver and passengers.

14.5 **The Fare Structure**

The present fare structure involves odd cent fares on four out of the eight fare sections, i.e., fares other than in 5 cents (silver coin) multiples—see Sub. No. 23 (B), Schedule D.

This results in unnecessary change-carrying and exchanging for both drivers and passengers, which tends to reduce operational efficiency. The present fare structure should be rationalised by a conversion into 5 cent multiples, whilst preserving comparability with standard State fares. This alteration can be done in my opinion with little disruption in present sectional fare levels. I recommend that it be done in respect of adult fare paying passengers, and in my view it could be done also in respect of pensioner fares, which could not unreasonably be increased to 5 cents. The present fare for children and scholars is 7 cents whilst travelling on school days, and it would be difficult to raise or reduce this to a 5 cent multiple.

14.6 **Fare Collection and Recording**

The M.T.T. system is out of date and very inefficient—para. 14.4 (*c*) above. Ticket machines are a necessity for an efficient system. All the large local private operators have such machines, and would not be without them. A good system of fare collection ticketing can be seen in operation on the Canberra buses. The passenger enters the bus directly opposite the driver, who is facing to his left front. He has in front of him a ticket machine containing a roll of numbered tickets, and below the machine a combined coin tray and coin collector for each silver coin component of the fare. The customer drops the fare into the tray.

The driver with his left hand slides each coin in the tray into the appropriate slot, whence it drops into the dispenser column for that coin. To give change, he actuates a flip lever at the bottom of the appropriate coin column and each time he does this the appropriate coin falls into his hand. With his right hand, he presses with one finger a button on the ticket machine, winds a handle on the machine once, and a numbered, dated ticket for the appropriate fare is dispensed by the machine, pulled off the roll and handed to the customer. The tickets are of thin paper. This system is very quick and easy in operation, and does not require any movement on the part of the driver except with his two hands. The system gives a complete record of the number of tickets, the date, and the amount, so that it is a simple and apparently foolproof operation for the driver to make up his journal of record.

To change the amount for which the ticket is issued, in order to cater for passengers travelling different section lengths, the driver changes two simple dials on the ticket machine in front of him, which are set in 5 and 10 cent multiples. This entails only one or two simple rotational movements of the dial.

It is recommended that a ticket issuing and fare collecting system on the above lines be installed on all M.T.T. buses as soon as possible. I do not agree with the M.T.T. approach referred to in Submission No. 10, at p. 88, which, although recognising the advantages and efficiency of a mechanised ticket issuing system, states that it would need to be phased in over several years commencing with one of the smaller depots. This proposition no doubt has regard to available finance, but in my opinion it is a matter of urgency in the interest of efficiency that such a system should be installed on all buses at the earliest possible time.

14.7 **Public Relations**

This is an area of M.T.T. operations which should be much improved. The Trust recognises this. Its submission states (Sub. No. 10, pp. 88, 89) that it has been concerned for some time about the need for better public relations, and that the present Minister has materially assisted in publicising Trust activities. The Trust suggests (*Ibid.*, p. 89) that a central city information and sales bureau should be established for the following purposes:—

(*a*) To supply information on bus services.
(*b*) Distribute time-tables.
(*c*) Sell daily all-route tickets and other forms of concessional travel that may be approved in the future.
(*d*) Promote charter travel and Trust services generally.
(*e*) Handle queries, complaints and other matters.

It further says that the establishment of such a bureau would be essential as a sales outlet should period concessional travel schemes be introduced, but that the Trust has been hesitant to establish a bureau because of the cost factor.

I completely endorse what has been said by the Trust as to the necessity for better public relations. I regard it as essential that if the bus services are to attract increased patronage, not only must the efficiency, comfort and convenience of the service be improved in every way possible, but the service must be advertised and sold to the public in the same way as any other product or service is sold by modern techniques.

Of course, this must be done with proper regard to finance available.

Concerning publicity, I endorse generally the suggestions made in the Gelling report (R.C. 18, para. 14). It should be approached from two angles, namely:—

(i) Space should be taken in press and on radio and T.V. according to a planned programme, in order to emphasise the advantages of bus travel over private car travel, such as—

Bus travel eliminates driving worries;
Is cheaper;
Is safer; and
Eliminates parking difficulties.

(ii) *Information services.* These should be free. The present small printed guide, which costs 10 cents and sets out the timetables, but gives little information otherwise, is inadequate, and inconvenient in use. (See pp. 713, 714).

It is most desirable both for the benefit of local bus users and potential users, and for tourists, that there should be a simple map setting out routes and giving other necessary information. The Adelaide system has such a map, modelled upon one produced by the

London omnibus service, and Canberra has a similar map. Ideally, these should be supplied free to every home in the Hobart area, but this might be too expensive. This whole matter is one which should be studied and planned by the Planning and Research unit which is recommended elsewhere.

I recommend therefore—

(1) a planned and sustained publicity campaign to advertise and sell the bus services; and
(2) the setting up of a bureau, kiosk, or the like, at a central location in the main city block in Hobart, to perform the function referred to by the M.T.T. Submission, as mentioned above;
(3) The above two recommendations should be studied by the research and planning team, and put into effect as soon as is reasonably possible. Consideration should also be given by the planning team to the question whether similar measures should be effected in Launceston.

14.8 **Route and Service Management and Planning**

This is an area in which the Metropolitan Transport Trust resources are very limited and deficient. The Trust does not, for example, keep records enabling it to cost any particular route and say whether or not that route or service is profitable (p. 37). What M.T.T. management does is to form a judgment on the basis of its experience and expertise as to whether the usage on a particular route or service is sufficient to justify keeping that route or service in operation. The Trust would find it very difficult to say whether any of its routes were profitable, and if so, which (p. 37). It simply responds to demand as it judges demand. Mr Boatwright said: '. . . as far as routes are concerned, our method of operation is to meet demand. We don't take out costing of individual routes . . . It doesn't concern me whether or not the route is actually paying, provided it is meeting the demand and the demand is there to justify the service provided' (p. 37). Asked how he decided when the demand was sufficient to justify a service being set up, Mr Boatwright said: 'in the first instance, before we put a service in, under normal circumstances we survey the area pretty thoroughly. We would see whether there was a potential there. We normally put a service in on a three months trial period' (p. 37). After being pressed, Mr Boatwright said that as a rough guide some ten or twelve passengers per 39-seater bus would justify putting on a service (p. 93).

There are of course many factors involved in deciding whether to maintain, increase or reduce a particular existing service, or put in a new service; and the Trust management undoubtedly considers and gives due weight to them all to the best of its ability. But this very important exercise in route and service management is done by the senior executives of the Trust on the basis of their experience alone, with very little assistance in the way of statistics or organised planning. In all the circumstances they do remarkably well with this process, but it surely is not the best way to run a large and complex business at the present day. The Trust management cannot adopt more modern methods because it does not have the resources to do so. Nor do the present Trust structure and management organisation allow for it.

The Trust does attempt to do some detailed planning and compilation of statistics (see Trust's Submission No. 10, p. 70), but it is haphazard and sporadic, again because the resources are not there. The fact that the resources are lacking is one more reflection on the Cinderella status of urban passenger transport planning in this community, in comparison with planning for the needs of the private motor vehicle. This is not only a local phenomenon, but has been the case generally in many countries, including the whole of Australia.

14.9 **Forward Planning Generally**

I have not in this report been concerned to suggest particular route or service changes, except in relation to some specific issues raised by the terms of reference. Route and service planning is a task for experts, based upon continuing detailed study of existing and future requirements, traffic and needs surveys from time to time, and the like. I regard my task as being to inquire into and make recommendations on a more fundamental level.

The obvious fact is that the M.T.T. is not equipped for in-depth planning at the level of specific urban passenger transport problems. It is a good day-to-day operator of bus services, but it cannot tell you in an organised way what its short-term or long-term objectives are, in relation to the services it expects or hopes to be providing, or the areas it expects to be servicing, next year, in five years, or in ten years time. It simply has no organised planning facilities. None of this is the Trust's fault. Again, it reflects the low level of capital and operating finance with which it has been provided up to now.

It is clearly necessary, in my opinion, to set up a suitable planning and research group or team to carry out, in a continuing way, forward planning specifically in relation to urban transport problems. It is also necessary, in my view, that forward planning on that specific level should be integrated with transportation planning on a broader scale. As already observed, urban passenger transportation needs are a product largely of land use and community living and working patterns. Consequently, the operations of any transportation planning and research groups set up must be closely dove-tailed with the proposed State Planning Board or other general and/or regional and local planning bodies which come into operation.

I should say that although I have not tried to enter the field of specific route and service planning, it is not to be thought that the evidence has not shown that many improvements could be made. On the contrary, room for improvement certainly exists. For instance, more use could and I think should be made of express services, cross-town services, and seasonal ticketing. At the present time there are two through-town services, namely from New Town Station to West Hobart and from Mount Stuart to Battery Point. That is to say, services which pass through the city from one suburb to another on one inclusive fare. The existence of a central or city bus terminal would certainly assist this objective.

In at least one case of an existing express service, evidence indicated that it is not organised as well as it should be—see the evidence of Mr McNab, the Union Secretary, at p. 153. Again, when an experiment has been made in running a free bus through the town to the railway station, it has not in my respectful opinion been done in such a way as to have the maximum effect. For instance, I should have thought that a bus so used should be painted in bright colours and have plainly indicated on it that it was the free bus around the city, or to the railway station. To this suggestion, the answer was given that if you painted a bus in that way you could not use it on the ordinary services. In my opnion that is not a satisfactory answer, because I do not see why a bus so painted could not be used on the ordinary services. In any event, however, if an innovation or experiment is to be tried, there is no use trying it unless every reasonable step is taken to make it successful. This is another aspect I think of the absence of proper facilities for planning.

14.10 **Repair and Servicing Facilities**

The Metropolitan Transport Trust is in dire need of a substantial infusion of capital in this area. The position is set out in its written submission—Sub. No. 10 p. 72 and following. The Hobart City Depot comprises two main sections located in Macquarie and Davey Streets respectively, and separated by Macquarie Street. The Macquarie Street section, which contains offices, work shops, garages, service area, bus storage and amenities, is bounded by Macquarie and Campbell and Collins Streets and the property owned by Roberts Stewart & Co. Ltd, and an hotel. The Davey Street section is bounded by Davey, Hunter, Macquarie and Dunn Streets. This section contains limited office space, bus washing facilities, service pits, fuel pumps, minor workshop facilities, employees' car park, and bus storage.

Originally, the Macquarie Street section accommodated tram-cars only, and the trolley bus fleet was garaged in a separate building at the corner of Lower Collins and Lower Park Streets. In 1952, the Davey Street trolley bus depot was built on the present site, and the Collins Street garage vacated. The depot was efficient for trolley buses, but their maintenance and servicing needs were of a different character from omnibuses. In particular, trolley buses did not need the same constant attention as petrol and diesel buses do.

Now, of course, both tram cars and trolley buses are gone, and the maintenance and servicing operations are carried out partly at both depots on petrol and diesel buses. The location of the two sections of the city depot entails shunting of buses from one section to the other through adjacent streets, which is inefficient and costly. Both the land available, and the facilities, are insufficient and inefficient. Modern principles in efficient servicing of a large fleet of buses utilize a flow-line principle which includes a holding area, extractor-cleaning unit bay, washing bay, servicing bay for fuel, water and oil, and a despatch area.

All office facilities in operation are also carried out in the Macquarie Street section of the Hobart Depot, and this compounds difficulties.

In general terms, the Hobart City Depot has reached saturation point in usage, and in any event according to modern standards it is very badly out-of-date and inefficient. There is an urgent need for re-location and construction of a new modern depot. I have inspected the Hobart City Depot and have also looked at a new modern counterpart being constructed in the Woden Valley at Canberra. As may be expected, the contrast is startling.

The Metropolitan Transport Trust regards the re-location and construction of a new Hobart City Depot as one of its prime needs. I agree unhesitatingly, and recommend that this be put on the urgent priority list for capital expenditure.

A modern depot is in the course of construction at Burnie, and that should be adequate for future requirements.

The Trust considers that the Launceston depot is coping satisfactorily with present-day requirements and with some modifications could overcome any problems which may arise in the foreseeable future (Sub. No. 10, p. 75).

The Moonah depot is reasonably satisfactory, and is capable of coping with substantially increased bus usage.

A complicating factor in relation to the Davey Street section of the Hobart City Depot is that it has for some years been reserved for projected freeway development. That fact has caused it to be abandoned as a possible base for future planning proposals. Relocation of the main workshops, thus permitting the remaining Macquarie Street section of the Hobart Depot to be re-organised as a running depot only, appears to be the desirable solution to the Hobart Depot problem.

14.11 **Bus Stops and Shelters**

The question of the siting of bus stops is one which needs constant attention, and it should be the subject of review from time to time by the Planning and Research Group within the Transport Commission which I recommend elsewhere.

Only sixty-one bus shelters are erected in the Hobart metropolitan area, and this constitutes coverage at only 5% of all existing bus stops in the area—Sub. No. 23B, para. 5.2. Many additional bus shelters need to be built throughout the metropolitan routes in all the urban areas. It is a great inconvenience, and a major inhibiting factor to bus patronage, that members of the public have to wait at uncovered bus stops, particularly in winter time in Tasmania.

It is obviously not feasible except over a long period to erect a bus shelter at every stop, but it is an urgent need that a programme of erection of suitable bus shelters should commence, and be continued until as many bus stops as possible can be given that facility. The design of such bus shelters will need close attention, and it appears obvious that they should if possible be so designed as to be removable relatively easily in cases where the siting of particular bus stops is altered.

15. STRUCTURE OF THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT TRUST

Consideration of this general issue will be deferred, so that it can be dealt with in conjunction with question 2 of the terms of reference, relating to possible incorporation of the Trust as a branch of the Transport Commission.

16. THE FUTURE OF HOBART SUBURBAN RAIL

16.1 **Recommendations of Previous Reports**

(See Ex. R.C. 33).

16.1.1 *The Hobart Area Transportation Study* 1964

H.A.T.S. 1964 said that existing levels of suburban rail patronage would not warrant sustained rail passenger service, ' and are clearly low enough to consider the abandonment of the passenger service '.—para. 821.

That Report further pointed out that although much growth had been forecast for Glenorchy by 1985, it was expected that the bulk of the population increases would be located remote from the River Derwent towards the mountains to the west. Since the suburban railway line is located on level ground near the waterline, ' it is unlikely that the line could compete successfully with motor buses for patronage from the hillside residential districts. Potential patrons from these districts would have to approach the rail stops by bus or private car. If a transfer of vehicles was required, it would react adversely against the choice of the suburban railways over a direct motor bus schedule '—para. 824.

The Report then observed that in order to be attractive as an alternative mode of travel, the suburban railway passenger service would require substantial and costly capital improvements—paras. 825 and 826. It recommended that future public transport needs in the greater Hobart area be provided by the Metropolitan Transport Trust in the form of motor buses—para. 827.

The observations made in that Report have been borne out by the events which have occurred in the intervening years.

16.1.2 *The Hobart Transportation Revision* 1970

The H.T.R. 1970 Report noted that the 1964 Report had recommended that consideration should be given to abandoning the suburban rail passenger services—H.T.R. 1970, para. 508 (*d*). The 1970 Report made no specific recommendation as to continuation or otherwise of suburban rail, but presumably it took this issue into account in recommending a wide ranging public transport study—paras. 516-520. It also, however, reported on a rail passenger survey carried out during the 1970 revision on a typical week day in April 1970. This revealed, *inter alia*, the following (para. 328)—

(i) the train with the greatest patronage was the 7.10 a.m. Hobart to Risdon, carrying 224 persons. (This was the work train to the E. Z. Co.);
(ii) two trains, the 5.25 a.m. Hobart to Brighton and the 8.58 a.m. Risdon to Hobart, carried no persons at any point on the service;
(iii) fourteen other trains carried less than twenty persons at any point on the service;
(iv) five trains carried 100 or more persons at any point on the service;
(v) the most heavily used section of line was that between Derwent Park and Sunderland Street, on which 1 526 persons travelled; and
(vi) a total of 966 persons used Hobart Railway Station as an arrival or departure point.

Table 3.7 of the Report (p. 24) also showed that total trips on an average week day in 1970 on M.T.T. bus services was 49 100, compared with 2 300 on Hobart suburban rail.

16.1.3 *First Report by Maunsell & Partners Pty Ltd on Motive Power and Passenger Facilities of Hobart Suburban Rail*

The introduction to this Report notes that on 19 March 1973, Maunsell & Partners Pty Ltd were requested by the Commissioner for Transport, Tasmania, to prepare two reports on modernising and upgrading the Hobart suburban railway system. The first report was to deal mainly with motive power and passenger vehicles, but was also to include recommendations on signalling, station buildings and any other aspects of the suburban system which merited attention.

The second report was to cover the permanent way and related works such as bridges and drainage.

The first report was delivered in April 1973—see the Report, Ex. T.C. 28, para. 1.

In paragraph 10 of the Report, the consultants recommended that major expenditure on improvements designed to modernise the present fleet of railway cars was not justifiable; and that instead, thirteen replacement rail cars should be purchased at an estimated cost of $2 730 000—para. 10, p. 21.

In paragraph 11 of the Report, the consultants went on to examine and report on other works which were considered by them necessary for improvement of the system. They recommended works of which the estimated cost was $4 719. They concluded paragraph 11 by stating as follows: ' In this section of this Report we have made proposals which, coupled with the acquisition of modern cars, would, we feel, enable the railway to compete on more equal terms with other forms of transport in the area being considered. We must state, however, that the railway as it is now situated is not in the best position to serve the major part of the population of Hobart. Development of the railway as a truly suburban system would involve extension into other areas of population, even to the extent of crossing the River Derwent to the Lindisfarne, Bellerive side and also seeking means of direct access to the city centre '.

The consultants were not asked, and did not make, a specific recommendation whether the suburban rail service should be continued or discontinued. However, it is to be noted that they reported the need for equipment replacement and associated works totalling $7 449, made up as follows—

	$
Replacement railcars	2 730
Signalling improvements	750
Station improvements	600
Car parks	50
Level crossing protection	990
Vehicle servicing facilities—	
(*a*) Hobart	1 500
(*b*) Launceston	400
Contingencies 10%	429
	$7 449

It is then to be observed that these consultants did not deal with the cost of track up-grading, which they said would be dealt with in the second report (p. 22, para. 11 (*a*)); and of course they made no attempt to consider the possible cost of extending the suburban railway system, as mentioned above.

16.1.4 *1971 Transport Commission Report*

(*a*) *The Report*

In 1971 the Comptroller of Accounts (Mr F. A. Peters) and the Assistant Economist of the Transport Commission (Mr B. J. Lynch) made a report on the Hobart suburban rail services. They pointed out in Section 1 (Ex. R. C. 32) that on an average over the last ten years the number of passengers carried by the service has declined by 134 000 per year. In 1970-71 the number of passengers carried was 636 000, whereas in 1960-61 the number of passengers carried was 1·86 million. The drop over the ten year period had been 66% in suburban passenger journeys. During the same period the number of passengers carried on Metropolitan Transport Trust services in Hobart had dropped by 19%. The ratio of rail passengers to metropolitan bus passengers is 1 to 23, which comparison serves to indicate the relative importance of the two modes of public transport in Hobart and suburban areas.

This report listed some of the reasons its authors saw as being principally responsible for the decline in suburban rail passengers. They mentioned the following:—

(i) Relatively small population growth rate for the area served by suburban rail in contrast with that served by non-rail serviced areas.

(ii) Ancillary services for private motor vehicles—e.g., growth of car parks in city areas, growth in free-ways, growth in car use.

(iii) Changed patterns of travel, namely the trend for more diversified movements to shopping areas in the suburbs as well as to the city. Fringe areas are ideally suited for the private car as against public transport.

(*b*) *Efforts to Increase Suburban Rail Patronge, as Listed by 1971 Report*

The 1971 Report said that the Commission had for a long period viewed the declining number of suburban rail passengers with concern, and had made strenuous efforts to arrest the decline. The following steps had been taken:—

Fares had been kept very low over the last decade, being increased only three times in that period. The increases had been, 27% from February 1961, 10% from November 1966, and 33% from October 1971.

The suburban rail fares are much lower than the M.T.T. fares, and in some cases as much as 50% lower. Concession fares have been introduced from time to time.

The Commission has experimented with the installation of car parking facilities at the Claremont Station in an endeavour to attract commuters. This measure attracted some small success.

The benefits of suburban rail travel have been advertised from time to time (see 1971 Report, para. 3).

(*c*) *Operating Costs*

A committee of review set up within the Transport Commission had reported in January 1969 that the assessed annual operating cost of the suburban rail services was $384 581. The 1971 study indicated that the then annual operating cost was of the order of $496 856. Ex. R. C. 32, a report on the operations of the Hobart suburban rail services put before me, indicated that the annual operating cost had increased from the 1971 assessed figure to $530 120 (1971 Report, para. 4; Ex. R.C. 32, p. 1).

(*d*) *Savings from Discontinuing Suburban Service*

The net savings estimated by the 1971 report of discontinuing the suburban rail services, without making any additional savings, were assessed at $245 183—1971 Report, para. 5. The updated figure for such savings at the present time is $284 600—Ex. R.C. 32, last page. The 1971 report estimated that by making certain other possible savings the full saving by discontinuing suburban rail would be of the order of $307 213—*Ibid.*, para. 5.

(*e*) *Effects of Terminating Suburban Rail Services*

(i) *Staff Retrenchments.* The 1971 report indicated that approximately sixty-five railway staff and two finance branch staff could be saved by withdrawing suburban rail services. The sixty-five railway staff were made up of thirty-three traffic; four Hobart workshops, seventeen Launceston workshops, and eleven locomotive running personnel. The Acting Chief Engineer at that time considered that the seventeen Launceston

workshop staff personnel could be gainfully employed on clearing locomotive maintenance arrears. This estimate of staff not required for suburban running did not include any estimate of workshops overhead staff or additional possible staff savings otherwise available. The report said : ' An examination would be required to determine whether some surplus staff could be retained to clear leave accumulations or replace natural wastage '. (1971 Report, para. 6 (*a*). Ex. R.C. 32, as of 21 March 1973, stated that this position would still be substantially the same).

(ii) *Stations.* According to the 1971 Report, the following stations would probably be no longer required following withdrawal of suburban rail:—

Unmanned—Botanical Gardens, Cornelian Bay, Sunderland Street, Rosetta, Berriedale, Hilton Road, Lutana.

Manned—New Town, Moonah, Montrose, Chigwell, Austin's Ferry.

No estimate had been made of the cost of dismantling those stations. At the Hobart Station, only one platform would be required for operating the Tasman Limited and the Launceston and Parattah services.

(iii) *Railcars and Carriages.* No estimate was made by the 1971 report of the likely disposal value of railcars, trailers and carriages not required; but it was assumed that the railcars in good condition would be retained for the Parattah service, for inspections and for relief requirements (1971 Report, paras. 6 (*b*) and 166 (*c*)).

16.2 Evidence of the Commissioner for Transport before the Royal Commission

16.2.1 (*a*) *Initial Written Submission*

In his initial submission to the Commission, the Commissioner for Transport, Mr Webb, dealt amongst a number of other subjects with the ' future of the Hobart suburban system '. (Sub. No. 23A, pp. 6 and following).

Mr Webb pointed out that the decline in the number of passengers carried on the Hobart system is much greater than the decline in each of the other Australian suburban rail systems—Sub. No. 23A, p. 6.

This fact is amply borne out by a report made by the Commonwealth Bureau of Transport Economics, entitled ' Economic Evaluation of Capital Investment in Urban Public Transport ', printed in June 1972. The studies reported on therein have so far concentrated almost entirely upon mainland issues in urban public transport, but the report did point out that whilst in Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth the deficits resulting from suburban rail operations were much higher than those in Melbourne and Sydney, yet the deficit ratio in Hobart was very much greater than in Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth. In Sydney and Melbourne, the 1970-71 loss on operations would have been equivalent to more than 30% of the revenue received. In Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, the deficits resulting from suburban rail operations for 1970-71 were more than twice the amount of revenue received—i.e., 200% as against the Sydney and Melbourne figure of 30%. But in Hobart, the ratio was four times—i.e., 400% as against 200% in the other three capitals, and 30% in Sydney and Melbourne—Ex. No. R.C. 100, pp. B12 and B13.

Mr Webb went on to say (Sub. No. 23A) that the losses on the Hobart suburban system to date had been met in full by the Commonwealth Government through revenue grants recommended by the Commonwealth Grants Commission to meet deficits incurred on the operations of the Tasmanian Government Railways as a whole. However, he said that if the State Government Railways are not transferred to the Commonwealth, ' it is not known to what extent the Commonwealth Grants Commission will continue to recommend reimbursement in full by the Commonwealth Government of the losses incurred from the operations of the Hobart suburban system '—*Ibid.*, pp. 9 and 10.

Mr Webb also confirmed that if the Hobart suburban system is retained it will be necessary to carry out a substantial amount of upgrading work.

A good deal of the content of this written submission I have not mentioned here, because it duplicated in substance several aspects I have cited earlier from other reports.

(*b*) *Supplementary Submission*

Notwithstanding its apparent belief that the rail service should be terminated, the Transport Commission has made some interim proposals in a supplementary submission for a twelve months trial of certain measures for promoting suburban rail, including reduction in fares for off-peak travel, advertising, and certain free feeder services—Sub. No. 23M, p. 11.

16.2.2 *Oral Evidence*

The Commissioner for Transport was cross-examined at length by counsel for the private operator, Mr Cresswell, and by counsel for the Metropolitan Transport Trust. In answers he explained his attitude on many matters of vital importance to the future of Hobart suburban rail, and I propose to refer to his *oral evidence* under various heads, viz.:—

(*a*) *Can Enough Additional Passenger Usage be Attracted to the Suburban Rail to Warrant its Continuance?*

I frame the question thus in order to express the Transport Commissioner's basic position about continuance of the suburban rail. He said this, in substance: The decline in passenger usage and the consequential annual loss on suburban rail is such that unless many more passengers are attracted, suburban rail must be terminated. Suburban rail is in competition along the whole of the corridor between Hobart and Bridgewater with the buses, and suburban rail is overwhelmingly the loser. So there are two basic issues—

(i) What is to be the principal mode of passenger transport serving the corridor, bus or rail?

(ii) If it is to be rail, the buses must be controlled and restrained—i.e., the buses must operate mainly as feeders to the rail. As to these matters, see Mr Webb's evidence at pp. 269, 275, 275 (*a*), 276, 280, 290, 291.

To explain further his idea as to control and restrain on the bus operators in order to support the rail, Mr Webb said: ' Now, if we were to continue the services, it seemed to me the (Transport) Commission would have to take quite strong action as regards the operations of the buses '—p. 275. He was asked, did that not mean that it would be necessary to get rid of the bus services altogether except for feeder services, and he answered: ' I am concerned that a policy decision would have to be reached if the railways (are) going to continue, what would happen with the passengers being carried by buses, and whether the (Transport) Commission should not attempt to control and co-ordinate the services being already run by the private bus operators '—p. 275. He was asked: 'And did you not have in your mind . . . that the only course available to the railways was by coercing commuters to travel by train?' He answered: ' I don't know about coerce but I had in mind that some means would have to be found to provide feeder services to the railways and reduce the number of route trips into the city by the buses '. Being asked: 'And to do that you would have to either abolish or restrict bus services?', he answered: ' restrict, place conditions on the operations . . . (The commuter) would have a combined bus and rail operation '—pp. 275, 275 (*a*).

(*b*) *The Grants Commission and Suburban Rail Losses and Fare Levels*

It has been mentioned earlier that suburban rail fares are much lower than the bus fares for comparable journeys in the area. Nevertheless, the Grants Commission has not so far made any unfavourable adjustment to the Special Grant on that account, nor on account of the annual loss incurred on suburban rail. The Commission has not done so, it is understood, primarily because the rail freight levels in Tasmania are somewhat higher than comparable freights in the standard States—para. 13.3.3 above. As to this, Mr Webb said that he had put to the Grants Commission this year that Tasmania should have a favourable adjustment because the level of rail freight rates in the State is too high—p. 260. It was put to Mr Webb (p. 270) that if the situation of the freight level being rather too high was corrected, the State would be very likely to come up against the situation that the suburban rail fares were much too low; and he agreed. He also agreed that if the suburban rail fares were comparable with the bus fares, the rail patronage would be very likely to be much lower even than it is now—p. 270. It was put to Mr Webb, ' Why do you think more people are travelling by bus and less by train at half the fare?' He answered: ' The bus is more convenient to most, but the point I want to make is, a decision will need to be made on the future of the railway. I don't mind what the decision is, but we cannot continue to run the railways and buses in these circumstances '—p. 270.

Lastly, on this subject Mr Webb said that the Grants Commission is concerned about the losses made by suburban rail, and at the last hearing in Hobart commenced to examine him on the question, but had been prepared to defer the matter until this Royal Commission should submit its report—p. 301. The implication from that evidence, which of course I accept, is that the fact

that the Grants Commission has not so far been prepared to recommend an unfavourable adjustment on account of suburban rail losses and lower fares is not likely to continue for very long into the future.

(*c*) *Are any of the Suburban Rail Services Profitable?*

Mr Webb agreed, as is plainly the fact, that ' the main passenger trains are the workers' trains '—p. 271. He was referring to the train services to Cadbury's, and to the E. Z. Co. Ltd. He was inclined to think that certain of those services at particular times would be profitable, but could not say so definitely unless they were costed—p. 295.

In any event, if it were not for the daily services to and from Cadbury's and the E. Z. Co., it is plain that the passenger loadings on Hobart's suburban rail would be even more dismal than they are now.

(*d*) *The Effect of Discontinuance on Persons Employed on Suburban Rail*

I have already mentioned the numbers of employees probably involved if Hobart suburban rail were discontinued—i.e., sixty-five members of staff, of whom seventeen are Launceston workshops staff. (see para. 16.1.4 (*e*) above).

Mr Webb pointed out that there would be a social problem involved in retaining some of the remainder of the personnel no longer needed, in that there would be work for them to do in other parts of the railway service, but the work would be in Launceston and not in Hobart. That would mean that a number of such staff would have to move from Hobart to Launceston if they were to stay in the railway service. The evidence does not show what the exact number so affected would be. It appears it would be upwards of thirty at the most, and their families—p. 300.

(*e*) *Suburban Rail as a Social Service*

Mr Webb's evidence highlighted the obvious fact that no matter how much suburban rail was upgraded, and no matter what increase in passenger usage could be attracted or coerced, the rail service could never be expected to do other than make losses. It provides, along with the buses, a necessary service to the public, which, so far as government-run services are concerned, must be expected to be at a cost to the public purse. With regard to suburban rail, however, the question is whether the losses can be reduced to tolerable levels—see his evidence at p. 271.

(*f*) *The Transport Commission Favours Discontinuance*

The Commissioner for Transport made it clear that his own opinion is that Hobart suburban rail ought to be discontinued (p. 289), and that the Transport Commission had made a recommendation to the Minister for Transport to that effect. The Transport Commission report dated October 1971, which I earlier referred to, did not contain a specific recommendation for discontinuance, but the Transport Commission's recommendation to the Minister to that effect accompanied the submission of that report to the Minister—pp. 267, 268.

Asked by counsel why the Commission thought it necessary to recommend to that effect to Cabinet and not implement the decision itself, Mr Webb made the obvious reply, in the following terms: ' I would not attempt to implement such a matter without advising the Government and obtaining the Government's views . . . This is a fundamental question relating to the public and the employment of railway personnel. Once closed down, it would be a very difficult job to start the service again '.—p. 268. I can only say that I agree entirely with that. It would be very expensive to start up again, but it will also be extremely expensive to continue at a proper standard, and that to no apparent purpose.

16.3 **Attitude of the Metropolitan Transport Trust to Discontinuance of Suburban Rail**

(*a*) The Trust sees no viable future for the suburban rail. This is because, it says, the rail system is relatively inconvenient (i.e., at some distance from the homes of most of the potential customers, and does not deliver close enough to the centre of the city), and the population density is low. (Sub. No. 10, p. 95).

The Trust says that the co-ordination of rail-bus services would not solve Hobart's transportation problems, because—

(i) the topography of Hobart limits the value of feeder services;

(ii) the low density of population makes rail passenger service less economical than road passenger service; and

(iii) the travelling time of suburban trains in Hobart is not sufficiently below that of the buses to off-set the inconvenience and the time taken for a passenger to change transport at the railway station. (*Ibid.*, p. 95).

The Trust concedes that the integration of bus-rail services in other States has been generally successful, but it stresses that conditions in Hobart are comparatively unique.

(*b*) The General Manager of the M.T.T. Mr Boatwright, made his own personal opinion plain in evidence—i.e., that suburban rail should be discontinued—p. 80. When asked: ' Are you in any doubt whatever that the substitution of road passenger services for rail passenger services would be beneficial to the travelling public?', he said: ' In some regards it would not be beneficial, because of the lower fare structure on rail, so those particular passengers would be adversely affected. The main advantage would be in the overall economy of the State, because we feel that the Trust, plus private enterprise, can handle it without cost '—p. 80.

Mr Boatwright was asked whether the M.T.T. could provide feeder services to the rail in the Moonah and Glenorchy areas. He said that such feeder services could be provided, but in his view they would not be an economical proposition, nor would the people in Moonah and Glenorchy welcome them. He said that the Trust had had experience with feeder services they had provided, and had found that feeder services to the rail were most unpopular with the public. He said, ' You have delays in transfer and to be a practical proposition you have to get into the bigger cities where you have got a rail service with development in-depth coupled with high rise where you can bring them into the rail and then give them a quick trip into the city; but as far as Hobart is concerned you have got the rail out of the way, not convenient, you have got so many people on the northern areas who do not wish to go right into town, you have got the shopping complex and the industrial areas and so forth; but the rail feeder in my view is not a practical proposition at all. It is not what the people want and it is no use trying to give services that we want to give them, we want to give service that the people want and I am satisfied there is not the demand feeder to rail '—p. 30.

Mr Boatwright agreed that the Trust had not itself provided feeder services to the rail as an experiment, but he was quite satisfied that they would not work because feeder services bus to bus had not worked when the Trust had tried them—p. 30.

16.4 **The Effect of Cessation of Suburban Rail on the Bus Services**

The General Manager of M.T.T. said that the closing down of suburban rail would be of advantage both to the M.T.T. and to Ace Bus Service; and, in effect, that those two services combined could easily cope with the extra demand—p. 50.

The M.T.T. could take over part of the transferred demand and run it profitably, and the advantage to Ace Bus would be even greater because ' they are in the area and the load to Cadbury's, say, would be on their dead trip back. They could give loading on the off-peak or the back loading trip '—p. 50.

In substance therefore, there would be no physical problem about the bus services handling any transferred demand arising from closure of suburban rail. Of course, (subject to possible subsidy by E.Z. Co. and Cadburys of their workers' fares) as far as the rail passengers are concerned, it would cost them the equivalent of present M.T.T. and/or private operator fares which are more than those they are at present paying. Closure of the rail would therefore, as Mr Boatwright said, be a disadvantage to them in that way; but on the other hand it is difficult to see that as any sufficient reason for continuing suburban rail at great loss, in order to give these passengers an advantage over the general run of users of public urban bus passenger services.

16.5 **Attitude of the Railway Unions to Closure of Suburban Rail**

(*a*) As is entirely proper in the interests of their members, the witnesses for the Railway Unions strongly advocated that there should be no closure.

(*b*) The points made by the Australian Railways Union expressed in general the attitude of all the Union witnesses, and I shall refer to some of the main arguments in that Union's submission (Sub. No. 18).

It is contended that the present suburban railway service in Hobart can be improved in its operation, and can be integrated with the M.T.T. bus services to provide a present and future benefit to the people of Hobart.

Hobart, it is said, is fortunate in having an existing railway and facilities, and better use should be made of its potential. The suburban railway passenger service has been allowed to run down over the years, and has made increasing losses. However, the recorded losses tend to cloud the importance of the railway as inherently an efficient transport medium for the mass carriage of passengers. Improvements to the rail potential have been constrained by lack of money, and by the choking of roads by private transport. Railways are a public service and should be used to the greatest advantage of the public.

The ideal way in which the railway patronage can be improved is by the provision of feeder services by bus to rail, so as to integrate bus and rail in a sensible co-ordination of service.

It is also said that attention must be given to suburban station buildings, car parks, and station approaches; because old and unattractive facilities will not be tolerated by people in modern conditions. Car parks at railway stations should be properly laid out and security provided for commuters who have to leave their cars for long periods. Timetables should be updated and made more convenient for the public. The convenience of the public and not the Railway Department should be considered first when timetables are being framed. Rapid and reliable service must be provided, particularly at peak hours, with the intervals between trains tailored to suit the varying starting times of office workers, shop assistants and other city workers. Finishing times should follow the same pattern. Moving people by train contributes to the safety of the roads by removing a number of cars from the roads at peak periods.

The use of trains also reduces the modern hazard of pollution, so much contributed to by the mass use of motor cars, it is argued. The long decline in railway patronage can be arrested by a genuine effort to attract more people to use the rail; and in that endeavour the two principles should be: ' convenience to the public ', and ' co-ordination of rail and road '.

Then some specific suggestions are set out for feeder services and the improvement of particular routes, and the like. The principal witness for the Australian Railways Union was the State Secretary, Mr Patrick Monaghan, (p. 530 and following; p. 873 and following).

(*c*) Evidence along similar lines was given by Mr R. C. Robertson, the State Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen; p. 615 and following, p. 773 and following; and Mr C. R. Powell, Southern Branch Secretary of the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (p. 936 and following).

16.6 **Conclusion and Recommendation**

The evidence persuades me conclusively as to two matters:—

(1) Spending any large sum of capital money on upgrading the suburban railway passenger service would be a complete waste. Spending any such sum as $7 500 000 or more (para. 16.1.3) simply could not be justified in the public interest, in my view.

(2) The case is extremely strong, virtually overwhelming, for closing down the suburban rail service.

I summarise the reasons for these views in the following way:—

First, the inherent disadvantages of suburban rail in the Hobart area in competition with buses and private cars are very great. Due to topographical reasons the rail is very poorly sited in relation to the potential passenger market. The line was built years before the motor car was a significant factor in passenger transport (see the Maunsell Report, Ex. T.C. 28, p. 2), and long before the substantial population growth in the northern suburbs of Hobart after the Second World War. The siting of the line along the Derwent means that the first few miles of track are not close to any population centre, and the parts further out are not close to those areas in which the greatest population growth has occurred since the war—i.e., away from the Derwent towards the western foothills.

Secondly, the population areas in all the Hobart suburbs are of low density. It is easier and cheaper to cater for commuter peak hour needs of low density population areas with buses than with trains, because the former are a far more flexible medium of transport.

The passenger usage statistics show that these factors in combination, plus other reasons such as the relative inconvenience of the railway terminal in Hobart in relation to the central city, have resulted in the railways carrying only a small proportion, and a continually decreasing proportion, of the available market in comparison with the buses. And that is the case notwithstanding the discrepancy between the fare levels, which heavily favours the railway fare.

The resulting annual losses sustained by suburban rail are, the evidence clearly shows, intolerable, and cannot be allowed to continue.

The only way to reduce the losses would be to attract or coerce enough passengers from buses to rail.

How could this be done? It would help, as the Railway Union evidence suggests, to make the rail services more convenient and the facilities more attractive. Apart from the high cost of doing that, however, no witness seriously suggested that such measures would by themselves attract a sufficient number of passengers from cars or buses to the rail. The only possible way in which this could be done would seem to be, as Mr Webb suggests, to restrict the bus services, both by cutting the number of services down, and by making the routes which they are licensed to travel such that direct competition by buses with rail would be lessened; and by instituting feeder services by bus to various stations along the railway line.

Would this be feasible in the socio-political context; and if so feasible, would it be in the public interest? And if those questions could be answered in the affirmative, would this sort of scheme work?

Admittedly it has not been tried in any realistic way, and so the answer cannot be given empirically. However, for my part, I am firmly of the view that it would fail. I think there are a number of reasons for this. The most obvious one is that if feeder services are run to the rail from, say, any parts of the population areas west of the main road, this will substantially increase the travelling time from home to work, because the traveller will be taken generally speaking at right angles to his desired travel path in order to get to the rail; and then there will inevitably be delay while waiting for the appropriate train.

The inconvenience arising to the traveller out of those factors is plain. I accept Mr Boatwright's evidence that feeder services bus to bus have proved unpopular with passengers, and consequently have not been well patronised; and I also accept his argument that, in effect, population densities in the northern corridor are not nearly high enough (nor the traffic densities high enough on the roads) to create the necessary conditions under which feeder services bus to rail can be successful.

Apart from questions of delay and inconvenience to the travelling public, I believe strongly (without, I hope, trespassing into political fields) that our socio-political climate is such that the extensive coercive exercise which would be required in order to cut down bus services into the city and, in effect, force-feed people onto the railway would be intolerable.

In any event, I think that the whole exercise would be largely pointless. Hobart and it suburbs constitute an area which can be well and adequately served by bus services without rail. The bus services constitute now, of course, the great majority of the passenger services available, and they are quite capable of providing all such services.

The disadvantages of closing down the suburban rail, in addition to the difficulty of starting up again, mentioned earlier are—

(*a*) inconvenience to the public which now uses the passenger trains; and
(*b*) dislocation and retrenchment of some railway employees.

Of these two, the second is in my opinion the more important. I have already indicated that it does not seem to be an unfair proposition, although undoubtedly a change would be resented by those affected, that present rail passengers should be placed in a situation of paying as much as bus passengers now pay. In any event, as already indicated, the likelihood is that the present low suburban rail fares are not likely to last much longer even if suburban rail continues.

As to the employment aspect, dislocation will be a serious matter to the employees affected, and their families. No employee should lose his job, or be transferred to a job in which his pay and conditions of service are less than they are now. I would strongly recommend in the event of suburban rail being discontinued, that steps be taken to ensure that this is so. However, looking at the matter from the point of view of the public interest, it does not seem to me that the detrimental effect on employees is a sufficiently substantial factor to stand in the way of discontinuance of the suburban rail passenger service. Any employees who need to relocate their places of residence should be given every reasonable assistance in doing so, if discontinuance takes place.

16.7 Concerning Interim Proposals of Transport Commission

As to the measures proposed by the Transport Commission for a trial period of twelve months in respect of suburban rail—see para. 16.2.1 (*b*) above, I have no confidence that they will have any appreciable effect in improving patronage.

17. THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVATE OPERATOR IN URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT

17.1 General

There is no doubt in my opinion that the private operators should continue in the foreseeable future to play an important role in the provision of urban passenger facilities in Tasmania. The reasons for this view are these:—

> The private operators within their allocated areas are providing a public service which in their absence the government-run buses would be obliged to provide, in part at least. At any given time there will be areas on the urban fringes which are in a transitional or semi-urban stage. These outer urban areas are in my view the ones in which the private operator's role should primarily lie, vis-a-vis the government bus services. The private operators have certain advantages over the M.T.T. in servicing those areas, and I think these advantages are likely to remain for a considerable time.

17.2 Advantages of the Private Operators in Servicing Outer Urban Areas

On the evidence before the Commission, it is clear that the private operators are able to provide a more comfortable service at cheaper fares than is the M.T.T. The claim by all the private operators to this effect was not disputed in evidence by the M.T.T. On the contrary, discussion was mainly devoted to the reasons why it was so.

The first reason is that employee awards and conditions are presently better for M.T.T. personnel than for private operator employees. Mr Boatwright said they are 'considerably superior' (p. 48). This fact is important because labour costs are easily the largest single factor in all the bus operations (Sub. No. 10, p. 27). The M.T.T. employees come under five different awards, of which that covering the greatest number is the Metropolitan Transport Trust (Tasmania) Traffic Employees Award, 1973. (Sub. No. 10, p. 21, and see transcript p. 48).

(It is disputed by some of the private operators that M.T.T. wages and conditions are better, but I accept that they are at present).

A more important reason is that the private operator services are generally smaller, more flexible, and more personalised in operation This is advantageous both for employee morale and efficiency and for passenger satisfaction—see e.g., the evidence (which I accept), of Mr Cresswell at pp. 441, 453, 482. The overhead costs of running the businesses are less because an operator or proprietor is likely to carry out a number of functions which different technical officers perform in the M.T.T.—see e.g., p. 482 (see also a submission of Messrs Manion, Stoward and Larissey, Sub. No. 43 at p. 8b). The public responds favourably to these personalised and flexible services. The submission made by Messrs Tyson and Hilder, representing the Parents' and Friends' Association of the Exeter District School (Sub. No. 46), for example, emphasises this factor.

Additional factors of great importance are that the private operators working into the cities and towns combine freight and passenger carrying with considerable advantage to their enterprises; and also integrate charter and school bus services into the pattern of business. Therefore, they in effect run mixed transport businesses, and do not rely solely upon passenger carrying as the M.T.T. does—p. 753. I have earlier pointed out that almost all of the licences issued to passenger carrying private operators are coach licences, which enable them to carry freight as well as passengers. The conditions of licence normally permit them to carry up to 56 lb of freight (p. 753). This is a service which is both very important to the public in the outer areas (see e.g., p. 771), and also to the bus operator (Sub. No. 43, p. 8).

17..3 Outer Urban Areas Defined

I have endeavoured to state a principle by which licensing of private operators to carry passengers in areas which are partly urbanised might be guided. The suggested principle is that private operators should be allowed and in fact encouraged to operate in and from outer urban areas. With areas which are plainly 'country', my terms of reference have no concern. In regard to private operators in wholly urban areas, there are particular issues, and I shall come to those.

What are ' outer urban areas '? Generally speaking they are where town is shading off into country; although there are exceptions which make generalising difficult, mainly due to Housing Department policies. Risdon Vale is an example. Every situation must be examined on its merits. Any rapidly developing surburban area in which the M.T.T. judges that by going in early it can fairly quickly build up a viable service to somewhere near the break-even point is an area in which it would be justified in objecting to a licence being issued to a private operator. It must be remembered that the M.T.T. depends virtually entirely upon passenger carrying for its revenues. Freight operations are impracticable, and charter operations are, and are likely to remain, notwithstanding some room for extension, ancillary. Accordingly, if the Trust cannot go into an area with some expectation of approaching a break-even point within a reasonable time, it ought to leave that area to a private operator who can integrate it into his mixed transport business, and make it pay where the M.T.T. would only increase its losses.

The questions of areas in which the private operators should be allowed to operate is closely connected with that of extension of the service area of the M.T.T.

17.4 **Private Operators in Fully Urbanised Areas**

As already said (para. 11 above), there are some p ivate operators servicing areas which are plainly ' urban ' in the full sense. As development goes on, outer urban areas become fully urban. What of a private operator in such an area? Should the M.T.T. take over his operation after he, whilst bearing the attendant commercial risk, has built it up into a state in which it is sufficiently viable economically for the M.T.T. to move in? Two such operations are those of Ace Bus Service in the Claremont and Chigwell areas, and Tucker's in the Ravenswood area of Launceston.

In my opinion the answer should be that if the State-run service wishes to take over a private operator's business in such circumstances, it must pay him full compensation, including compensation for goodwill.

It is useful to note that a successful method of valuing the assets and goodwill of private operator undertakings being compulsorily acquired has been evolved in Western Australia, where the businesses of eleven private operators have been compulsorily acquired in the Perth area in recent years, and in only one case was it necessary for resort to be had to arbitration. The method appears to be (as is desirable) slightly on the generous side to the private operator whose business is being acquired, and it provides for arbitration in the event of failure to reach agreement. The method of valuation is set out in a letter from the Chairman of the (Perth) Metropolitan Passenger Transport Trust dated 11 April 1973—Ex. M.T.T. 50. I need not describe details of the method here, but it is a useful model for study by both an acquiring authority and a private operator in the event that any undertaking is compulsorily acquired.

There may be legitimate reasons for the State wishing to acquire a private operation worked wholly within a metropolitan area. It may be that the State-run services are in a position to provide a greater variety of off-peak, night or weekend services, or to supply a particular demand for concessional service such as to pensioners in the area, or the like, which the private operator cannot economically provide. There may be other reasons. I do not think that the right of the State to acquire the operation, in effect compulsorily, should be circumscribed; but on the other hand, the private operator's right to full compensation for all of the acquired assets including goodwill should be provided for by statute, in my opinion.

However, I do not think the private operator should be able to force the State to acquire his undertaking if he is unable or unwilling to carry on operating under his licence. He should then be left in a position of selling or otherwise disposing of his business. That, as I understand it is the position now, and it seems fair. Instances of the M.T.T. buying out services which became unprofitable for private enterprise are the Riverside service formerly operated by Mr Buchanan, and the Mayfield service, formerly operated by Mr Stevens (p. 736).

There is no provision in any relevant Act providing for compulsory acquisition by the M.T.T. of a transport undertaking carried on by a private operator wholly within a metropolitan area, but such a provision is unnecessary because of the M.T.T.'s right under Section 44 of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954 to object to the granting or renewal of a private operator's licence—see para. 9.5 (*a*) above. Where the M.T.T. does prevent the renewal of a private operator's group of licences in a metropolitan area there should in my opinion be a statutory right in the operator to require the M.T.T. to acquire his undertaking or the relevant part of it, and to be paid compensation including compensation for goodwill, if any. The amount of compensation should be decided by arbitration in the event the parties cannot agree.

17.5 Licensing and Control of Private Operators

The present system of licensing private operators by the Transport Commission has been described in a summary way in para. 12 above. I now wish to discuss the question whether there should be some changes in that system in the future.

(a) Period of Licence

At present the period of a licence is three years. The holder must apply for re-issue of the licence at expiry of that period. The Commissioner for Transport sees no reason why public vehicle licences issued for private bus operators should not be unlimited in duration. He makes this proposal subject to two qualifications (Ex. T.C. 30, pp. 2 and 3)—

(i) that the Transport Commission would have the right at any time (subject to appeal) to recall and cancel licences which are not being used by the individual operator to whom they were issued; and

(ii) that there should be no trafficking permitted in public vehicle licences.

I agree with the Commissioner for Transport on this point, except in respect of licences for a service wholly within an urban area. In those cases the three-year licence needs to be retained because of the aspect of possible acquisition by the State referred to in para. 17.4 above. Otherwise, it seems an unnecessary exercise to review and re-issue licences every three years; provided that Mr Webb's two conditions apply, and provided that the Transport Commission has power to cancel a licence for good reason on proper notice to the licensee to show cause, and subject to appeal. The system of paying fees at three-yearly intervals need not be altered.

I recommend that this change in licensing procedures be adopted, except in respect of a licence for a service operated wholly within an urban area. The change should have the effect of eliminating a good deal of unnecessary administrative work, and would give the private operator a feeling of increased security, to which in my view he is entitled having regard to the importance to him of his investment of capital and personal effort in the industry.

(b) Sale of Licences

Mr Webb also recommended in evidence that public vehicle licences should be indorsed with a condition that they may not be sold (Ex. T.C. 30, pp. 3 and 4). This condition now applies to taxi licences (p. 1059), and Mr Webb recommended that it should in future apply to all new vehicle licences, including those on buses and commercial goods vehicles, and replacement licences (Ex. T.C. 30, p. 3). It would means that if a private operator sold his undertaking, or ceased for any reason to carry it on, the licence would have to be returned to the Transport Commission. It would not mean that a private operator would be prevented from selling his undertaking conditionally upon the Transport Commission being prepared to issue a new licence to the purchaser.

To attempt to prevent such conditional sales would in my opinion not be in the public interest, because it would remove one strong incentive for the operator to keep his business in the best condition and going order. It would also be unfair to private operators; and in any event would be impracticable.

Mr Webb made it clear that he has no objection to such conditional sales (pp. 1057-1061), provided that the holder of a licence has no express or implied right to have the licence transferred to the purchaser. This, he said, should be made clear by the indorsement of such a stipulation on the licence itself. In the event of a conditional sale taking place, the vendor would disclose such sale to the Transport Commission, and also his intention to give up the licence provided that the Commission was prepared to re-issue the licence to the purchaser. The intending purchaser would apply for the licence. The Transport Commission would make all necessary enquiries, and if there were no good reason to refuse the application by the purchaser would ordinarily grant it.

Mr Webb at first expressed himself as being against goodwill attaching to licences. (See his submission, T.C. 30, and p. 1057). However, in subsequent oral evidence he agreed with me that in practice there would be no objection to conditional sales on the lines indicated above, which would involve a sale of goodwill of the business as distinct from goodwill specifically attachable to the licence (p. 1059). It is, I think, only a matter of semantics. Provided the Transport Commission is willing to transfer the licence to the purchaser, a sale of goodwill will in fact be possible, and in my opinion unobjectionable.

It is recommended that all public vehicle licences in future should contain a condition indorsed upon them that if the operator to whom the licence has been issued is no longer able or willing to operate the vehicle under its terms, the licence shall be returned to the Transport Commission for cancellation. It is further recommended that a conditional sale of a business of a private operator, including a sale of goodwill, on the lines indicated above, should be regarded as unobjectionable.

(*b*) *Should M.T.T. buses be licensed by the Transport Commission?*

Another recommendation by the Commissioner for Transport was that, in addition to licensing public vehicles used by private operators, the Transport Commission should also have the responsibility of licensing all M.T.T. buses ' so that the Commission would have the same control over them as regards safety standards, inspection of the vehicles and the numbers of passengers which can be carried in the vehicles ' (p. 1042). He said it has been ' put to the Commission that it is not right that private buses should be licensed and the Trust buses should not be licensed ' (p. 1044).

With respect, I see no virtue in this proposition. For one public authority to licence the public vehicles operated by another public authority, with all the administrative work and cost involved, would seem to me to be a wasteful and unnecessary procedure. Mr Webb agreed that no evidence of a need for such control in relation to M.T.T. buses had been shown (p. 1044).

17.6 **Control by the Transport Commission over Private Operators**

The Commissioner for Transport suggested in evidence that the Transport Commission should in future exercise closer control over the buses and routes used by private operators (p. 1042).

I am not concerned to make any recommendation about whether the Transport Commission should exercise closer control over private operators *except* those whose services operate wholly within a metropolitan area.

In my opinion, closer supervision must be exercised by the Transport Commission in those cases in order to see that standards of service are being provided appropriate to the needs of the particular area.

17.7 **Commissioner for Transport's view of the Future of Private Operators**

Mr Webb said in evidence that he could see no long term (ten to twenty years) commercial future for commuter bus services at present conducted by private operators in the major Australian cities and towns. He said that private operators were not responsible for any commuter bus services in any major overseas city which he visited recently; also that from enquiries made in England he understood that the existing commuter bus services conducted by private operators were, in the main, confined to relatively small towns and communities, and in any case did not involve many vehicles. He referred to a Paper, *'Analysis of Two Privately owned Demand—Responsive Transportion System'*, given at the recent national Transportation Conference at Brugge, Belgium, which commented on private commuter bus services in the United States. This paper commented that there has for some years in the United States been a strong trend for public transportation to become publicly owned. Many private businesses which were operating in the field had ceased to be economically viable and had discontinued service.

Mr Webb suggested that, in considering possible additional long-term capital investment, the existing private operators of commuter bus services in Tasmania should give consideration to this situation (see Ex. T.C. 30, pp. 4 and 5).

17.8 **Conclusion**

With respect, I do not see that those comments and conclusions are valid in the Tasmanian situation, for the reasons which I have given earlier (see para. 17.2).

In our small State, with its low-density population and relatively slow population growth, I think those reasons are likely to apply for a considerable time yet.

In addition, Tasmania's position as a claimant State in the Federation makes it imperative that where a private operator can provide an adequate service in an outer urban area, which can be satisfactorily co-ordinated with and complement the State-run services at no additional cost to the public purse, his services should be taken advantage of by the State.

That does not mean that I favour permitting the private operators to take over the State-run services wherever the private operators think they could do so at a profit, as was advocated in relation to the Launceston services by a witness on behalf of the Bus Proprietors' Association (Tasmania) (Sub. No. 50, and by Tasmanian Coach Lines—Sub. No. 24, p. 8). On the contrary, such a proposition could not in my opinion be seriously entertained. If a private operator were allowed to take over any significant part of the M.T.T. operation the State, which has the responsibility for providing this public service in the urban areas, would be left virtually at the mercy of the private operator. The latter would be placed in an intolerably strong position vis-a-vis the State in respect of fare levels and the like; because if it did not for any reason suit the private operator's book to continue the service, the State would have to step in and re-establish its own services.

For the reasons outlined earlier, however, I take the view that private operators will have a valuable role in outer-area urban passenger transport in conjunction with the State-run services for a long time yet. I have tried in this section of the report to sketch out the nature of that role, and how it should be regulated by the State.

18. TRAFFIC CONGESTION—CONTROL OF THE MOTOR CAR

18.1 Some Control Necessary in Cities

The disproportionate amount of the community dollar spent in past years upon providing facilities for private motor vehicles has been accompanied by neglect and running down of the public passenger transport systems. In this we share in a world-wide problem, and it is agreed on all sides that an effort must be made to restore the balance (see the submission by the Transport Commissioner, No. 23L, a report on the International Conference on Transportation Research, Belgium, June 1973). One way to do that is to improve the public sector; another and complementary way is to try to control the ubiquitous motor car. But how much control, and according to what policy guidelines?

18.2 Measure of Control

I do not think it would be right to try to adopt harsh measures of control over the legitimate and desired conduct of such a large proportion of the community as motorists constitute; especially since our problems are relatively light and relatively easy to cope with; nor would the community tolerate harsh measures.

These views, which seem to be justified in the Tasmanian context, are in line with the consensus of a high level group of experts in this field expressed at the recent International Conference in Belgium (see above).

However, some relatively gentle and graduated measures of control are called for.

18.3 Discourage Commuter Parker

In suggesting specific measures to exert a measure of control over the motor car in Tasmanian cities, attention will be confined mainly to Hobart, where the problem is more acute than in Launceston.

In my opinion, the issue comes down to kerbside and off-street parking, and the guiding principle should be that advocated by Mr Calver and Mr Gelling. That is to say, long-term commuter parking should be discouraged and short-term parking by shoppers and those wanting to do business in the city should be encouraged by all *reasonable* means. It may become unreasonable to continue indefinitely to provide on and off-street parking for all those who come into the second category (see para. 7.4 (*a*) above). That is, in my opinion, an issue which should be the subject of planning by an expert body upon which the City Council has representation but not a controlling voice (vide para. 7.4 (*a*) (iii) above).

18.4 Recommendation

(1) I recommend that parking control in Hobart be made the subject of planning by an appropriate section or group within or in liaison with the State Planning Authority proposed to be set up by the State Government.

(2) That this planning section or group should be part of appropriate planning machinery set up for the purpose of co-ordinating transport planning and development in Tasmanian urban areas (cf. Prof. Scott's written submission, No. 48, p. 2).

I do not think it is appropriate for me to make a recommendation as to the machinery which the suggested planning body should take, particularly as the Government proposal for a State Planning Authority has apparently reached an advanced stage. However, the sort of planning body I have in mind would advise

the Government on the control of facilities for car parking in the Hobart urban area, as one important aspect of transportation planning as a whole for this area. One subject which it should pursue, in my opinion, is further progressive restriction upon long-term commuter on and off-street parking around the city. Battery Point, for example, I believe should not be cluttered up and spoiled for both tourists and residents by all-day commuter parkers.

Similar planning measures in relation to parking in and around the Launceston city area will also, I think, be necessary before long.

Other specific recommendations in this report which involve car parking but relate more to traffic control will be dealt with under the appropriate specific term of reference.

18.5 **Further Comments on Urban Transportation Planning**

Before leaving the subject of planning for transportation needs in the Hobart area, I refer to an article in Special Report No. 137 of the Highway Research Board of the American Transit Association, which refers to passenger transit development in the city of Ann Arbor, in south-eastern Michigan, a city of about 100 000 people. The article is by John E. Robbins, Ann Arbor Department of Traffic Engineering and Transportation. I cite the following passage (pp. 9 and 10):—

> 'The city of Ann Arbor has also expressed considerable interest in developing a truly comprehensive transportation plan, a plan that considers the highway network, mass transportation, parking, pedestrians, and bike-ways.
>
> Past practices have generally consisted of separating studies of mass transportation systems from parking facilities studies. It is my feeling that these studies should be performed as a unit.
>
> We need to know, in some detail, the inter-relation among the demand for down-town parking, fringe area parking, and the provision of public transport facilities. We need to develop measures of the external costs generated by private automobile operations. By external costs I mean those costs that are currently not charged, or not fully charged, to those who benefit from automobile operations. These external costs include the widening of streets, building and maintaining parking structures, and the adverse effect of air pollution and street congestions.
>
> We need to learn the proper mix of prices, regulations, and subsidies that would induce a better balanced total transportation system.'.

That passage summarises the views which a number of expert witnesses have expressed during this inquiry, and practically the whole of the passage could be applied in full to the Tasmanian situation; particularly in regard to the absence of integration between planning for transportation needs, highway development, parking and the like.

18.6 **Traffic Control Measures**

18.6.1 *Give Way to Buses Pulling Out*

(*a*) The M.T.T. urged in its submission (No. 10, pp. 33 and 69) the desirability of providing that motor cars should be required to give way to M.T.T. buses leaving the kerb, in order to ease the effects of traffic congestion in delaying the buses and thus increasing strain on drivers, and lessening the attraction of the bus service to the public. The General Manager, Mr Boatwright, said in evidence that such a give way rule would be a distinct advantage to M.T.T. operations, particularly during peak periods, when drivers must of necessity ease their way out from the kerb. He said that if they were to wait until things were completely clear there would be no service at all (p. 99).

Mr Gelling also referred in his report (R.C. 18, p. 10) to the particularly congested evening trip through Collins Street as a good example of the effects of traffic congestion on the buses in terms of delay.

(*b*) Expert evidence on this question was given by the Traffic Engineer from the Transport Commission, Mr Lock. He opposed the institution of such a give way rule on the following grounds (p. 426. His views are reproduced in Transport Commission Submission No. 23C, at p. 2). He said that traffic laws should be simple and easy to comply with; and Regulation 22 (6) of the Traffic Regulations, which requires vehicles leaving the kerb to take reasonable and proper precautions to avoid a collision, observes that principle and is well understood by motorists. If motorists were required to apply in a small area, such as the central city core, a regulation which required them to give way to buses leaving the kerb, it would be difficult to erect signs around the central city block so that motorists would understand when they were required to give way. It would also be confusing to tourists and visitors who would not be aware of the rule.

Mr Lock also made some calculations on stopping distance, reaction times and the like. Without going into the details (p. 426), the effect of these calculations was, this witness said, that motorists within a reasonably close distance to the bus at the time that it wished to pull out would find it difficult or impossible to give way, and that the possibility of rear end collisions between bus and motor vehicle would be increased.

(*c*) I agree with the proponents of such a rule that it would be of considerable assistance in easing the lot of the bus service vis-a-vis the motorist, and I do not think it would be an unreasonable rule to impose from the motorist's point of view. Many motorists now apparently regard it as reasonable to give way to a bus coming out into the traffic stream, because many do in fact give way (Sub. No. 23c, p. 13; evidence of Mr Calver at p. 185).

The main question is whether the rule would be workable in practice without creating safety risks sufficient to outweigh its advantages.

With all respect to Mr Lock's view, I think the rule would work satisfactorily, subject to certain conditions.

Two examples of other traffic laws support this view. One is the seat belt rule, and the other is Traffic Regulation 21 (2) (*e*), relating to traffic approaching an amber light. It was often said before the introduction of the seat belt rule that it was incapable of enforcement and therefore should not be enacted. But experience has shown that most people observe it, even though it is difficult to enforce. The reason, in my view, is that most people see it as a reasonable and beneficial rule. So I think most people would regard this proposed rule.

The amber light rule says, in effect, that the amber is an instruction not to proceed beyond the stop line *unless the vehicle is so close to the stop line when the colour amber first appears that it cannot be safely stopped.* That again is a very difficult rule to enforce, and some drivers abuse it; but on the whole it seems to work reasonably well because of the good sense of the majority of drivers.

(*d*) I recommend that a give way rule for buses should be enacted, subject to the following conditions:—

(i) The rule should be expressed to apply within defined city areas, mainly the central city but not confined to the streets bordering the central block. One simple and effective way to define the areas, I should think, might be to express the rule as applying in parking metered areas only.

(ii) The rule should be expressed so as to require a driver approaching the rear of a passenger carrying coach or omnibus which is stopped at the kerb and showing a flashing rear indicator light on the side nearest the street to stop and give way to such coach or omnibus, unless the approaching vehicle is so close to the rear of the coach or omnibus that it cannot be safely stopped in order to give way.

(iii) The regulation should expressly provide that nothing therein contained should absolve the driver of such coach or omnibus from observing the provisions of Regulation 22 (6) (*b*), requiring him at all times before and while moving his vehicle to take all reasonable and proper precautions to avoid a collision.

(iv) The regulation should also prohibit the driver of such coach or omnibus from signalling his intention to move out from the kerb by operating his indicator light until ready to move out.

(*e*) I make the following further comments on this proposed rule:—

(i) Proposed sub-rule (*d*) (ii) should overcome the problem which concerns Mr Lock of the driver who is too close to the rear of the bus to stop and give way safely. The regulation would be construed reasonably by courts and police, as the corresponding part of the amber light rule is, and prosecutions would be few, I should think, which again is the case with the amber light rule. I would expect that the great majority of drivers would see the rule as reasonable and observe it in a reasonable way.

(ii) Proposed sub-rule (*d*) (iii) would be necessary in order that the driver of the bus should be under the obligation of not pulling out from the kerb until the leading vehicle approaching from his rear had in fact stopped for him or was clearly in the course of doing so.

(iii) Sub-rule (*d*) (iv) would be designed to prevent what sometimes now occurs—namely that the driver of a bus picking up passengers and intending to pull out from the kerb as soon as he has loaded will actuate his indicator light well before he begins to pull out.

Mr Lock's point about tourists and visitors not knowing about the rule has some substance, but is not in my view very significant. A tourist or visitor anywhere has to make himself reasonably familiar with local traffic rules, and in any event our traffic regulations as a whole are so voluminous that very few people have more than a working knowledge of the principal ones. As to erecting appropriate signs, I also think that is not a very significant problem. I have some difficulty seeing that it would be necessary to erect signs in relation to such a rule, but would be confident that the traffic authorities can find a solution.

18.6.2 *Prohibition of Private Vehicles Parking around inside face of Central City Block*

(*a*) It was suggested by the M.T.T. (Sub. No. 10, p. 33), and supported by Mr Boatwright in evidence (p. 99; and see also, Gelling Report, p. 46) that parking of private vehicles should be prohibited around the inside face of the inner city block, i.e., on the left side (in the direction of present one-way traffic flow) of Elizabeth, Liverpool, Murray and Collins Streets. The point was not specifically made in evidence, but I assume that all witnesses intended the proposition to apply to week days during ordinary business hours—say from 9.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. The Traffic Engineer, Mr Lock, was asked to examine this question.

(*b*) The Hobart City Council conducted a test of such a non-parking rule by hooding all parking meters around the inner face of the central block for a trial period of one week between 2 and 6 October 1972. The trial was organised after a number of meetings between representatives of various interests concerned (see report of City Council Engineer to Council, Ex. No. R.C. 42, p. 2).

In the introduction to this report, Mr Crawford states that the trial came about as a result of representations to the City Council by both private and public sectors of the community concerning traffic problems in the central business district. Elderly people, who come to town to shop and enjoy the environment of the central city, apparently often complain about excessive walking distances because of the difficulty of ' setting down ' in the central core. A ' no-parking ban ' allows such setting down, and permits a vehicle occupied by its driver to stand at the kerb for a reasonable time.

The report contains all the details of the experiment so conducted for one week. Replies obtained from a questionnaire sent around to business houses were mixed. Some thought the trial had been successful; others that it had caused a drop in business; others that the trial had been too short (*Ibid.*, pp. 11 and 12).

The General Manager of the M.T.T. wrote to the Town Clerk by letter dated 12 October 1972, making the following comments in respect of Trust operations as affected by the trial:—

'(1) Congestion caused by vehicles endeavouring to get into and out of parking meter space has been eliminated.
(2) Traffic flow, particularly on the inside lane, is quicker, largely due to (1).
(3) With other space available commercial vehicles did not use bus stops for loading or unloading to the extent prior to the ban.
(4) Buses enter and leave bus stops with much more ease than before, when other vehicles are parked on the ends of stops.
(5) Traffic volume appeared to be reduced. This may be due to those desiring to park not entering the parking ban area due to the restrictions.'.

Mr Boatwright's letter said that the trial was very successful as far as the Trust operations were concerned, and he could see considerable merit in this parking ban being implemented on a permanent basis. A copy of his letter is contained in the report (Ex. R.C. 42).

Mr Crawford, the City Engineer, made a number of comments in the report, and amongst them were the following:—

(i) The kerbside was ' opened up ' and greater visibility was created for the pedestrian.
(ii) Bus traffic and manoeuvres were facilitated.
(iii) The ' opening up ' of the kerbside was considered by some to give the impression of a deserted city. It was commented elsewhere that this may have been due or partly due to private vehicle drivers not realising that the non-parking ban permitted setting down at the kerbside.
(iv) Summing up, the trial was successful in demonstrating an improvement to traffic flow and consequent reduction in congestion; but on the whole, the trial had been too short.

(*c*) The Traffic Engineer, Mr Lock, gave evidence before the Commission as to his views about such a non-parking rule. He was of opinion that when people became fully aware of what a no-parking rule permitted, the advantage to the M.T.T. buses might be short-term only because the kerbside would tend to be fully occupied throughout the day by drivers setting down passengers and waiting for them to return (p. 427).

At a later stage, Mr Lock again gave evidence after having perused the reports in relation to the trial period of one week, then made the points that loading zones for commercial vehicles and taxi stands would probably have to be re-located if the ban became permanent; and that some small retailers who use parking meters for unloading purposes would be inconvenienced. He was inclined to believe that the M.T.T.'s opinion that the experiment had been successful in relation to the buses was a subjective view which critical and expert observation over a period might not bear out (pp. 666-670). On the whole, Mr Lock's opinion was unfavourable. (For a favourable comment from the Transport Commission, however, see Sub. No. 23 M, App. A).

(*d*) *Conclusion and Recommendation*: Notwithstanding Mr Lock's view, which I treat with respect, I accept the opinions of Mr Boatwright and Mr Crawford that the trial period was beneficial to the buses and on the whole was successful. However, I agree that the trial was too short. A week is not long enough for people to become familiar with the new situation and to exploit its possibilities. In my opinion, this proposed no-parking rule around the inner face of the city block shows promise of being a very useful permanent measure both for the benefit of the freer flow of public buses, for the flow of traffic generally, and for the public using the inner core of the city. The trial period appears to have been successful enough to warrant a trial for a longer period sufficient to enable all effects to be fully assessed.

I would think one month would be the least that would enable such a full assessment by all sectors of the public, including the businesses affected. I believe that the problems mentioned by Mr Lock could all be overcome relatively easily if the rule were shown to be in the general public interest. For example, small retailers who use parking meters for unloading purposes could be given a certificate enabling them to use a commercial zone, or they could load before or after ordinary trading hours. Re-location of commercial vehicle areas and taxi stands should not be a difficult exercise.

I recommend therefore that a further trial of this no-parking ban be conducted for a period of at least one month, with the object in view of installing the ban permanently if the further trial is successful.

18.6.3 *Bus-only Lane in Collins Street in Evening Peak Hour*

(*a*) Evidence was given by a number of witnesses of the advisability of giving passenger buses some priority over other traffic at peak hours, in order to make bus travel more attractive and thus attempt to reduce the number of private cars on the roads. Various methods were suggested. One was to set up bus-only lanes from which other traffic would be excluded. I don't pause to discuss this because I regard it as totally impracticable in the Hobart area; and I note that overseas the view appears to be forming that bus-only lanes are prohibitively wasteful of road space (see Mr Webb's report, Ex. T.C. 29, p. 6, para. 15).

(*b*) Two promising specific suggestions were made for the Hobart area. One was a contra-flow lane in Liverpool Street to the Railway Roundabout during evening peak hours. This would involve the buses going to the eastern shore turning left from Collins into Argyle Streets, travelling up Argyle Street with the traffic flow to Liverpool Street, and then turning right into Liverpool Street and travelling against the flow down Liverpool Street to the roundabout.

The main disadvantage of this suggestion is that it would require the putting out of ' hardware ', i.e., conical markers, between the bus lane and traffic coming in the normal direction. Putting down ' hardware ' for the required period each day would be a very costly factor.

Another expert, Mr T. O. Eaton, Engineer and Traffic Planning and Control expert from the Transport Commission, put forward an alternative suggestion. This was that in the evening peak hours there should be a bus-only lane on the northern side of Collins Street from Argyle Street onwards, continuing as far as the roundabout. That would enable much quicker progress of the buses along the section between Argyle Street and the roundabout. Several traffic markings and other alterations would need to be made, but these appear to be relatively simple.

There are at present two existing bus stops in Collins Street past Argyle Street—one where the private buses stop before reaching Market Place, and the other the M.T.T. stop outside the Transport Commission Office. These would not need to be altered. Buses would, as now, proceed into the centre lane at the intersection of Collins and Argyle Streets, proceed across the intersection in the centre lane, and then proceed in the left lane and so continue until the end of the bus-only lane at about 100 or 150 feet from the roundabout. Other traffic would be prohibited from using the bus-only lane from Argyle Street to that point.

Traffic markings at the roundabout would need to be altered so that traffic in the middle lane would be restricted to turning east, instead of being able as at present to proceed either north or east. This change would be necessary in order to prevent buses in the left lane turning across traffic intending to travel north.

It would also mean that north-bound traffic in the middle lane would need to change to the left lane before reaching the roundabout. Evidence was given that at present a certain amount of merging of traffic takes place, in that, for example, buses using the left hand lane as far as the approaches to the roundabout do in fact move over to the middle lane in order to turn towards the east. A reversion to middle and right lanes turning east only would be a return to a situation which applied up to some two years ago (p. 932).

Mr Gelling agreed, after considering Mr Eaton's scheme, that it was an improvement on his own contra-flow plan, and that it would be less costly because no ' hardware ' would be necessary.

I recommend that for a trial period this bus-only lane proposal by Mr Eaton be instituted with a view to permanent adoption if found satisfactory. I would add that it seems to me that parking meters on the left of Collins Street between Argyle and Campbell Streets would need to be hooded during the bus-only period. That part of Argyle Street is not I think wide enough to permit parking meters to be occupied on both sides of the street during peak hours.

18.7 **Central Bus Terminal**

18.7.1 *Reasons Favouring*

This was a proposal advocated by Mr Calver on behalf of the Southern Metropolitan Master Planning Authority (see Sub. No. 5, pp. 7 and 11). The reasons favouring such a central terminal are succinctly stated in the Gelling report (Ex. R.C. 18, p. 11), where it is observed that there are at least twenty separate bus terminals in the city areas (including M.T.T. and private operators) not only offering no shelter or standards of comfort to intending passengers, but also inhibiting the use of public transport for cross-city trips; and that such lack of facilities for the many thousands of daily bus passengers compares most unfavourably with the facilities offered at the Hobart Railway Station catering for less than one thousand persons per day.

18.7.2 *Where might a Central Terminal be situated?*

Such a central terminal ought to be as close as possible to the central core of the city, in order that public bus patrons should not have to walk very far to their desired destinations. Ideally, it should be of sufficient size to cater for all M.T.T. services, private operator services and intrastate services. The facilities should include adequate and comfortable waiting areas, toilets, cafes, shops such as newsagents, tobacconists, etc., and information and luggage areas. (See Gelling report Ex. R.C. 18, p. 25).

Both Messrs Calver and Gelling suggested that a desirable location, if it were otherwise capable of achievement, would be the ground floor to the West End parking building proposed to be established by the Hobart City Council (see Ex. R.C. 18, p. 25; and the evidence of Mr Calver at p. 204). Mr Calver visualised the bus station as occupying the ground floor, with buses arriving and leaving around the perimeter, and the island area inside the perimeter having the various facilities already mentioned.

Private parking would take up all areas except the ground floor, and there would of course have to be properly designed access for private vehicles (see p. 204).

18.7.3 *The M.T.T. Attitude*

The M.T.T. opposes a central city terminal in Hobart (see Sub. No. 10, at p. 64). Mr Boatwright said that the position of a central bus depot had from time to time received consideration, but a satisfactory solution had not been found. His own view was that the expense involved would not be warranted provided that the Trust can retain sufficient kerb space around or in the vicinity of the central city block. He said that a central depot would need to have capacity for forty to fifty buses to operate efficiently, and it must be centrally placed (p. 97). He also said that grouping the bus stops around the city blocks, as at present, is favoured by the retailers in the area (p. 97; see also his evidence at p. 761).

18.7.4 *View of the Hobart City Council*

The Hobart City Council has other plans for the ground floor of the proposed West End parking station, and naturally prefers to adhere to them.

The general attitude of the Council planners to a central bus depot was stated by Mr Harris pp. 993 and following). He said that such a facility could be envisaged for Hobart in the future, but perhaps not nearer than ten years. He said the Council did have a policy about fifteen years ago to encourage the development of a transport terminal on the block where the Transport Commission offices are now standing, but that policy lapsed because of distance to the centre of the city, and the intervention of the growing hospital

complex. He believed that if a bus terminal was required for the city it ought to be close to and just west of the city, as for instance the block between Harrington and Barrack Streets and between Collins and Liverpool Streets, which has poor development.

As to the West End site, Mr Harris said that in order for such a terminal to function properly it would need to bring in the whole range of M.T.T. buses. Therefore the streets feeding the West End site, namely Harrington, Elizabeth, Collins and Murray Streets, are ' far too close to the inner area to carry this type of traffic, particularly when one feels intuitively that if the retail functions of the city are going to extend, which we believe they will, very slowly, they must go westward into this block, and we feel more intensive retail activity and specialist type services will develop around the proposed West End car park. Perhaps not so intensive as now in the Cat and Fiddle block. This is the only way the city can extend unless it goes northwards up towards Bathurst Street but the hill is a strong deterrent to this move ' (p. 993).

Mr Crawford, the City Engineer, added (p. 994) that the area around the car park and the surrounding buildings is proposed to be given over entirely to pedestrians for the purpose of circulation, for rest, and for enjoying the city. He said there are insufficient numbers of these places of quiet in the city, and the Council is strongly of opinion that this area should be made pedestrian-orientated, with kiosks, coffee shops, outside coffee tables, small boutiques and so on, and perhaps a theatrette. To introduce buses into this atmosphere, he said, would nullify that planning.

18.7.5 *Transport Commissioner's Opinion*

The Transport Commissioner also says the proposal is not feasible because of difficulties of access, which he says would be ' difficult if not impossible ' (Sub. No. 23M, App. D).

18.7.6 *Conclusion and Recommendation*

In my opinion, it would be a substantial advantage to patrons of the bus services, and would be likely to make the services much more attractive to potential customers, if a central bus station could be established close to the core of the city. However, the arguments put against the proposal concerning the West End site obviously have weight, and one comes reluctantly to the conclusion that a central bus terminal on that site is not practicable. I do not think the question of a central bus terminal for Hobart should be lost sight of, and recommend that it be kept in mind by the transport planning authorities in case an opportunity to establish one arises in the future.

18.8 **Some Launceston Problems**

18.8.1 *Better liaison by Transport Commission required*

The written submission tendered by the Launceston City Council (Sub. No. 41) laid great stress on the need for continued and increased access for local representation to the Traffic Management Section of the Transport Commission. Complaint was made that in recent years such access has been restricted, to Launceston's detriment (*Ibid.*, p. 3).

In particular, the submission pointed out that for many years the Transport Commission convened a Launceston Traffic Advisory Committee, on which a number of organisations were represented including the Launceston City Council. The function of that Committee was to comment and advise on traffic problems in Launceston in the light of local conditions and local experience. In recent years that Committee had not been convened, and the Council suggested to the Transport Commission that it should be revived, particularly because important decisions were required concerning traffic proposals made in the Launceston Area Transportation Study (Ex. R.C. 51) and the more recent Launceston Central Area Report (Ex. R.C. 52).

(The Launceston Area Transportation Study was made by P. G. Pak Poy & Associates, along similar lines to the H.A.T.S., and the final report was submitted in December 1968. The Launceston Central Area Study was a report prepared for the City of Launceston by Messrs Perrott, Lyon, Timlock and Kesa, Architects and Town Planners of Melbourne. The report was delivered to the Council in July 1972).

The City Council submission states that the Transport Commission, when asked to re-convene the Launceston Traffic Advisory Committee, replied that the functions previously performed by the Committee could now best be undertaken by the Commission's Traffic Engineering Section, which could supply technical services on traffic problems and provide a means of bringing traffic matters to the notice of the Commission (Sub. No. 41, p. 3).

The Council's written submission went so far as to state that the attitude of the Transport Commission is ' bureaucratic, high-handed and demonstrates an arrogant disregard of local sensibilities, which is no way justified, or even sought to be justified ' (*Ibid.*, p. 4).

The Mayor of Launceston, Alderman Fisher, gave some examples of this absence of consultation by the Transport Commission with local experience and advice (e.g., pp. 783-786).

Mr J. D. Yaxley, the Deputy Town Clerk for Launceston, and Mr J. L. Walton, the Assistant City Engineer, also gave evidence in association with the Mayor. Mr Yaxley said that there were long lists of outstanding matters between the Council and the Transport Commission which had not been resolved over a long period (p. 789); although it could be, he said, that failure to satisfy the Council was due to lack of funds or overall State priorities of which the Council may not have been fully aware (p. 788). However, a good deal of frustration had been caused to the Council (p. 789). The position had been very much improved during a period when the Transport Commission had a permanent Traffic Engineer living in the North, but once he had gone the Commission tended to ignore the Council again (p. 790).

In my opinion there is a clear case for restoration and strengthening of the kind of avenue for local representation which the Launceston Traffic Advisory Committee formerly provided. A Committee of that sort is the best way to achieve this, and I recommend that this Committee be reconvened and made a permanent arrangement. This State is much more decentralised than other States, and in my opinion it makes clear good sense that northern local knowledge and expertise should be properly consulted and availed of in all transportation matters which particularly concern the region.

18.8.2 *Central Bus Terminal for Launceston*

The Launceston Central Area Study recommends that there is justification for establishment of a central transport terminal for all passenger services, both private and public (Ex. R.C. 52, p. 47). The reason given is that use of kerbside stops by large passenger vehicles increases traffic congestion in the central city streets, particularly in relation to difficulties for the bus services created by the one-way traffic system (*Ibid.*, p. 47).

The General Manager for the M.T.T. expressed himself as being against a central city terminal, since he prefers both for Launceston and Hobart the present system of utilising kerbside space around the streets (p. 761). The Mayor of Launceston, Alderman Fisher, said that the Council is definitely planning for the possibility of establishing a central bus terminal in the future. It is not clear whether the Council can do so within its own resources, but they have a site in mind and in general favour the establishment of such a terminal when this becomes feasible (p. 797).

I agree with the proposition that a central bus terminal for Launceston is a desirable objective, both for the purpose of facilitating the needs of bus passengers and for improving the free flow of traffic around the city streets.

The question of providing such a terminal—how it can be done, and when and where—is a complex one. It requires much further study, and this could be done by the Planning and Research group proposed elsewhere in this report, together with Launceston City Council experts, and the Launceston Traffic Advisory Committee. Such a study should in my view be put in hand.

18.8.3 *Illegal Parking on Bus Stops*

Mr L. Whittle, who is a Launceston M.T.T. bus driver and is part-time Secretary of the Launceston Branch of the Australian Tramways and Motor Omnibus Employees Association, gave much interesting evidence about various aspects of the passenger transport operations in Launceston. One particular matter to which he referred, and illustrated from his own experience as a driver, is the frequency with which motor vehicle drivers park or stop illegally on bus stops in Launceston. He produced photographs showing this sort of activity, and said it is a quite common occurrence which requires buses to double-park at times, and frequently to be much inconvenienced (p. 861). It is very difficult to prosecute such offenders because of the necessity of identifying the person who parked or stopped the vehicle illegally in the bus stop area, which is an offence prohibited by Traffic Regulation, 8 (5) (*e*) of the Traffic (General and Local) Regulations 1956 (1971 Reprint—S.R. No. 203 of 1971).

I have no doubt this is a problem in Hobart also, although there was not specific evidence of it. In my opinion it is a serious problem, and a relatively simple solution is available.

Under the Parking Meter laws, the principle has been adopted from the beginning that the registered owner of a motor vehicle parked in breach of the law should be liable for the contravention unless he can show that some other person was responsible (see now *Local Government Act*, Sec. 705 (i), (3) and (10)). I recommend that the same method be adopted in respect of this particular offence. I can see no other effective means of preventing it because of difficulties of proof. If a regulation along the lines recommended were enacted, bus drivers I think would be encouraged to record the registered numbers of illegally parked vehicles, and be prepared to give evidence; whereas at present such action is not worth while (see p. 861).

189 **River Ferries**

(*a*) Before July 1963 the Transport Commission operated a passenger ferry service across the Derwent between Hobart and Bellerive. When the service was abandoned in June 1963 there was, according to the Hobart Area Transportation Study 1964 Report (para. 206) ' a considerable amount of community reaction to the decision to abandon this service and a certain amount of public pressure to reinstate it '. Proponents of the service suggested amongst other arguments that the ferry would operate as a significant relief facility to the Tasman Bridge. H.A.T.S. 1964 concluded that patronage of the service did not warrant its continuation (paras. 206-209).

(*b*) H.A.T.S. 1964 pointed out that the river ferry offered good service only to those patrons who had trip destinations within walking distance of both ferry landings. For other patrons, feeder services by motor bus would have been required in order to increase the numbers using the ferries, provided that such users would have been prepared to put up with the inconvenience of transfer from one mode to another. The report suggested that most users would consider it more advantageous to remain on the motor bus and be transported to a point in the central city which was more convenient to their ultimate destination (para. 831).

It concluded that it was not expected that conditions by 1985 would have changed sufficiently to warrant a resumption of ferry service between Bellerive and Hobart, but that was not to be construed as implying that some ferry services would not be desirable (paras. 832-833).

H.A.T.S. 1964 said that a ferry operation catering primarily to tourists and sightseers or as an additional feature of the River Derwent acquatic recreational scene would be entirely feasible. It went on to say ' provided that these ancillary functions would warrant the capital investment in ferry equipment, then some week-day peak hour ferry service could be offered, but only as a secondary venture to supplement other ferry operations '. (para. 833).

It must be observed that what has happened since that report completely vindicates the passage just quoted.

(*c*) The Hobart Transportation Revision 1970 Report noted the recommendation of the 1964 Report (para. 508 (*f*)), and since it suggested no other conclusion (para. 510-515), must be taken by implication to have confirmed the previous recommendations.

(*d*) Evidence was given before me in relation to the river ferries by the General Manager of the M.T.T.; and by Mr F. R. Clifford, Managing Director of Sullivans Cove Ferry Company, which operates the ferry Matthew Brady. Mr Boatwright, by letter dated 30 July 1973 to Counsel assisting the Commission, said that he had had a number of discussions in recent months relating to the question of possible bus feeder services to the Hobart ferry. (Ex. M.T.T. No. 46). The letter said that since the commencement of the recent ferry service, bus passengers had not decreased, and it was therefore considered that ferry service passengers must comprise in the main former car commuters, and possibly persons residing within walking distance of the ferry terminal.

It also said that in his opinion the passenger potential would not justify the high cost of operating feeder bus services to the ferry, and that in addition there was no real demand for such services. He pointed out that an additional driver and vehicle would be required because such feeder services would be at peak hours. The letter made it plain that the provision of feeder services to the ferry, as requested by Mr Clifford's Company, would not in his opinion be justified, but said nevertheless that in order to test the matter the Trust was prepared to run for a trial period, during the fortnight school holiday commencing 3 September 1973, a feeder service from and to Tranmere to connect with the ferry at 8.20 a.m. and 5.35 p.m. Mondays to Fridays.

The results of that trial period of operation of feeder services, given to me by letter from the M.T.T. (Ex. R.C. 103), show that the experiment was not successful. A combined bus-ferry fare of 40 cents was charged (cf. the ordinary ferry fare of 30 cents, reducing to the equivalent of about 16 cents on a monthly

concession ferry ticket (p. 927), with the Trust and the ferry company sharing the fare at 20 cents each. The average number of persons carried per trip was nine. The weekly cost of running the bus feeder service was $200, and weekly income of the order of $15, so that the loss to the Trust was substantial.

(*e*) Mr Clifford, the Managing Director of Sullivans Cove Ferry Services, also gave oral evidence before the Commission. He said he believed that the harbour should be used as a highway as well as a scenic attraction, and he outlined the benefits of ferry travel. For example, the cost of a vessel similar to the new vessel being constructed by his company was about $40 000, approximately the cost of one and a half buses. It would carry 160 passengers and was operated by a crew of two, the crewman doubling as a barman in addition to helping man the vessel. He detailed other advantages relating to the relatively cheap cost of providing ferries and other facilities, and the like (pp. 926-927).

Mr Clifford agreed that the ferry was taking virtually no passengers from the buses, because his commuter passengers were virtually all former commuters by private motor car who found it more satisfactory to use the ferry and leave the family car at home for use by the housewife (p. 926).

Mr Clifford's evidence that tourists (amongst whom he included local people making a pleasure run around the harbour) made up about 80% of his total trade. Tourists in fact accounted for the apparent present success of the ferry. The patronage of the ferry by commuters had been less than he expected, but this had been more than made up for by the tourist traffic.

(*f*) Building of the ' Matthew Brady ' and the second vessel now under construction has been financed entirely by private means, Mr Clifford said. There has been no Government subsidy or finance in any way except by the Marine Board, who built the jetties and have not charged very much for them. He thought that his company would need government finance in order to build more suitable facilities. Facilities at the present time are relatively crude. People in authority generally had been notably unenthusiastic about the ferry project during the time his company had been preparing to set it up, but the official line of thinking seemed to be changing somewhat, and he was hopeful that the Marine Board might provide better facilities in the near future (pp. 928-929).

(*g*) *Conclusion.* My conclusion is that the 1964 H.A.T.S. report has proved to be entirely correct in its prediction that a river ferry service was possible and desirable from a tourist point of view; and that such a service could provide some useful secondary peak-hour commuter service as an adjunct to its other activities. Mr Clifford's evidence and the results of the feeder service provided by the M.T.T. for the trial fortnightly period in September of this year entirely support that view. I think there may well be some increase in peak-hour commuter patronage by persons who now travel in private cars from the eastern shore to Hobart, particularly if the areas in which free commuter all-day parking is now possible are gradually eliminated as recommended elsewhere in this report, and if the business centre of the city continues to extend towards the south-west. River ferry service will not, however, in the foreseeable future provide a primary mode of commuter transport from the eastern shore, and no justification exists for considering the provision of such a service by a public transport authority.

However, in my view, every reasonable assistance should be given to the operator of the ferry service by way of assisting in the provision of ancillary facilities and the like, because of the importance of this service as a tourist and local sightseeing facility, and because of its evident viability in that role.

18.10 **Staggered Working Hours**

(*a*) Not much time was devoted to this subject in evidence before me. Evidence was given, however, that a study of the question of implementing staggered working hours in the Tasmanian Public Service has been made by a committee consisting of representatives of the Office of the Public Service Commissioner, the Public Service Association, the Public Works Department, the Metropolitan Transport Trust, the Transport Commission, the Police Department, the Hobart City Council, the Retail Traders Association, the Council of the Commonwealth Public Service Association, and the Southern Metropolitan Master Planning Authority. Mr Calver of the latter Authority acted as Chairman. After a number of meetings the committee reported two conclusions to the Minister, namely:—

(i) that if any benefit to traffic resulting from staggered working hours in the Public Service is to be obtained, a starting time of either 7.40 a.m. (or earlier) *or* 9.30 a.m. (or later) should be adopted; and

(ii) that in addition, matters such as the four day week, the nine day fortnight, and the principle of ' gliding time ' are worthy of consideration, as they would all assist in alleviating the problem of morning and evening peak hour traffic.

The view of the Public Service Commissioner at that time was that to change to either suggested new starting time in the Public Service would be undesirable, and so also would be introducing the principle of ' gliding time ' (as the Commissioner understood it).

The question of the four day week and/or the nine day fortnight would be referred to the Tasmanian Public Service Association for further detailed explanation and comment (see Ex. No. 81).

The Minister was inclined to think that the suggested variations would be impracticable departmentally. There the matter rests so far as evidence before me was concerned.

(*b*) The concept of staggered working hours is designed, so far as traffic congestion is concerned, to relieve congestion at peak hours, but evidence by the M.T.T. was that the afternoon peak is generally satisfactory for M.T.T. purposes in that the pattern of afternoon demand fits in with drivers' rostering commitments.

It is the morning peak hour problems which create the greatest difficulty for the M.T.T. in relation to the effective use of drivers and their rostering, particularly in Hobart.

The Trust said therefore that any staggering of existing working hours during the afternoon peak would create more difficulties for the Trust than it would solve. ' The ideal would be to reduce morning peak in Hobart without upsetting the afternoon peak ' (Sub. No. 10, p. 28).

There was also evidence that peak hour problems are becoming more generalised in Hobart than they were formerly as traffic congestion grows. The Hobart City Council planner, Mr Tiller, referred to the abovementioned study by the inter-departmental committee in the following terms:—

> ' The general feeling of that committee, as I understand it, is that it is O.K. for the small organisation to stagger hours, but in a very big organisation such as Commonwealth or State Public Service there are insufficient gaps into which they can be fitted. If you take the Bridge or the Northern Outlet, there is only a small gap into which another two hundred cars can be accommodated. Two hundred cars is only a flea bite really in relation to the overall problem, and if you accommodate them in the period, say, 8.05 in the morning, then you would make your 4.30-4.40 peak at night very much worse than it is now. In other words there really are no gaps of any great magnitude in which you could fit the staggering of working hours.
>
> . . . There are other times at which traffic peaks occur than in working hours and it is fairly evident in every situation that this would be on Saturday and even on Sundays when the loading, as is well known in relation to the Bridge, is not far short of intolerable away from the working hours, and traffic studies in these days take account of these other times whereas they were formerly based on working hours. That has happened at Sandy Bay Road already with the opening of the Casino. Saturday is as heavy a day as Friday now, which was previously its heaviest day. I would anticipate that if any more development of that type takes place around the Casino in Sandy Bay Road the heaviest day will be on Saturday. In fact the commuter traffic on Sandy Bay Road is only 8% of the normal traffic as distinct from the normal average of 10% or 12%. In other words, the traffic at Sandy Bay is very much more spread out than it is on other roads. The increase in traffic on Sandy Bay Road from 20 000 to 25 000 vehicles a day could present great difficulties '. (pp. 990-991).

(Mr Tiller's evidence there obviously has relevance to the looming requirement for the Grosvenor Expressway).

(*c*) *Conclusion.* My comment is that although the evidence before me was relatively scanty it enables no conclusion to be drawn except that the subject of staggered working hours is a very complex one, in which advantages as regards traffic congestion have not so far been proved. No doubt, however, further study will be given to the subject, and developments in other parts of Australia and elsewhere will be watched.

TERM I—SPECIFIC ISSUES

19.—'1 (a) PRACTICABLE ALTERATIONS WHICH COULD BE MADE TO EXISTING PASSENGER TRANSPORT OPERATIONS IN THE AREAS INDICATED TO PROVIDE IMPROVED SERVICES AND GREATER CO-ORDINATION'

I have dealt in detail in other sections of the report with a large number of such alterations which could be made in order to provide improved services and greater co-ordination. These will be brought together in summary form in Part I, together with other recommendations made.

20.—'1 (b) THE DESIRABILITY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, OF INTEGRATING BUS AND RAIL PASSENGER TRANSPORT SERVICES (INCLUDING PRIVATELY OPERATED SERVICES) WHERE PRACTICABLE IN THE HOBART METROPOLITAN AREA'

I have earlier set out reasons which to me are compelling for discontinuing the suburban rail passenger transport service in the Hobart area. I have also given reasons for the view that there are no feasible measures which would be effective in materially improving the number of passengers carried by that service. I therefore make no other recommendations except that the suburban rail service be discontinued.

21.—'1 (c) EXISTING OPERATIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT TRUST AND WHETHER THESE OPERATIONS SHOULD BE EXTENDED AND, IF SO, TO WHICH AREAS'

21.1 Proposals by Metropolitan Transport Trust for extension of service area

The Trust in its written submission (Sub. No. 10, p. 66, para. 3) said that the Hobart Transportation Review 1970 recommended that the service district of the M.T.T. be extended beyond the seven mile limit 'and this matter is receiving attention'. (See also p. 84 of the submission).

I would first comment that the H.T.R. 1970 report did not make such a recommendation. It merely referred to the recommendation made by the H.A.T.S. 1964 Report (see H.T.R. 1970, para. 508 (*g*)).

The proposal for extension stems from the 1964 Report. After paras. 816-819 of that report ,it is recommended that the service district of the Trust be extended beyond the seven mile limit 'to include the urbanised portions of Hobart', which extension it was said would provide 'the entire community with a single integrated public transport system' (p. 819).

At para. 816 it was said that the seven mile limitation prohibited the Trust from providing urban bus services to several communities which are integral parts of the Hobart Regional area, including Claremont, Austins Ferry, and Blackman's Bay. The report also said (para. 817) that exclusion of areas which are properly portions of the Hobart urban unit had required that private operators serve those districts, which had in turn created many instances of service duplication within the district of the M.T.T. 'In many instances the private buses are not fully loaded and are travelling together with buses of the Trust which are also not loaded to seating capacity'. (para. 817).

21.2 Comments on 1964 Recommendation

At this point I make three comments:—

(*a*) The 1964 H.A.T.S. report was devoted entirely to the Hobart situation. It was not in any way concerned with Launceston.

(*b*) In speaking about an extension of service area providing the community with 'a single integrated public transport system', the report was not concerned to consider the situation of Tasmania as a claimant State, and the effect of the Grants Commission background in relation to increased losses sustained by the M.T.T. As explained earlier, regard must constantly be paid to this factor, though I have suggested that M.T.T. forward planning should not be dominated entirely by it, as it virtually now is.

(*c*) H.A.T.S. appears to have overlooked that Claremont and Austin's Ferry had already been added to the M.T.T. service area in 1961 with 'the northern extension'.

21.3 **Draft Bill to extend service area of M.T.T.**

The minutes of the meeting of the M.T.T. held on 20 September 1972 (Ex. M.T.T. 22) record that the Trust discussed and approved a suggestion by the General Manager that it recommend to the Minister making amendments to the definitions of the metropolitan areas in Hobart and Launceston to extend the boundaries of those areas.

In due course the matter progressed to the extent that a draft Bill was prepared (Ex. M.T.T. 21) which would if enacted have extended the definition of the Hobart metropolitan area so as to include all the area within a radius of 20 kilometres from the Hobart G.P.O., together with that extending beyond the 20 kilometre radius as far as Brighton to 1 kilometre on either side of the Midland Highway. The draft Bill proposed to extend the Launceston service area in a similar way, as mentioned below (see para. 21.5).

21.4 **Proposed Hobart Extension of Service Area**

(*a*) The principal reason given by the General Manager of the Trust for extending the service areas in both Hobart and Launceston is that it would enable the Trust to plan for the provision of adequate services in the urbanised areas around those two cities as those areas gradually extend (p. 81). Secondary reasons are that it would extend the area within which the Trust may carry out charter work under the Act, and would enable the Trust to exercise the same measure of control over private operators within the extended area as it presently exercises within the seven mile radius (p. 81). It does not mean that the Trust necessarily intends to extend its services into those areas in the near future if the extensions are granted, but it would have the power to do so if future needs so required (pp. 81 and 749).

(*b*) In my opinion there is a sound case for the proposed Hobart extension. The present seven mile radius from the G.P.O. takes in most of Rokeby but does not extend to Lauderdale; it takes in most but not all of Kingston Beach and not Blackman's Bay; and the northern extension (to one mile either side of the main highway) does not cover certain parts of the Housing sub-division at Bridgewater. A reasonable rule to apply would be, in my view, that the Trust boundaries should take in such areas around the city as are or are becoming urbanised extensions of the cities, or appear likely to become so in the next five to ten years.

On that basis, an extension should be made to cover those abovementioned areas which are not within the seven mile radius. The proposed extension is to twenty kilometres from the Hobart G.P.O. That extension would go beyond Bridgewater but not quite as far as Brighton on the northern corridor, and on the Channel Highway would extend as far as Electrona. The circumference would also pass through Orielton Lagoon, and would therefore take in the whole of Midway Point, and in addition, the Seven Mile Beach and Lauderdale areas.

(*c*) I recommend that the proposed extension of the Hobart M.T.T. service area to twenty kilometres from the G.P.O. in accordance with the Draft Bill should be proceeded with. (See Ex. M.T.T. 10B).

21.5 **Proposed Extension of Launceston Service Area**

(*a*) The 1973 Draft Bill to extend the M.T.T. boundaries contained a provision that the definition of the Launceston metropolitan area should be extended so as to include a radius of twenty kilometres from the G.P.O. at Launceston, and also ' such part of the Tamar Valley extending to, and including the town of George Town on the eastern side thereof and the town of Beauty Point on the western side thereof as lies within three kilometres of the Post Office at the towns of George Town and Beauty Point respectively, and includes the area generally bounded by the East Tamar Highway on the eastern side of the Tamar River and the West Tamar Highway on the western side of that river '. (See Ex. M.T.T. 21).

(*b*) The Launceston Area Transportation Study (referred to hereinafter as L.A.T.S. 1968) paid much less attention to public transport in the Launceston area than did the H.A.T.S. 1964 study in Hobart. In fact, I can find only three references to public transport in L.A.T.S. 1968 (in paras. 131, 246 and 313).

(*c*) It remains therefore to examine what the arguments are for extending the M.T.T. service area in Launceston. Mr Boatwright in evidence stated, in effect, that it was thought advisable to extend the Launceston area as a matter of forward planning for fifteen to twenty years ahead, anticipating further urbanised development during that time. In addition, the extension would give the Trust the opportunity to operate charter work within the extended area (p. 749). Mr Boatwright indicated that more charter work was becoming available from Education Department sources beyond the existing seven mile radius (p. 750). He also made it clear that the Trust has no present intention of extending services in Launceston beyond the seven mile radius, and that if it did it could only expect to make losses (see pp. 749-750).

(*d*) The present seven mile radius in Launceston gives the M.T.T. ample scope for forward planning, in my opinion. In particular, I see no sound basis for expanding the Trust's service area into a Tamar Valley corridor similar to that formed by the Northern Extension area in Hobart. The present seven mile radius in Launceston extends to Breadalbane on the Hobart Road; past Hadspen on the North West Coast Road; on the West Tamar to Legana; and on the East Tamar about one and a half miles short of Dilston (Ex. M.T.T. 9).

Present M.T.T. routes in Launceston do not at any point appear to reach out to within two miles of the circumference of the area (*Ibid*). On the West Tamar the M.T.T. route goes as far as north Riverside; on the East Tamar, as far as Rocherlea; on the Hobart Road as far as Franklin Village; and on the North West Coast Road as far as Prospect.

On the evidence, no extension of an M.T.T. route beyond the seven mile radius is likely to be called for in at least the next five years, in my opinion. I agree with the view expressed by the Mayor of Launceston, who said that the M.T.T. service area should be bounded by ' a theoretical greater Launceston area ', including the dormitory suburbs (p. 796).

I take Dr Fisher to have in mind the suburbs of (at the outer fringe) Youngtown and Franklin Village, St Leonards, Waverley, Ravenswood, Mayfield and Rocherlea, North Riverside and Cormiston, and Summerhill; and they are all well within the seven mile radius. As already noted, Hadspen is within that radius, but I should not think that would be referred to as a dormitory suburb of Launceston.

(*e*) There are two reasons, in relation to Launceston particularly, why in my opinion it is not desirable to extend M.T.T. boundaries before a demonstrated need for such extensions (so as to facilitate forward planning) can be seen. One is that extension of the area would bring with it a substantial measure of control by the M.T.T. over licences issued to private operators servicing the area (see para. 9.5 above, and also, e.g., p. 74) even though a great part of it could plainly not be described as urban.

The other reason is that Launceston is even less dependent on public transport than Hobart is, and consequently, extension by the M.T.T. into low-density population areas carries the risk of greater losses than in Hobart. For example, statistics given on p. 35 of the M.T.T. submission (Sub. No. 10) show that in 1971-72 the M.T.T. carried in Launceston approximately 25% of the number of adult passengers carried in Hobart during the same period, even though the population of Greater Launceston is approximately half that of Greater Hobart. Again, the proportion of adult passengers of the total carried in Hobart in the same period was 51·11% whereas in Launceston the proportion was 39·75%.

Mr Boatwright said in evidence (p. 741) that he thought the main reason for these differences is that ' the private motor car is so well catered for in Launceston '. He said that in Launceston both the short term and the long term parker is particularly well supplied with parking facilities, and while that situation continued the demand simply did not exist in Launceston for greater frequencies in public transport (p. 741).

(*f*) I recommend therefore that the service area of the M.T.T. in Launceston be not extended at present. If and when a demonstrated need for extension arises, a simple amendment to the M.T.T. Act 1954 will achieve it.

21.6 **Whether M.T.T. services should be extended in the Hobart area**

21.6.1 *Bridgewater and the Northern Extension Area*

(*a*) *Strongly contested issue.* The most hotly debated single issue before the Commission was in respect of the means of urban transport by which the growing Bridgewater area should be serviced. The issue was precipitated by the establishment of the subdivision at Bridgewater by the Housing Department, commenced about July 1972. The fact that the suburban railway service was in a reasonably good position to service the area, and that in addition there were two private operators (Ace Bus Service and Tasmanian Coach Lines) ready to compete for this market, with the M.T.T. a fourth factor in the background, supplied the elements for a lively situation.

(*b*) *Disputed issues of fact.* During the evidence before the Commission there was strenuous debate upon certain disputed questions of fact concerning the services to Bridgewater. The main issues were two:—

(i) Whether the M.T.T. had been directed by the Minister for Transport to commence bus services to Bridgewater, or whether Mr Boatwright, the General Manager, had agreed to do so on behalf of the Trust, at a meeting held on 12 January 1973 attended by the Minister for Transport, the Commissioner for Transport, the Secretary for Railways, and Mr Boatwright.

Mr Boatwright claimed that he had been so directed by the Minister (pp. 44, 45, 49, 50, 53, 56 and 71); whereas Mr Webb, the Commissioner for Transport, contended that Mr Boatwright had not been directed but had agreed (Ex. T.C. 9, T.C. 10, and p. 253).

(ii) Under what circumstances Ace Bus Service had been running certain buses to the Bridgewater Housing Subdivision, and in what circumstances its application for a licence to enable it to supply an extended service thereto was refused by the Transport Commission.

(*c*) I do not intend to make findings of fact in relation to either of these issues in so far as details were disputed in evidence. The salient facts are clear enough for present purposes. A summarised account of relevant undisputed facts is as follows:—

Mr Cresswell, the Managing Director of Ace Bus Service, has consistently claimed in letters to the Transport Commission (see copies of his letters contained in Ex. T.C. 9) and in evidence before me (p. 432) that he was ' given ' the northern extension of the Hobart metropolitan area by the then Labour Government in about 1962, and that he has supplied services therein ever since; and should therefore be entitled to provide a full passenger service to the new Housing Subdivisision at Bridgewater.

In May 1972, Mr Cresswell applied verbally to the Transport Commission for a variation of his existing time-table to provide a 7.00 a.m. service Hobart to Bridgewater, with return from Bridgewater at 7.45 a.m. and a similar afternoon service for 4.25 p.m. and 5.10 p.m. (Ex. T.C. 9, p. 2).

The point about the application to run a bus at these times was that Ace Bus Service was already licenced to run buses at certain times to and through the Bridgewater area from Hobart, but in order to serve the new Housing Division adequately, additional *times* of service needed to be permitted by the Transport Commission (p. 290).

Ace Bus Service had in fact been running buses to and from Hobart at these times since 1971 (p. 432), and Mr Cresswell claimed in evidence that he applied to the Transport Commission for the necessary variation of licence by letter in November 1971 (see T.C. 9, App. C, and also p. 433). The Transport Commission claimed that it had never received this letter (see note to Appendix C, Ex. T.C. 9).

Mr Cresswell claimed in evidence that after he made the application in November 1971 he had gone to a conference on the mainland; that when he came back the service was already in operation, and he had overlooked checking whether he had received the necessary permission (p. 433). He continued to run those services, altered his timetables accordingly, and advertised them in Moore's Guide (p. 433). He claimed that he had been asked many times to increase his services in the northern suburbs during the decade 1962-1972, that he had never bothered to wait for approval for the Transport Commission to come through, and there had never been any difficulty. Requests were made to him to extend his services by the M.T.T. on numerous occasions. The Transport Commission was well aware of the extensions, and there was no difficulty (pp. 449, 450).

Mr Webb, in evidence, agreed that in general this was so, and he said he thought that the Transport Commission had been lax in the matter (p. 290. Of course, this was before Mr Webb's time as Commissioner).

As to Mr Cresswell's claim that he had been ' given ' the northern extension area in 1961, Mr Webb said that he had not seen any documents to that effect, and could not understand how that could have occurred since the Transport Commission was required by statute to issue the necessary licences.

After Ace Bus Service lodged its verbal application for variation of time-table, as mentioned above, the ordinary procedure required by the Act was followed, and in June 1972 Tasmanian Coach Lines lodged an objection to the application by Ace Bus. Eventually, on 21 August 1972, the Transport Commission advised Ace Bus Service that the Commission was not prepared to consider his application until a report was submitted by the Urban Transport Advisory Committee (Ex. T.C. 9, p. 3 and Appendix E).

In November 1972, Ace Bus Service submitted a further formal application for a series of extended times to serve the Bridgewater Housing Subdivision (Ex. T.C. 9, App. K). The M.T.T., pursuant to its rights under Section 44 of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954, refused its consent to this application by Ace Bus Service, stating that the Trust itself proposed to implement bus services to the Housing Department Subdivision at Bridgewater in the near future (Ex. T.C. 9,

App. L). Accordingly, the application by Ace Bus Service was refused, but notwithstanding that it appears that a number of their unauthorised services to Bridgewater continued to run (See App. P of Ex. T.C. 9).

It appears that Ace Bus Service discontinued its unauthorised services in about January 1973 (Sub. No. 16, p. 7).

In the same month, January 1973, the M.T.T. began a service to Bridgewater, and has continued that service since.

(*d*) *Ace Bus Plans for the Bridgewater Service.* Mr Cresswell claimed in his submission that if his company were granted a licence to operate a full service to Bridgewater he would completely restructure his present services. He would, in effect, split his Berriedale to Brighton service area into two, and operate the Windemere-Cadbury's, Abbotsfield-Hilton Hill section independently of service to Claremont-Austin's Ferry-Bridgewater-Brighton. This, he said, would provide a more direct and faster service to all these suburbs, which are presently part of the one route. He would employ four more drivers, a mechanic and an apprentice, and construct a depot and allied facilities at Bridgewater.

These integrated services could be run by his company at no cost to the public, at generally lower fares than the M.T.T., and at a profit when fully developed (Sub. No. 16, p. 7).

Mr Cresswell further submitted that no service from the city which serves Bridgewater alone, in the area presently covered by his company, could be run at a profit in the foreseeable future, and that the M.T.T. could only run such a service at very considerable loss (T.C. 9, pp. 7 and 8; and see also p. 447).

(*e*) *M.T.T. attitude to Servicing the Northern Extension Area, including Bridgewater.* The services which the M.T.T. was running to Bridgewater as at the end of March 1973 comprised three trips in the morning, two in the afternoon, and one at night on week-days, covering a time span between 7.30 a.m. and 12.00 p.m. (p. 55). That is, nearly enough, six services on every day except Sunday, when there were none.

Again, as at the end of March 1973, Mr Boatwright's evidence was that in round figures it cost the Trust $200 per week to run the Bridgwater service, and the revenue was approximately $30 per week (p. 66). On the other hand, the overall loss on Bridgewater was not nearly as much as that, he said, because the Trust had certain contracts with the Housing Department to run buses for Housing Department workers to the Bridgewater Subdivision (p. 66). He expected that those Housing Department contracts would continue for a considerable time into the future as the Housing Subdivision was extended, and when those contracts eventually ended the Bridgewater Subdivison would have been built up to the extent that the Trust would be much more likely to get near the break-even point on its services to that area.

Mr Boatwright agreed that there was no economic justification for going into the Bridgewater area when the Trust did, in view of the fact that the area could have been serviced by Ace Bus without cost to the M.T.T., but the decision that the M.T.T. should service the area was a political decision and not a Trust decision (p. 70).

He said that the M.T.T.'s Bridgewater service would become less unprofitable as time went on, and following the full development of the area he felt that the Trust would ' come somewhere near break-even point ' (p. 363).

The basic attitude of the M.T.T. to the question whether it should operate in the northern extension area is set out in its written submission (Sub. No. 10, at pp. 80, 81). It is this—that if Ace Bus Service is to be permitted to operate its various services in the northern extension area after the expiration of its current licences in June 1974, then Ace Bus should also be permitted to operate in the Bridgewater Housing development. On the other hand, if the Government should decide that the M.T.T. is to take over the Ace Bus Services in the northern extension after June 1974, then Ace Bus should not now be permitted to operate in the Bridgewater development area, but the Trust should commence operation in the early stage of development at Bridgewater p. 80). The submission goes on to say that on Ministerial direction the Trust commenced services to and from the Bridgewater Housing development area on 21 January 1973, the service times being scheduled to avoid competing with trips licensed to be run by Ace Bus, and to involve minimal competition with rail services (p. 81).

Mr Boatwright was asked in evidence whether he claimed that the M.T.T. could profitably run passenger bus services throughout the whole metropolitan area serviced by Ace Bus, and he replied that in his opinion the Trust could operate the whole area ' at very near break-even point '. He said further, ' if you had

asked me twelve months ago, I would have said we could operate at a profit at the present time with the others, but with the movements and variations of the wage structure, I am doubtful if you could break even, but it would not be too much out' (p. 45). He said that if the Trust increased its operation to cover this particular area, it would not be committed to many of the overhead charges which it carried already, but in fact would be incurring basically only the additional drivers' wages, buses and running costs. Staffing, for example, would not be varied, and there would be little difference in interest charges (p. 45).

(*f*) *Feeder Services to Bridgewater Rail.* Neither Mr Boatwright nor Mr Cresswell see any future for these. Mr Boatwright said that at the conference earlier mentioned, held on 12 January 1973, at which the Minister and the Commissioner for Transport were present, he had strongly opposed a bus feeder service to the rail at Bridgewater. He had had the costs taken out on this, and had found that it would cost the Trust as much if not more to run feeder services than to provide a complete service to and from the city from Bridgewater.

That was at an early stage of development when the rail was about ⅜ths of a mile from the furthest houses (p. 28). He said, 'In my view feeder services to rail are not a practicable or an acceptable proposition as far as the public is concerned. They have now at the present time the opportunity of travelling by rail at, well nearly half the cost of public transport, and they are still not using rail because it is not the convenience they require'. He stated also that the Trust as a whole had agreed with his recommendation opposing the provision of feeder services to the rail at Bridgewater (p. 63).

Mr Cresswell, when asked whether he could see any practicable way in which feeder services to rail could be used in the northern extension area, said that the only possibility in his view was a feeder service to the Bridgewater rail station when Bridgewater became fully developed, to cater for school children and peak hour commuters. Apart from that, he said, 'If I am running the services, I could not see the people getting off my comfortable buses to get on a train and come into town and have to walk up from the Railway Station' (p. 449)

(*g*) *Application by Tasmanian Coach Lines to Service Bridgewater Housing Subdivision.* The other large private operator serving in the vicinity of the northern extension area has made an application to the Transport Commission for a licence to run feeder services from the Housing Subdivision at Bridgewater to its regular Hobart-New Norfolk services, transferring at Granton (see Tas. Coach Lines written submission, No. 24, p. 12, and transcript pp. 507-509)

There was also some suggestion that if Tasmanian Coach Lines were permitted to operate into the Bridgewater Subdivision and found that demand was sufficient to justify establishing a complete service from there to Hobart (i.e., not feeder), that company would probably seek to do so (pp. 508-509).

(*h*) *Pensioner and Child Concessions on M.T.T., Ace Bus Services and Tasmanian Coach Lines.* This question is relevant to the Bridgewater issues.

The M.T.T. has a pensioner concession fare of 4 cents irrespective of the distance travelled ('pensioners' being, in general, age, repatriation, invalid pensioners, and the like, who have a medical entitlement as part of their pension rights). It also has a similar concession rate for all persons over seventy years of age.

Its child and scholar concession rate is 10 cents irrespective of distance travelled, and 7 cents scholar concession while travelling on school days (p. 57).

Ace Bus Service has, in effect, a pensioner concession rate of 12 cents, and says that it has issued 364 current pensioners' passes, leading to an estimated loss to the company of $9 800 per annum (Sub. 16. p. 5; and see pp. 45 and 474). Ace Bus Service has over a period sought a subsidy for part reimbursement of concession fares it grants to pensioners, but has always been refused. This is a common problem with private operators in the State, on whose behalf the Bus Proprietors' Association has for a considerable time sought a subsidy in order to enable pensioner concessions to be given or increased (see pp. 445, 803. Mr Cresswell would like a subsidy sufficient to reduce the pensioner concession from 12 cents to about 8 cents (p. 474). Ace Bus Service has a school child concession fare, in that children aged four to fourteen travelling to or from school pay half fare (Sub. No. 16, p. 5).

Tasmanian Coach Lines offers concession fares to pensioners. They were formerly by way of a 33⅓% reduction, and are now (apparently) a 20% reduction (Sub. No. 24, and see copy letter to Chief Secretary, dated 24 March 1971, attached thereto.

(*i*) *M.T.T.'s Recent Experience with Bridgewater Service.* By letter dated 3 October 1973 to Counsel assisting the Royal Commission, the General Manager of M.T.T. advised that two additional week-day services had been commenced between Hobart and Bridgewater on 27 August 1973. Following further developments by the Housing Department, the bus route was also extended within the Bridgewater area on that date. Additional bus mileage was involved in those alterations to the service without additional man-power cost. The minimum cost of operating the Bridgewater service was now estimated at $257 per week, whereas the previous estimate in April 1973 was $210 per week. The increased cost of operation of $47 per week is due to variations in the Award Rate of drivers—$22 per week, and the balance by the increase in bus mileage.

Passenger revenue for the week ended 22 September 1973 is estimated at $191 as compared with the average revenue of $36 per week for the eight weeks ended 31 March 1973. The net weekly loss is now (as at 3 October 1973) estimated at $66 per week compared with the estimated loss during the eight weeks ended 31 March 1973 of $174 per week.

(*j*) *Petition by Residents.* Mr Cresswell produced and put in evidence a petition signed by approximately 1 200 residents, mainly of the Berriedale-Claremont-Chigwell-Austin's Ferry areas, requesting that the services of Ace Bus Service be retained in the Brighton, Bridgewater, Austin's Ferry and Claremont areas, and stating that they had no complaints whatsoever about the services supplied or the type and condition of the vehicles used in the service, which in their opinion are much superior to the M.T.T. buses (Ex. AB 8).

(*k*) *Discussion of Issues:*—

(i) I have already observed that Mr Boatwright has some doubts whether the M.T.T. could take over all of the services operated by Ace Bus in the northern extension area without making an overall loss, although he would hope to be near break-even point. It is clear however that as General Manager of the M.T.T. he has no wish to see the M.T.T. take over those services. He stated that his personal attitude was (and there is no indication that the Trust attitude is otherwise) that the private operator should be left alone while he is providing satisfactory service (pp. 53, 741). There is no suggestion that Ace Bus Service is not providing a satisfactory service. Mr Boatwright said that in some respects the Trust would not achieve the same quality of service as Ace Bus, but in respect of frequency of service it might possibly be better (p. 55). The areas in which the M.T.T. quality of service would be less are in respect of comfort of buses and somewhat higher fare levels, except in relation to pensioners and school children.

(ii) My view is that if the M.T.T. took over all the Ace Bus operations within the northern extension area the probability is that it would find achieving break-even point progressively more difficult, because each time wage levels rise the impact on M.T.T. is considerably greater than it is on private operators, due to the smaller size and greater flexibility in operation of the latter (see para. 17.2 above). If that view is correct, such a take-over would tend to increase the annual loss.

The annual loss of the M.T.T. is already heavy, and probably will increase if measures recommended elsewhere in this report are taken to improve substantially the level of M.T.T. service in many respects. The latter task (of over-all improvement) will be heavy enough for the M.T.T. to tackle even with substantial Commonwealth financial assistance, and so the balance seems clearly to be against any thought of take-over by the M.T.T. of the Ace Bus operation at the expiry of the current licence period in 1974, or probably for, say, at least the next five years.

It would, in my opinion, be more in the public interest if private operators in urban areas could be subsidised to grant larger concessions to pensioners and school children than it would be to take over a private operation in order principally to provide a better social service to those entitled to concession fares.

(iii) *What then of the Bridgewater Service?* It may well be that Ace Bus Service is in the best position to operate into the Bridgewater Housing Subdivision economically. It would appear to have a competitive edge over its rival, Tasmanian Coach Lines, which at this stage proposes only a feeder service to the Hobart-New Norfolk run.

I agree with those witnesses who have said consistently that feeder services either to rail or bus have always proved unpopular in the Hobart area, and are unlikely to succeed in the case of the Tasmanian Coach Lines proposal.

However, in relation to Ace Bus Service, there are other factors of importance besides its present competitive position. It appears to be very much a personalised operation, and may depend largely for its present success upon the energies and skill of its Managing Director. Its personalised aspect, indeed, is one of its claimed advantages, as in the case of other private passenger transport operations about which evidence was given.

It would be a mistake to consider the present issues too much in the short term. The M.T.T. could find itself in the position of having to take over the provision of services now operated by Ace Bus in the northern corridor—if, for example, the present management of that operation was changed, and the services provided in the area became inadequate, or were no longer viable economically.

In order to service the Bridgewater subdivision, Ace Bus would have to increase its capital investment substantially (see (*d*) above), and if a take-over by the M.T.T. became necessary in the future for any reason such as one of those just mentioned, the capital cost to the State of payment of compensation may well be a good deal greater.

In addition, there is the question of principle, as I see it, that where it is reasonably feasible and practical, new services within the metropolitan areas ought to be provided by the M.T.T. The whole of the northern corridor to and including Bridgewater should at present, I think, be described as urban. Over the long run the tendency will be, in my opinion, for the M.T.T. (or its equivalent) to take over and operate private services carried on wholly within metropolitan areas. The main reason for this is the inherent difficulty of predicting long-range futures for relatively small personalised operations.

The M.T.T. has, in fact, been operating into the Bridgewater subdivision now for some nine months, and has shown substantial improvement in its cost-revenue position over that short period. The evidence would seem to suggest that the break-even point for the M.T.T. in relation to the northern corridor as far as Bridgewater may not be far off, notwithstanding that this particular operation is subject to the difficulties created by the escalating wage structure. In any event, if a loss continues to be made, it will be relatively small compared with the possible M.T.T. loss if, say, the whole of the Ace Bus urban operation were taken over.

Lastly, there are the advantages to pensioners of the M.T.T. fare concessions.

(*l*) *Conclusion.* Bearing in mind the above factors, my view is that the bus service to the Bridgewater Housing subdivision should continue to be operated exclusively by the M.T.T. I recommend accordingly. The recommendation expressed elsewhere that the Hobart suburban rail service should be discontinued is not affected by any consideration relating to the passenger potential available to it arising out of the Bridgewater subdivision. I also recommend that the M.T.T. should not object to renewal of the existing Ace Bus licences for the Northern Extension area at the expiration of the current licence period.

21.6.2 *Rokeby*

(*a*) The M.T.T. in its written submission (Sub. No. 10, p. 81) stated that it strongly reommended to the Government during 1971 that the Trust operate in the area being developed by the Housing Department north of Rokeby township, and that Tasmanian Coach Lines continue to operate in the old Rokeby Post Office area. However, the Government of the day decided that Tasmanian Coach Lines and not the Trust would serve the Housing Department development.

(*b*) The Trust considers that it should serve the Rokeby area being developed by the Housing Department, so as to provide services in line with those in other comparable areas serviced by the Trust, together with the concessional advantages granted by the State for scholars and pensioners. It therefore intends to object to the renewal of the current licence of Tasmanian Coach Lines in respect of the carriage of passengers within the Rokeby area north of the township of Rokeby, when that current licence expires (see Sub. No. 10, p. 81).

(*c*) Mr Boatwright said in evidence that Rokeby can be serviced reasonably economically by the M.T.T. because it would be done as an extension of an existing service to Tranmere. In his opinion, serving the Housing Development at Rokeby would be a profitable operation (p. 52. See also Sub. No. 10, p. 81).

Rokeby is the only area presently served by a private operator in which the Trust has a definite policy to exercise its right to object under Section 44 to a renewal of the licence, and to service the area itself (p. 51).

In further explaining the view of the Trust concerning Rokeby, Mr Boatwright said that the Housing Development there only began operating about twelve months ago, and that if the Trust serviced that development, the existing services of Tasmanian Coach Lines south and east of Rokeby would not be affected (p. 86).

(*d*) Mr Boatwright was asked by Counsel for Tasmanian Coach Lines whether the Rokeby Housing Development service would not be a logical extension of the Tasmanian Coach Line routes in that area. He agreed it would be to the advantage of Tasmanian Coach Lines to acquire the additional service (p. 87), but that he thought it was Government policy that residents in the various Housing Subdivisions should as far as possible receive equivalent services, pay equivalent fares, and be entitled to the maximum level of concession fares for pensioners and school children. This was, in his view, a major reason for extending Trust services to the Housing Subdivision at Rokeby (p. 135).

(*e*) Mr Ayers, Managing Director of Tasmanian Coach Lines, said little in evidence about Rokeby. The Rokeby service is, of course, only one of many services operated by this company. Tasmanian Coach Lines made a general submission that no reduction of any part of the urban content of any of its services should be contemplated, for various reasons which it set out in written submission No. 24, p. 7. The substance of the argument stated therein which most concerns Rokeby is that that company's services would be rendered less economical by withdrawal of any part of the Rokeby service.

(*f*) *Conclusion.* The arguments of the M.T.T. for extending its Tranmere service to the Housing Department development north of the township of Rokeby are, in my opinion, persuasive. I recommend that the Trust's services should be so extended from the conclusion of the present licence period of Tasmanian Coach Lines in respect of that area.

21.6.3 *Kingston-Blackman's Bay*

(*a*) Assuming that the service area of the M.T.T. is extended as recommended in para. 21.4, the whole of these districts will come within the Hobart Metropolitan Area. However, the Trust does not presently wish to service them. The Trust's written submission states that if it should provide services to Kingston and Blackman's Bay, it is likely that those operated beyond that area by Tasmanian Coach Lines would become uneconomical (Sub. No. 10, p. 82).

Mr Boatwright's view is that if the Trust began to service Kingston-Blackman's Bay, the private operator services further down into the Channel area may cease to be viable economically. In addition, the Trust could not service Kingston-Blackman's Bay nearly as economically as it could the Housing Department Subdivision development at Rokeby (p. 52).

(*b*) I agree with the M.T.T. view that it should not at present extend its services to the Kingston-Blackman's Bay area. My recommendation to this effect does not go beyond the next three-year licence period of Tasmanian Coach Lines. A new Housing development has been announced in the Kingston area, and developments there will need to be carefully watched in the next few years so as to assess when and if it will be desirable for the Trust to expand service into the area.

21.7 Whether M.T.T. Services should be extended in the Launceston Area

21.7.1 *Ravenswood*

Much activity by the Housing Department in recent years in Launceston has been concentrated in the Ravenswood area, but it is not, and has not been, serviced by the M.T.T. It is served by the private operator, Tucker's (pp. 741-742). The Trust has no present intention of moving into Ravenswood, notwithstanding that (according to the Housing Department's submission (Sub. No. 31, p. 5)) the Housing Department may well continue development in that district. The reason stated by Mr Boatwright for the Trust's attitude to Ravenswood was 'because the private operator is already in the area and is doing the job properly. There is no need for us to move in' (p. 741). The Trust's attitude (as compared with, say, its attitude to Rokeby) is influenced by the fact that in Launceston there is no demonstrated demand for increase of Trust Services, and patronage of public passenger transport is demonstrably less than in Hobart, as indicated elsewhere in this report (see para. 21.5, and p. 741).

A further aspect of importance is that at present Commonwealth Government policy is to give substantial financial help to urban public transport in the capital cities, but not elsewhere. There is a good case for this assistance to be extended to Launceston, I believe, but there is no present indication of that view being

accepted although it is being pressed upon the Commonwealth. For these reasons, any extension of M.T.T. services in Launceston would be likely to result in greater losses to the Trust than comparable extensions in Hobart.

No evidence was given to suggest that the Ravenswood service, provided by Tucker's, is not adequate to meet the needs of the residents. I recommend that the Trust does not extend its services into the Ravenswood area at the end of the current licence period. I do not think I should make any recommendation beyond that.

21.7.2 *St Leonards*

This is the only other suburb in the Launceston area in respect of which a possible extension of M.T.T. services was discussed. The Trust attitude is stated in its written submission. It is that there is limited potential in this suburb, and the present operator appears to meet the residents' needs (Sub. No. 10, p. 83). I see no reason to disagree with that view, and do not recommend any extension of the M.T.T. service into the St Leonards area.

21.8 **Possible Extension of M.T.T. Services on the North-West Coast**

Evidence given before this Commission did not indicate any need for consideration of extension of M.T.T. services on the North-West Coast, apart from in the Burnie area. A full description of bus operations on the North-West Coast was tendered in a written submission by the Commissioner for Transport (Ex. T.C. 33).

The Trust operates in the Burnie residential and business areas, but outlying districts and all the adjacent towns on the North-West Coast are serviced by private operators. I have already indicated that notwithstanding that adequate notice was given to the public inviting submissions from interested persons, no submissions or information of any kind was received from residents in the Devonport/Latrobe area (para. 11.4 above).

The view of the Commissioner for Transport is that the standard of service provided by the M.T.T. in the Burnie district compares in general favourably with the services provided by private operators, subject to the reservation that some of the latter are providing coaches of a superior standard to the M.T.T. (Ex. T.C. 33, p. 1).

The Commissioner for Transport considers that attention will need to be given to the question whether the M.T.T. should provide extended services in the areas around the Burnie district, including Ridgley, Somerset and West Somerset, West Mooreville, Parklands, Acton South and Acton West (Ex. T.C. 33, p. 2).

The Commissioner also considers that more satisfactory commuter services could be provided in Devonport by the private bus services, and that if the private operators cannot provide regular services to meet the community needs, consideration might be given to the M.T.T. providing such service (*Ibid.*, p. 2).

Evidence was, however, given by a number of witnesses on the North-West Coast concerning deficiencies and future needs in respect of passenger transport. For example, Mr T. C. Badcock, the Warden of Ulverstone, deposed that public passenger transport facilities at Ulverstone are old, cramped, inconvenient for waiting members of the travelling public, and generally unsatisfactory (p. B874). He was speaking about the town-to-town services and not those within Ulverstone. He was of opinion that a bus depot needs to be erected somewhere in the vicinity of the shopping centre; with up-to-date booking offices, a waiting room and toilet facilities, a goods reception and storage room (p. B875). He thought also that as the Ulverstone area is growing, a bus service within the town and environs will ultimately be required (p. B876). It would not be an economic proposition for the Town Council to erect a bus depot, because the number of passengers involved is not large enough (p. B878).

Mr J. A. R. Owens and the Honourable H. W. Braid gave joint evidence. Mr Owens is the Penguin delegate to the North-Western Municipal League, and Deputy Warden of Penguin. Mr Braid is Deputy President of the North-Western Municipal League and a Member of the Legislative Council. Mr Braid said that the Ulverstone Council had complaints over a number of years in relation to the facilities described by Mr Badcock. He made it clear that he was not criticising the people who conduct the shop and bus depot, nor were other witnesses. They are, in fact, fulfilling a useful function, but the point made by the witnesses was that better facilities are needed. As to the future, Mr Braid said that he could see a need to provide off-street bus parking in Ulverstone, and the sort of depot described by Mr Badcock. He thought that, looking

towards the future, land should be acquired with a view to ultimate development for public transport purposes (p. B878). Planning of this sort should take place in relation to the needs of the whole of the North-West Coast, preferably with the co-operation of the various Councils concerned (p. B878). Mr Braid was of opinion that such transport planning should be closely related to land-use planning in the region (p. B879).

Mr Owens read a submission to the Commission. He said that passenger transport on the North-West should consider—

(i) workers' buses to and from work;
(ii) school buses to and from school;
(iii) shopping buses;
(iv) mail bus and passenger services connecting country areas with towns;
(v) air terminals to Burnie or Devonport with airways passengers;
(vi) intra-town and intra-state services by Tasmanian Coach Lines and Tasmanian Government Railways; and
(vii) hire car and taxi services (pp. B879-B880).

He referred to the fact that after the M.T.T. took over Norton's Motor Service at Burnie, which had consistently made a profit, the Trust proceeded to make an annual loss despite the fact that registration fees are minimal, parts are available for maintenance tax-free, and so on. This, however, is not fair to the M.T.T. in my opinion, because the fact that a privately operated service is making an annual profit does not mean that adequate capital expenditure for replacement of buses and the like is taking place. According to Mr Boatwright's evidence, the Trust at Burnie took over a run down private service. Mr Owens' view was that, instead of M.T.T.'s operations being possibly extended, they ought to be diminished wherever possible, and the field would be served more adequately and satisfactorily by private operators (pp. B880-B881). He himself had been a private transport operator in the past.

Mr Braid also made the point that on the North West Coast there is an increasing tendency for workers in industrial centres to live in dormitory areas, and to travel some distance by car to the industries. He could foresee that the amount of private car travel thus generated might in the future approach intolerable levels, and more effort would have to be made to induce people to make increased use of public transport. Now, in his view, was the time to begin forward planning for this situation, which might arise in five to ten years (p. B883).

Mr Yaxley, the Council Clerk of Burnie, gave evidence that the Burnie Council's relation with the M.T.T. in the area is in general satisfactory, and that the operations of the Trust were also reasonably satisfactory (p. B886). The M.T.T. is at present in the course of building a new headquarters for offices and buses, repair, refuelling, etc., in South Burnie, and upon that being completed, Mr Yaxley said traffic flow in the Burnie streets would be improved (p. B887).

Conclusion. The effect of the evidence given on the North-West Coast leaves a strong impression of the need for planning for future passenger transportation needs of this area, in which growth is rapid.

In my opinion it is very important that such planning be instituted. It should, as in other areas in the State, be on two levels, namely—

(i) specific planning for the operational and growth aspects of the M.T.T. in the Burnie area; and any other areas on the coast in which a need may in the future be shown for the services of the Trust; and
(ii) broader transportation planning for the needs of the region, to include, for example, trunk services through the coastal area, commuter needs within the towns, and also between dormitory centres and industry.

The specific planning under (i) should be co-ordinated with the broader transportation planning under (ii), and the latter should be co-ordinated and integrated with the general planning for the region.

I recommend that such planning be put in hand. In respect of specific planning for M.T.T. operations, it should begin with the need for extending M.T.T. services in the Burnie suburban areas.

22. '1 (d) POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT IN URBAN PASSENGER TRANSPORT'

22.1 Scope of Report under this Term of Reference

I cannot usefully do more under this term of reference than indicate the extent to which action already taken or proposed by the State and Commonwealth Governments respectively in relation to improvement of urban passenger transport in Tasmania is consistent with action which the evidence given before the Commission has lead me to think desirable.

22.2 Concurrence with Action so far Taken

I am able to say that I concur entirely in what has been done so far. The proposals made to the Commonwealth Government by the State Minister for Transport, the Honourable N. L. C. Batt, M.H.A., during 1973 were submitted to me for comment before transmission to Canberra, and I stated that they were consistent with the direction in which evidence given before the Commission up to that stage was leading.

There remains, of course, much to be done, and the principal hope for carrying out many of the recommendations made in this report, if and in so far as they are accepted, lies in the possibility of financial assistance from the Commonwealth Government.

22.3 The Proposals for Commonwealth Assistance so far made by Tasmania

The proposals made by the State Government for Commonwealth financial assistance are contained in detail in Submission No. 23B, Ex. T.C. 23, tendered by the Transport Commission. The proposals cover the 1973-74 and 1974-75 financial years.

A Summary of these proposals is as follows:—

1973-74—Replacement of fifty-six old buses with new, modern and comfortable bus-coaches, and the provision of additional bus shelters, estimated cost $1·552 million.

1974-75—Replacement of a further forty-five buses and the acquisition of ten new buses for improvement and extension of services, introduction of ticket issuing machines, and extension of bus shelters—estimated cost in 1974-75 $1·812 million.

22.4 Commonwealth Assistance for Planning and Research Programme

Tasmania has not so far submitted a programme for Commonwealth Assistance in this field, but three other States (Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia) have submitted such a programme for 1973-74; and the Commonwealth Department of Transport has indicated that a similar programme submitted by Tasmania for 1974-75 would be received and given consideration (see a letter dated 5 October 1973 by Commissioner for Transport to Counsel assisting the Commission—Ex. No. R.C. 102).

I consider that since institution of an adequate programme for planning and research in the field of Tasmanian urban transport is one of the most urgent needs in this State, such a programme should be drawn up and submitted for the period 1974-75.

22.5 Assistance Approved by Commonwealth Government to Tasmania in 1973-74

The Australian Minister for Transport and Minister for Civil Aviation, the Honourable C. K. Jones, M.P., in a public statement dated 21 August 1973 announced, *inter alia*, that a programme for upgrading urban transport in Tasmania at a capital cost of $1·06 million had been approved by the Commonwealth Government, and of this amount that Government would contribute two-thirds, namely $·71 million.

The respective amounts are made up as follows:—

	Total 1973-74 *Expenditure*	*⅔ Aust. Govt. Contribution*
	$M	$M
1. Replacement of buses—the purchase of new buses	1·00	0·67
2. Ticket issuing machines—ticket issuing and change machines and coin sorting equipment so as to increase efficiency	0·04	0·03
3. Bus shelters—forty additional bus shelters, of steel construction	0·02	0·01
TOTAL	1·06	0·71

22.6 **Procedure by which Commonwealth Assistance is to be Given**

The Australian Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation has advised the Minister for Transport for Tasmania that the procedure under which the Commonwealth assistance will be granted will be as follows:—

> Legislation will be necessary to be passed by the respective State Parliaments. Two Bills will be introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament. The first will cover the improvements projects, and will ratify an agreement to be made between the Commonwealth Government and the respective States. This agreement will cover the conditions, including Commonwealth Government representation on State transport authorities, which are to be attached to the assistance. The first Bill will become operative when it is passed by the Commonwealth Government, and at least one State Parliament has ratified the agreement. Funds will not become available to a particular State until its Parliament ratifies the agreement.
>
> The second Bill will cover the planning and research programme but will not include an agreement between the Commonwealth Government and the particular State. However, the Commonwealth Minister advises that his Government would be reluctant to make funds available under this programme to a State which had not ratified the agreement referred to in relation to the first Bill. The Commonwealth Minister so advised by letter dated 20 August 1973 (see Ex. No. R.C. 102).

22.7 **Projects Warranting Submissions for Future Commonwealth Assistance**

The following are, in my opinion, amongst those projects warranting future submissions for Commonwealth financial assistance:—

> Continuation of the bus replacement and bus shelter programmes.
> Continuing adequate planning and research programmes.
> Completion of the ticket machine programme.
> The establishment of adequate public information facilities.
> The construction of an adequate repair and servicing facility in Hobart. The Tasmanian Minister for Transport has already advised the Commonwealth Minister, Mr Jones, when forwarding the Tasmanian submission by letter dated 26 April 1973, that proposals to be submitted for the period 1975-76 to 1977-78 would include proposals for a new bus depot and workshops in Hobart.

22.8 **Approved Programme Applies only to Hobart**

The Commonwealth Government has made plain in public statements relating to its proposed assistance to urban transport in the States that this assistance would apply to capital cities only. In relation to Tasmania, the case for including Launceston in such assistance has been pressed by the State Minister upon the Commonwealth Minister. The basis of such submission is, broadly speaking, that Tasmania is the most decentralised State in the Commonwealth. In no other State is there a second population centre so relatively large in relation to the capital city as Launceston is. This matter was again raised with the Commonwealth Minister when the Tasmanian submission was sent by the State Minister in April 1973. I recommend that this point should continue to be pressed upon the Commonwealth Government as opportunity offers. (Since this was written, a formal submission has been prepared, in November 1973, for transmission to the Commonwealth Authorities (Sub. No. 23P)).

However, on the assumption that the Commonwealth policy that assistance should be confined to capital cities will not alter, it is important that the beneficial effect of Commonwealth financial assistance to urban transport operations in the Hobart area should be enabled to flow on as much as possible to Launceston and to the Burnie operation. For example, the very substantial upgrading of the standard of bus used in the Hobart operation should enable as a consequence some overall upgrading of the bus standard in Launceston and Burnie also.

22.9 **Commonwealth Bureau of Transport Economics**

The Commonwealth Bureau of Transport Economics has carried out very substantial studies in respect of public transport improvements and developments considered necessary by State authorities in all capital cities except Hobart. The report thereon has been referred to elsewhere herein (para. 16.2.1). Social benefit—cost evaluations have been made in respect of proposals involving expenditures of $300·9 million in various of the other State capitals.

The potential value of possible future studies by the Bureau of Transport Economics of urban public transport proposals in Tasmania would appear to be a matter of considerable importance to the State, and I anticipate the appropriate Tasmanian authorities will keep the resources of this Bureau in mind, and will make such use of them as is possible.

23. '1 (e) POSSIBLE NEEDS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF PASSENGER TRANSPORT SERVICES'

23.1 Interpretation of Term of Reference

I have treated this term of reference as applying to possible future modes of urban passenger transport different from those presently operating, i.e., train and bus. That is to say, I treat this term of reference as emphasising the word 'development'. Evidence was given of a number of proposals for such future modes, and I propose to describe them briefly and make some comment on them.

23.2 Proposed Monorail System

23.2.1 *Description of Proposal*

Mr K. R. Dixon, a retired mechanical design engineer with experience in aircraft design, put before the Commission a proposal for a monorail system of Personalised Rapid Transit (P.R.T.) for the Hobart area. The proposal was worked out to preliminary design stage only, and therefore if worthy of further consideration would require detailed cost and feasibility study, as Mr Dixon said.

A summary account of the proposed system is that it would consist of monorails located on columns on the road kerb of the principal city streets, extending out along the main feeder roads as far as economically viable. There would be off and on-loading stations at suitable positions along the routes, and transit would be by way of light personalised cars running above the footpath at about first floor level. The monorail would be duplicated at each station, permitting vehicles on one rail to stop as required, and on the other rail to pass through without stopping. Stairways would be provided from the station down to the pavement, with moving stairways possible at the busiest stations.

23.2.2 *Method of Operation*

Each passenger would be the sole passenger in a given car. He would walk to the nearest station, select the front car in a waiting line of cars at the station, insert a coin to open the car door, and then control movement and direction by pressing appropriate buttons, inserting additional coins of the required multiple of 5 cents size according to the distance he wished to travel. The whole operation would of course be computer controlled, and there would be a control panel in each car showing the distance of travel, direction, etc., which the passenger had programmed. Appropriate fail-safe devices would be provided. From the passenger's point of view, operation would be simple and easy—somewhat, I gather, like the operation of a lift (see Sub. No. 17). The system would be run on solid rubber tyres and would be absolutely silent. Motive power would be by electricity (p. 522).

23.2.3 *Claimed Advantages*

It would cost less per mile than the cost of running a private car, and would be just as comfortable and private. Running on electricity, it would avoid pollution. It would not interfere with normal vehicular traffic on the roads. It might well have the effect of obviating the necessity for huge sums of public money to be spent on freeway construction and a second bridge over the Derwent. It would provide a service on demand with no waiting time. It would be a generally efficient system.

23.2.4 *Cost*

Mr Dixon had not endeavoured to take out detailed costs, but had made some preliminary estimates (p. 522). He thought, for example, that it might be possible to construct a whole city and suburban system for not more than the cost of building a second bridge across the Derwent, at, say $16 million (p. 522). However, obviously, as he said, a detailed costing study would have to be made.

23.2.5 *Conclusion*

This proposal is a very interesting one, which may be possible of achievement in Hobart at some uncertain future date. There appears little hope that it would be a feasible proposition within, say, the next ten to fifteen years. Detailed cost and feasibility studies would not be warranted at this stage, but they may become justifiable in the future. This proposal should be kept in mind for future reference by appropriate transportation planning authorities within the State.

23.3 Dallas-Fort Worth Mass Transit System

23.3.1 *Description of System*

Mr A. L. Patten, the Australian Manager for the LTV Aerospace Co., described a mass transit system which in recent months has come into operation to serve the new Dallas Airport between Dallas and Fort Worth in Texas. It is a fully automated transportation system designed to serve all the passenger, freight and ancillary transit services for the airport. The system in its first phase is designed to move 9 000 people, 6 000 bags and about 70 000 lbs of mail per hour, in addition to certain other ancillary functions (p. 918). Each car is designed to carry a maximum normal load of forty persons and seated capacity of sixteen. The vehicle is normally expected to carry not more than sixteen people. It is carpeted, the seats and general interior are attractively designed. The technology involved is all well established and readily available.

The vehicle is propelled by a 60-h.p. electric d.c. powered motor, and it travels on an 8-ft wide concrete guide-way which has side wall 2-ft high. The guidance and switching system is all inbuilt and automatic, and electronically and computer controlled. No drivers or other employees are involved in the movement of the cars themselves, apart from those involved in general supervision of the system. Normal steering is through wheels which are located at the periphery of each car and contact either the left or the right hand side of the guideway (pp. 919-922).

23.3.2 *Cost of the System and Expected Revenue*

Mr Patten said that as installed at Dallas-Fort Worth, it was shown by detailed costing that although the automated system was initially about four times the cost of a comparable bus system, the system, due to very much lower operating expenses in respect of labour required, was rapidly expected to begin making money. A comparable bus system would always have operated at a loss, according to the costing study (p. 923). The study indicated that by 1990 the automated system would have made, on present money values, about $69 000 000 profit, whereas a comparable bus system would have sustained losses of about $40 000 000.

23.3.3 *Comments*

The kind of automated transit system described by Mr Patten obviously, I think, indicates one of the directions in which mass transportation in high density population areas will go in the future. It is equally obvious that such a system is beyond feasibility for Hobart in the next ten to twenty years. If and when any such system is set up in Australia, it is no doubt most likely to occur in one of the two major States. Nevertheless, this is again a matter which is well worth watching and keeping in mind by the local transportation planning authorities.

23.4 Underground Ring Railway Proposal

23.4.1 *Nature of Proposal*

In a most interesting written submission which illustrates the kind of innovative and imaginative thinking which future transportation planning requires, Professor Carey tendered a proposal for an underground ring railway in the Hobart and suburban area. His proposal is designed to make particular use of the local topography and geology. He points out that these raise special transport problems, and might imply special solutions.

The proposal essentially is for a low-level underground railway which would go through the hills but emerge at each transverse valley, where an appropriate ground level station would be built. For example, starting from the existing railway at Moonah, the line would enter a portal after crossing New Town Creek, then emerge at the surface at the junction of New Town and Risdon Roads, go underground again to emerge at the centre of the city at about the position of Cat and Fiddle Arcade, but in the next block up; go through the hill again and emerge near the corner of St David's Park, then again through that hill and emerge on the Sandy Bay Rivulet at Magnet Court; and so on. The same kind of process would take place on the eastern shore.

The whole complex would set up a ring system involving two river crossings; with stations near the Bellerive oval, in Flagstaff Gulley to serve Warrane, and again at Lindisfarne, Geilston Bay and Risdon. The tunnelling, which would be done with a Mole Tunnel Borer, would pass nearly all the way through relatively soft sedimentary strata. A single tunnel would suffice, with three passing loops located at the surface, allowing continuous passage of three trains in each direction, giving a fifteen minute service each way.

23.4.2 *River Crossings*

Two river crossings would be involved, and the plan suggests particular solutions for both. The northernmost would be in the vicinity of Risdon, but instead of a bridge would take the form of a barrage, designed as a leaking dam not requiring any cut-off membrane in or below the silts. The barrage would be built by tipping raw rock into the river so that the river water could percolate through it, with provision of a spillway to cope with floods, and if desired a lock to enable the passage of small ships. The barrage would allow for passage of both the railway and a main highway. Such a barrage would have very important economic advantages over a bridge, the first being that Derwent water would become fresh right down as far as the barrage. Such an enormous supply of fresh water would have great industrial advantages (see Sub. No. 1). At both the upstream and the downstream side of the barrage, appropriate wharves, cargo sheds and the like would be built, with appropriate systems designed for moving cargo between the upper and lower levels (*Ibid.*, p. 2).

The downstream crossing, from Wrest Point to Bellerive, would be in the form of a prefabricated tunnel, constructed in 50 or 100 metre lengths and then towed to the required position, which would already have been prepared by dredging to the designed depth. The prefabricated tunnel section would be filled with water and sunk with precision-controlled winches. The top of the tunnel would lie one metre or so below the present bottom of the stream, and the weight of each section of tunnel would be designed to be approximately equal to the weight of the mud displaced, so that there would be no load on the tunnel which would tend to make it sink or rise. The shore ends would be connected into open coffer dams.

23.4.3 *Mr Calver's comment on Professor Carey's Proposal*

(*a*) Mr Calver was invited to comment on the implications of this proposal for an underground ring railway. He said (Ex. R.C. 112) that, as Professor Carey agreed, the principal objection to the proposal was its high cost. He thought that nothing short of concentrating all future housing development in Hobart for the next fifty years within a quarter of a mile of each railway station would generate sufficient passenger traffic to justify the underground railway.

(*b*) Mr Calver was, however, principally interested in the proposals concerning the river crossings. He thought that the barrage proposal, particularly, deserved consideration by a panel of experts. The factor with which he would be most conerned would be interference with the ecology which a change from a tidal and brackish to non-tidal and fresh water environment would probably bring about. Large shallow waters, such as Berriedale Bay, are valuable breeding grounds for fish and other marine life. The effect of the barrage might be to destroy this. Also, the cleansing effect on sewerage disposal plant outfalls at Prince of Wales Bay, New Town, Cornelian and Geilston Bays in particular would be largely lost, and higher standards of effluent treatment and new outfalls would be essential. Another factor affecting pollution is that the salinity of sea water seems to make it more resistant thereto. On the other hand, however, effluents from the abattoirs, Prince of Wales sewerage treatment plant and the E.Z. Co's works would not be swept up-river on the rising tide, and pollution from these sources would be confined to below the barrage. This would have a beneficial effect above the barrage, but would probably increase the concentration of the metal washes below it.

Mr Calver's conclusion was that the barrage scheme involves many problems on which the advice of a multi-disciplinary team of experts should be sought. A less controversial and less ecologically damaging solution might be to place a barrage, weir and locks above Boyer.

23.4.4. *Conclusion*

Professor Carey was of course well aware that the cost of this scheme would prevent it being feasible in the Hobart area in the foreseeable future. I agree with that. Apart from this proposal's fascination in its own right, the main benefit of having it put before the Commission was that an ingenious and innovative scheme was placed on record in a public way. It is there for study in the future if it, or any part of it, such as the barrage proposal, should come closer to possible reality than at present.

PART F

24. TERMS OF REFERENCE—QUESTION 2—WHETHER THE M.T.T. SHOULD BE INCORPORATED WITHIN THE TRANSPORT COMMISSION AND OPERATE AS A BRANCH OF THE COMMISSION

24.1 Claimed Advantage of Incorporation

The Commissioner for Transport, Mr Webb, maintained throughout his evidence before the Commission that the efficiency of operations and the standard of service of the bus operations carried out by the M.T.T. would be improved if these activities were under the control of the Transport Commission and the M.T.T. operated as a branch of the Commission in somewhat similar manner to the Railway Branch and the Shipping Services Branch (Sub. No. S230, pp. 1 and 2).

The grounds upon which this move is advocated are in substance the following:—

24.1.1 (*a*) *One Authority for Urban Public Transport*

It is said by the Transport Commission that the tendency in Australian mainland capitals is to set up one authority to control, or to control and operate, all forms of urban public transport including trains, buses, trams and ferries (*Ibid.*, p. 3). The reason why this is considered desirable by the Transport Commission is stated succinctly in the words of a French expert ' When several undertakings are responsible for public transport in a conurbation, it is desirable, as regards the co-ordination of their activities, that they should all come under the same authority ' (*Ibid.*, p. 4).

Examples are given of the situation in the other mainland capitals (*Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 3). In South Australia there is said to be a proposal before the Parliament at present to establish one control authority to be responsible for all transport services including railways, M.T.T. and private buses, and all licensing powers. It is proposed that such authority will be subject to Ministerial control. In Western Australia a new authority has been set up to be responsible for closer integration of rail and bus services. However, the Western Australian Government Railways will continue to operate the government railways on behalf of the new authority. In New South Wales a public transport commission was set up last year to integrate the management and operation of the railway system and the government-owned suburban bus and ferry services. That Commission is also subject to the control and direction of the Minister for Transport. In Victoria, a new Board has been set up to take over all responsibility for the Victorian Railways, including the suburban rail services. Another recommendation of Sir Henry Bland's report in Victoria was that there should be a new Road Transport Agency embracing all functions, including that of motor registration and road safety. The Victorian Government has announced that this recommendation also will be implemented. The proposed Road Transport Agency is to be responsible to the Minister for Transport (Sub. No. 230, p. 4).

The question of more effective control of public transport operations is under consideration in Brisbane (*Ibid.*, p. 4).

Mr Webb states that he considers that over the next five years the public transport operations in all the capital cities on the Australian mainland will be brought either under the control, or the control and operation, of one metropolitan transport authority (*Ibid.*, p. 4). He also cites a similar situation existing in London and in Paris.

(*b*) *Comment*

I note that only one of the mainland capitals, Sydney, has actually set up integrated control of urban rail and bus services. Integration is not complete in Perth, and at present is only proposed in Adelaide. *In any event, there are two facts applying in Tasmania which do not apply in the mainland capitals*:—

(i) All the mainland capitals have a substantial urban passenger rail network of services.

(ii) None of the other States is decentralised to the extent Tasmania is. In all the other States the overwhelming proportion of State population is in the capital city area.

24.1.2 *Assistance and Advice to the Minister for Transport*

The Transport Commission says that since the Minister for Transport is responsible (and the Government has the ultimate responsibility) for the operation of the Transport Commission and the M.T.T., it is essential that the Minister have the best possible advice in formulating and making decisions on matters of policy. (First Submission by the Commissioner for Transport, Sub. No. 23A, p. 2).

In order that this advice be of the required standard, it is said, the Minister must be able to call at all times on a competent and experienced administration with suitable back-up staff to meet his needs (*Ibid.*, p. 3).

24.1.3 *Co-ordination of Public Transport Services in Hobart*

Mr Webb in his first submission said that the Transport Commission has not in the past adequately co-ordinated public transport services in Hobart, and that a fundamental reason for this failure is the fact that the Transport Commission has had no control over operations of the M.T.T. (Sub. No. 23A, p. 3).

24.1.4 *Economies Effected by Amalgamation*

(*a*) *Savings in Administrative Costs.* If the Transport Commission became responsible for the operation of the service now conducted by the M.T.T., it is suggested by the Transport Commission that considerable savings could be made in administrative costs in relation to, *inter alia*, the following matters—

(i) all new engagements of staff would be made through the Commission's Staff Superintendent;
(ii) all industrial matters would be handled through the Commission's Industrial Officer;
(iii) all public relations and promotional activities through the Commission's Public Relations Officer;
(iv) all research projects through the Commission's Economist;
(v) all legal matters through the Commission's Solicitor; and
(vi) all public traffic questions (e.g., location of bus stops, bus turning areas) through the Commission's Traffic Engineer.

(*b*) *Savings on Computer Operation.* The M.T.T. has a small computer of its own for handling various administrative functions, and so does the Transport Commission, except that the Commission's computer is somewhat larger and more sophisticated. The Commission suggests that there would be economies to be had by transferring all records of the Trust which are now on the Trust's data processing unit to the Commission's computer, and so in effect handling all the work of both the Transport Commission and the Trust on the one facility. Some quite detailed evidence was submitted by both the Commission and the Trust in relation to the relative merits of the two computerised systems, and as to whether any worthwhile economy could be had by transferring the M.T.T. operation to the Commission's computer.

I make two comments. The first is that, notwithstanding quite detailed evidence, it appears that to evaluate the two systems completely would require a much more detailed study than has so far been done. Secondly, that in any event an evaluation could only be made by an expert, which of course I am not.

I am able to say, however, that the evidence from the Trust that its computer operation is relatively inexpensive and is adequate for its task seems persuasive, and is not disputed by the Commission's expert see Ex. T.C. 22, p. 9. Overall, I don't regard the computer issue as being of great importance to the question whether the M.T.T. should be incorporated in the Commission. It may well be that a small specialised data processing operation handled by the Trust itself is best for its purpose. Neither the State Treasury nor the Grants Commission have raised any queries about it. Being used only for the Trust's operations, it is continuously available for service to the Trust; whereas a time-sharing operation with the Commission's computer may be inconvenient and less satisfactory. (As to the relative computer operations, see Ex. T.C. 22 and Ex. M.T.T. 40A).

(*c*) *Other Savings.* The Transport Commission claims that its specialist staff, ' who have extensive experience in handling transport problems and have regular contact with other public transport authorities on the mainland ' would be available continuously to deal with and advise on M.T.T. problems as they arise, if the Trust were incorporated in the Commission (Sub. 23A, p. 4).

This specialist staff includes:—

Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the Commission;
Solicitor and Assistant Solicitor;
Economist and Assistant Economist specialising in transport economics;
Staff Superintendent;
Industrial Officer; and
Comptroller of Accounts.

The Commission further points to the ' inbreeding ' which results from limited avenues for promotion, and the inability of employees to move to other government departments and instrumentalities (*Ibid.*, p. 5).

Amalgamation of the Trust and Commission would enable inter-movement between the two, and give greater opportunities for Trust employees to undertake study courses (*Ibid.*, p. 5).

In addition, says the Commission, its combined experience in transport administration is much more comprehensive than that possessed by the General Manager, part-time members of the M.T.T., and senior staff of the Trust (*Ibid.*, p. 5).

24.1.5 *Review of Bus Operations*

The final submission of the Commissioner for Transport says that close examination should be made of the detailed costs of operation of the M.T.T., and that there should be no complacency as regards its present operations and the costs of providing the services. These should be compared with comparable costs of public bus authorities in the capital cities in the mainland (Sub. No. 230, pp. 4 and 6).

Various statistics were quoted by the Commission (*Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 6), but my comment is that they are of no particular assistance, for various reasons. The M.T.T. submission (Sub. No. 10, at p. 114) makes the point that direct comparison of operational costs cannot be made owing to the different accounting systems and policies under which each individual authority operates. I accept that point. The Commission does not suggest otherwise.

Further detail as to matters which a thorough review of the M.T.T.'s urban bus operations might consider is set out by the Transport Commission in one of its many written submissions (Sub. No. 23c, Appendix I). This covers many of the matters I have dealt with in various parts of this report, and other particular ways in which the Commission suggests it would, if it had control of the M.T.T., endeavour to increase public patronage.

The Commission raises the question whether the Trust has the resources to deal with policy planning for the future. It instances particularly the Trust's handling of the question of obtaining financial assistance from the Commonwealth Government for its operation. The Commissioner for Transport says that he would have expected that the Trust would have supplied to the Royal Commission detailed submissions in relation to a number of matters, including a draft submission to the Commonwealth Government for financial assistance for M.T.T. operations in Hobart, and also for financial assistance for Trust operations in the north of the State; designs for improved buses, suitable bus shelters, locations, etc., review of suitable ticket machines and ancillary equipment, construction of a new bus depot in Hobart, with specific designs, proposed equipment, etc.; and a five year programme for lifting the standards of buses in service, improving services and the like. Such submissions, he rightly says, have not been provided (Sub. No. 230, pp. 7 and 8).

24.1.6 *Liaison with Commonwealth Department of Transport*

The Transport Commission points out that there is an increasing problem in handling liaison with the Federal Minister for Transport and the Commonwealth Department of Transport in relation to financial assistance in the various capital cities (Sub. No. 230, p. 11). The Tasmanian Minister for Transport refers all such matters for attention to the Commissioner for Transport, and the Commonwealth Department deals with the Transport Commission in all matters effecting sea, road and rail transport to and from and within Tasmania (*Ibid.*, p. 11). The Commissioner, Mr Webb, attends meetings of the State Transport Ministers with the Federal Minister, comprising the Australian Transport Advisory Council, twice a year, and at other times meets with his opposite numbers in the other State and Commonwealth Departments. Mr Webb points out that the Managers of the public bus authorities from the six Australian capital cities and the A.C.T. do not attend these policy meetings. In addition, the Transport Commission is represented on other bodies established by the Australian Transport Advisory Council (*Ibid.*, p. 12). His point is that in order that matters involving urban public transport within the State should be properly represented in discussions between the relevant Australian bodies, the operations of the M.T.T. should come under the control of the Transport Commission.

24.1.7 *Commonwealth Government Representation*

According to the Transport Commission (Sub. No. 230), the Federal Minister for Transport is insistent that a Commonwealth Officer should sit on the Authority in each State responsible for formulating policy for improving urban public transport and allocating expenditure, including Federal funds for this purpose (*Ibid.*, p. 13). The Commissioner for Transport says in this submission that Commonwealth representation has been discussed with senior officers of the Department of Transport (presumably by Mr Webb or his representative), and the former have indicated that representation on the M.T.T. would not be what is required.

24..8 *Industrial Relations*

One of the Transport Commission's arguments for incorporating the M.T.T. is that the Transport Commission has a full-time Industrial Officer, who would be available to conduct all necessary negotiations on behalf of the M.T.T. with the Unions concerned (Sub. No. 23A, pp. 4 and 5). For instance, it is said, negotiations could and should be carried on with the Transport Unions in relation to the following matters:—

Determination of the most appropriate size of bus to be acquired in future for urban public bus operations in Tasmania.

Review of the present limit of thirty-nine seated passengers, subject to satisfactory safeguards.

Organisation with the Transport Unions of a quarterly meeting of Union representatives with the Transport Commission. It is said that this could be along the lines of the regular quarterly meetings held by the Transport Commission with the combined Railway Unions at Launceston.

Negotiations with the Transport Unions for a limited number of part-time drivers to assist with the morning and afternoon peak.

The M.T.T. submitted arguments rebutting all of these proposals (Ex. M.T.T. 48, opp. p. 7). The Trust says, for example, that the antipathy shown by the Drivers' Union to buses larger than 39-seaters in the past would seem to indicate the futility of pursuing any proposal for introducing a larger type of vehicle in the future. The Trust also considers (as earlier noted) that for Tasmanian conditions a maximum of thirty-nine seats is reasonable. It says that meetings with representatives of Unions on a combined basis are seldom requested, and unless there is some particular request or problem common to all Unions, are not generally favoured by the individual Unions. The Trust observes that the Secretary of the A.T. & M.O.E.A., Mr McNab, in evidence before the Commission supported that view.

The M.T.T. also considers that the Commissioner for Transport is optimistic in thinking that the Unions could be brought to accept employment of part-time drivers. It says that such a proposal is not in accord with accepted practices by the Union in all capital cities in Australia (Ex. M.T.T. 48, opp. p. 7).

The M.T.T. prides itself upon the excellent relations it has had over the years with the Transport Unions. Since the inception of the Trust in 1955 the main Union in Hobart, the A.T. & M.O.E.A., has stopped work on only three occasions. Two of these, a four-hour stoppage of 16 May 1969, and a one-day stoppage on 25 May 1969, were in relation to a national issue. The other occasion, four hours by agreement in an off-peak period on 4 June 1962, was to confirm negotiated variations in rostering methods (see Trust Sub. No. 10, p. 22).

The Trust says that this excellent record is in direct contrast with the stoppages by members of the same Union in the passenger transport undertakings in Melbourne and Sydney (*Ibid.*, p. 22).

I asked the General Manager of the Trust, Mr Boatwright, during evidence whether the past good relations with the Unions had been due to the fact that the Union dominated the Trust and always got its own way. Mr Boatwright replied that he himself negotiates with the Unions on all important matters and did not think that any Branch of the Union would suggest that he was over-generous. The Trust employs a part-time Industrial Officer, but any issue of a major nature he deals with personally. He has had long experience with Union matters, having been a Union official in his early days as a Secretary of a branch of the Municipal Officers' Society and later as a Federal Councillor of that Society (pp. 764 and 765).

I asked Mr Boatwright whether he thought that in the present size of the Trust it was reasonable for the General Manager as part of his duties to conduct this sort of negotiation on principal issues with the Union. He replied that the area was so vital that he felt it one of his responsibilities to handle such important issues personally and that in the present size of the Trust it was reasonable for the General Manager to do so (p. 765).

I regarded Mr Boatwright's arguments on this matter as persuasive, and in my opinion the excellent relationship maintained by the Trust with the Unions over the years has been one of its major successes.

24.2 **Trust Opposes Amalgamation**

24.2.1 *Rebuttal by the M.T.T.*

The M.T.T. is just as firm that it should not be amalgamated with the Transport Commission as the Transport Commission is certain that it should be. The Trust undertook to rebut in detail many of the arguments put by the Transport Commission for incorporation, but I do not propose to do more than summarise its point of view. In substance it is this—that the Trust operates the urban bus services efficiently and econ-

omically within the financial constraints imposed upon it up to this time; and that it has accumulated expertise, which the Transport Commission lacks, for continuing to do so (see M.T.T. Sub. No. 10, pp. 100 and 106).

In relation to particular aspects, the Trust submitted the points set out hereunder.

24.2.2 *Recommendation by the Denholm Committee*

This Committee was referred to during the hearings as the Urban Transport Advisory Committee set up by the Minister for Transport during 1972, to examine and report on the operations of the M.T.T. The M.T.T. points out that in late 1972 this Committee (which consisted of the Transport Commission Economist, Mr B. H. Denholm, as Chairman, the Engineering Manager of the M.T.T., Mr J. H. Holmes; and Professor Scott, Senator K. S. Wriedt, and Mr P. H. Goddard of the State Treasury, as consultants), recommended certain changes in the composition and Ministerial control of the Trust, but did not recommend incorporation within the Transport Commission (see Ex. R.C. 35).

24.2.3 *Co-ordination of Services*

The Trust conceded that there is a trend in Australia towards centralising control of the various forms of urban public transport. However, it submits that there is virtually no scope for such centralised control in Tasmanian urban areas because the provision of public transport is virtually wholly a question of bus operations (Sub. No. 10, pp. 101, 102).

24.2.4 *Management Expertise*

The practical experience of the Transport Commission in operating urban transport, according to the Trust, is restricted to the suburban rail passenger services. On the other hand, the Trust claims it has developed considerable knowledge and expertise in the specialised requirements of urban transport, which in Tasmania are characterised by short repetitive haul processes in bus operation (*Ibid.*, p. 102).

24.2.5 *Economies of Scale*

The Trust claims that cost savings or other benefits to be derived from amalgamation would be negligible, in that its specialised expertise in the relatively narrow field of bus passenger operations enables it to carry out that sole function efficiently and economically (*Ibid.*, pp. 101-102).

24.2.6 *Other Arguments*

Finally, the Trust opposes incorporation in the Transport Commission because—

(*a*) it would be against the spirit of the agreements for the taking over of the undertakings formerly conducted by the Hobart and Launceston Corporation; and

(*b*) amalgamation with the Commission would eliminate important principles involved in the Trust's present organisational structure, e.g.—

(i) public participation in policy making through the corporation nominees;

(ii) continuous liaison between the Trust, the two corporations, and the State Treasury; representation by a variety of community interests in the structure of the Trust; and

(iii) a single specialised function (*Ibid.*, p. 105).

24.3 **Consensus of Evidence by Witnesses involved in or Connected with Urban Transport**

The outstanding feature of the evidence in relation to this issue, whether the M.T.T. should be incorporated within the Transport Commission, was that very firmly and with virtual unanimity it was against such incorporation. I do not regard this as conclusive of the question by any means, but it is a factor to be seriously weighed in the Tasmanian context.

I propose to set down a list of the witnesses (other than the two parties concerned) who opposed incorporation, together with a very brief indication of the reasons expressed, respectively. The order is that in which they gave evidence.

Name and Representation	*Reason*
Mr H. H. McNab, Local Secretary, A.T. & M.O.E.A.	Transport Commission operations over the years on rail and Green Coach Lines not impressive (Sub. No. 7, p. 1).

Mr W. H. N. Calver, Chief Planning Officer, S.M.M.P.A.	T.C., as now constituted appears to have a bias towards rail. Would not have knowledge of all relevant factors for road passenger operation (Sub. No. 5, p. 14).
Mr M. D. Cresswell, Managing Director, Ace Bus Service	Specialised expertise is needed to run bus operations. Licensing authority should not also be an operator (Transcript, p. 482).
Alderman Soundy, Lord Mayor of Hobart	H.C.C. view is that this limited and specialised service can be more efficiently and economically carried out by a specialised ad hoc body than by a government department with inevitable restraints on quick action and decision making which characterise such departments. M.T.T. expert and efficient (Sub. No. 19, p. 2).
Mr R. C. Robertson, Station Secretary, National Union of Railwaymen	Amalgamation only if suburban rail continued. If not, amalgamation unnecessary (p. 655).
Alderman Fisher, Mayor of Launceston	Very strongly opposed because of original government agreement with Council, and necessity of adequate representation by Council. Decentralised management of M.T.T. essential; essential direct, adequate representation of northern interests. T.C. bureaucratic, disregard of local interests (Sub. No. 41).
Mr L. Whittle, Northern Branch Secretary, A.T. & M.O.E.A.	Strongly opposed. Practical experience essential. T.C. lacks necessary expertise (Sub. No. 45, pp. 8 and 9).
Mr V. G. Yaxley, Town Clerk, representing Burnie Council	Burnie Council very satisfied with M.T.T. in present form, desires retain (p. B885).

It is noteworthy that no single witness who expressed an opinion on the matter, outside of the Transport Commission, favoured incorporation of the Trust within the Commission.

24.4 Discussion of the Issues

24.4.1 *Whether M.T.T. would Operate more Efficiently as a Branch of the Transport Commission.*

The evidence does not persuade me that it would. Apart from the Transport Commission criticism, which in the main was based on a generalised attitude that the Commission has more resources and could run the operation better, and not on specific alleged failings of the Trust, the major criticism of the Trust during the evidence before me came from the Unions. That was, that the structure of the Trust is faulty because there is too little transport expertise in the Trust itself, and the higher executive staff structure is overloaded.

I agree in substance with the first of these two criticisms and will discuss possible changes in the structure of the Trust subsequently. If there was substance in the second criticism, it should be remedied as a result of recent retirements and reorganisation (pp. 121-122). Apart from that, as I have said earlier, the Trust is agreed on all sides to be a generally efficient operation within the financial constraints imposed upon it. It is true that the main deficiency of the Trust, which is an outcome of those constraints, is lack of planning and research facilities. As a consequence of that lack it has had perforce to run a day-to-day operation, so to speak—one not characterised by organised forward planning, nor by in-depth review of present operations in order to seek to improve quality of service.

As a further consequence of financial constraint and the over-riding need to provide an economical operation, the Trust management not only tends to abjure innovative or imaginative thinking about the quality of its service, but it has not the manpower nor the time to engage in such thinking.

Those failings (which, let it be emphasised, are not management failings as such, but an inevitable result of the financial framework within which the Trust operates) must be put right if a public urban transport service is to be provided which will have a real chance of attracting substantial new patronage.

But there are valid objections to incorporation, and in my view there is a better way of providing a remedy for Trust deficiencies.

24.4.2 *Integration and Co-ordination of Services*

This argument for incorporation (see para. 24.2.2 above) is not of such substance in Tasmania as it is in other States, because of the minor and declining role of suburban rail. Even if one assumes that suburban rail will continue for some time yet (contrary to what is recommended elsewhere in this report), its overall contribution to the urban passenger services of the State can never be more than minor, in my view. The problems of co-ordination of services relate to the public and private bus services. Co-ordination there is mainly a matter of eliminating unnecessary competition between them, and this is now provided for reasonably efficiently by Section 44 of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954. That co-ordination can and should be improved, but not I think by incorporation of the Trust within the Commission. Incorporation would bring the undesirable result that the same authority which licences the private operators would also be operating the public bus service. What is needed is better co-ordination between the Transport Commission and the Trust; and I propose hereafter a number of ways of achieving that. One is by re-structuring the Trust.

24.4.3 *The Specialised Nature of the M.T.T. Function*

The whole M.T.T. operation throughout the State is a relatively small one in Australian terms, and it has from an operational point of view, as a number of witnesses observed, a single specialised function. Provided proper facilities are made available for policy, operational, and forward planning, and management techniques are improved, no sufficiently good reason has been demonstrated in my view for bringing such a comparatively small and specialised function within a larger organisation charged with a variety of operational and regulatory transport functions. The evidence indicates, on the whole, that the M.T.T. is likely to operate more effectively as a separate organisation.

24.4.4 *Decentralised Management*

I regard this as a very important factor in the Tasmanian context. I think the present decentralised management divided between south, north and north-west, with substantial delegation of authority to the regional managers, is decidedly preferable to the much more centralised administration which would inevitably come about if the M.T.T. operated as a branch of the Transport Commission.

Evidence given in Launceston provides strong support for this view. Northern local interests and expertise should continue to have direct representation on the controlling body of the public urban bus services; and I do not regard, for example, a Tasmanian Urban Transport Council, as proposed by the Commissioner for Transport (Sub. No. 23 (*o*), p. 15), or a like body, as an adequate substitute for the direct northern representation which the importance and individuality of Launceston problems warrants and requires (see e.g., Launceston City Council Submision, Sub. No. 41, p. 2).

24.4.5 *High Regard of Local Authorities for M.T.T.*

The evidence is (para. 24.3 above) that the three local authorities which are of necessity most closely involved with the M.T.T., the Hobart and Launceston City Councils and the Burnie Municipal Council, regard the Trust highly, value their relationship with it, and want that relationship to continue. In my opinion it is, accordingly, important that the good relationship of the Trust with the three urban local authorities should continue unless there is sufficient reason to alter it. I believe it is unlikely that that relationship would continue to be as good if the Trust became incorporated within the Transport Commission.

24.4.6 *Success in Industrial Relations*

The success of the M.T.T. in its relationship with the relevant Unions since the setting up of the Trust is another good reason not to disturb the present independent operation of the Trust, in my opinion. I believe that the present practice of the General Manager of the Trust personally conducting important negotiations with the Unions, while in a larger organisation it would not be possible, is the best way of handling this very important area of management. It is likely to remain the best way, I think, until the public bus operations grow appreciably larger. I believe that this sensitive area of management-employee relationship is more likely to continue to be successfully conducted whilst the M.T.T. remains a separate entity.

24.4.7 *Liaison with other States and Commonwealth Transport Departments*

I think, with respect, that there is substance in Mr Webb's arguments on this point, but the problem can be overcome by the changes in structure of the M.T.T. which are suggested hereunder.

24.4.8 *Commonwealth Government Representation on Public Urban Transport Authority*

The question whether there should be Commonwealth Government representation on the controlling authority is, in my opinion, so purely a political question that I propose to make no recommendation about it. But if there is to be such representation, I see no difficulty about the Commonwealth Government having a representative on a re-constituted M.T.T.

24.4.9 *Recommendation Against Incorporation*

I recommend that the M.T.T. should not be incorporated in the Transport Commission, but that it should continue as a separate entity, subject to the alterations of structure and in planning and management facilities discussed hereunder.

24.5 Proposed Alterations in Respect of M.T.T.

24.5.1 *Structure of the Trust*

(*a*) *Reasons for Recommending Alteration*

Without implying any criticism whatever of the present or past members of the M.T.T., I believe that the Trust would be more effective as a controlling body if—

(i) it had more transportation expertise amongst its membership;
(ii) it was more closely allied and co-ordinated with the Transport Commission, wherein lie facilities for policy planning and operational review lacking in the Trust itself; and
(iii) there were representation thereon by employee interests.

(*b*) *Chairman of the M.T.T.*

In my opinion, liaison and co-ordination with the Transport Commission is so important to the operations of the M.T.T. that the Commissioner for Transport should be designated as Chairman of the Trust, and I so recommend. *This recommendation has in mind the following points*:—

(i) The Transport Commission is the controlling authority in relation to private operators, who constitute the other important segment of the urban passenger services, and whose operations should be closely co-ordinated with those of the M.T.T. Co-operation and co-ordination between the Commission and Trust at present is spasmodic, and depends mainly upon the attitudes and goodwill of the respective personnel concerned.
(ii) It is recommended hereunder that an urban transport policy and operational planning group or unit be set up within the Transport Commission for the purpose of advising the M.T.T. upon its policy, operations generally, and forward planning.

Reasons for that recommendation are there stated. It is essential in my view for the proper operation of the scheme upon which that recommendation is based, and for other reasons having to do with transportation planning (discussed below), that a high level representative of the Transport Commission should occupy a prominent place in the membership of the Trust. That place, I believe, is Chairman. The purpose, briefly, is to permit the M.T.T. to continue as an independent operational entity, but to ensure that policy and other planning emanating from the Transport Commission is adequately and fully considered and used by the Trust.

In addition, designating the Commissioner for Transport as Chairman of the Trust will, I believe, adequately cover (i) the question of proper representation of the Trust on other appropriate Australian transportation authorities and departments; and (ii) the desirability of the State Minister for Transport receiving broadly-based advice upon matters relating to urban passenger transport.

(*c*) *Interests which should be represented on the Trust*

In my opinion, both the Hobart and Launceston City Councils should have direct representation upon the Trust, because the cities are naturally the focus of the services provided by the Trust, and because so many aspects of city planning and development—for example, land-use, parking, traffic management—are so intimately connected with the running and planning of the urban passenger services. I think that with direct City Council representation there should be no need for further local government representatives. There was no indication in the evidence that the interests of other local Councils covered by the M.T.T. operations are not adequately covered by, or could not be adequately represented through, the City Council representation on the Trust. I am also of opinion that employee organisation should be directly represented by one member of the Trust. One of the present members, Mr H. T. McGee, in fact has Union as well as management experience, but such experience is not mandatory in the statutory constitution of the Trust (see para. 9.2.2). I

(*f*) *The General Manager*

At present, the General Manager of the M.T.T. is also the Manager of the Southern Branch. In my opinion it is plain on the evidence that the General Manager is overworked—or at least, so fully occupied by the activities of the post of Southern Manager that he has not enough time to be General Manager (see his evidence at pp. 130, 131 and 766).

With the expected infusion of capital monies from the Commonwealth and State Governments for the purpose of upgrading the system, and on the assumption that a strong effort will be made to increase the attractions of the bus service to the travelling public, the duties of the General Manager will increase. He should also be much more closely involved with planning in future. The case therefore in my opinion is very strong that the General Manager's position should be severed from that of Manager of the Southern Branch, and that the two positions should be occupied by separate individuals. I recommend accordingly.

24.5.2 *Policy, Operational and Forward Planning*

(*a*) *Planning Generally*

The planning experts who gave evidence all regarded as axiomatic the principle that transportation planning should not be divorced from general development planning. I cite some brief examples from the evidence:—

Professor Scott

'In 1961 an objection to the proposed Master Plan for metropolitan Hobart, which I drafted for submission by the R.A.C.T., stressed the need to co-ordinate transport and land-use planning, advocated the establishment of a single authority to be responsible for co-ordinating all transport and traffic planning and development within the metropolitan region, and urged that the establishment of the authority be regarded as a matter of urgency'. (Sub. No. 48, p. 3).

Mr Calver—S.M.M.P.A.

'Public transport is merely a part of the much larger transportation problem . . . it requires regional, State and indeed Commonwealth participation and co-ordination if a satisfactory solution, which is environmentally and economically sound, is to be found'. (Sub. No. 5, p. 1).

'No new town should be designed without regard to the total transportation system, but in Tasmania this is given scant attention. Every subdivision proceeds piece-meal with little regard for its neighbour, and even less regard for the future use and transportation requirements of more distant parcels of land. The reason for this is that municipalities do not have sufficient power to plan for the future development of private land in sufficient detail'. (*Ibid.*, p. 9).

(NOTE.—The evidence of the M.T.T. as to the difficulty of putting services into Moonah Heights, Howrah Heights, and West Hobart, owing to lack of proper planning in private housing developments) (Sub. No. 10, p. 93).

Mr B. McNeill, Director, Department of Environmental Design, Tasmanian College of Advanced Education

'Urban transport problems cannot be separated from the urban situation in general. Transportation and communication are not isolated or independent factors. They are the movement of goods, services, people and information between points of activity, residence or interest in an urban region. Any real attempt to grapple with urban transport problems cannot achieve a great deal of success without reference to the effort to deal with the inter-dependent social, political, administrative, economic and ecological problems or urban systems'. (Sub. No. 61, p. 1).

Mr McNeill went on to say in evidence—

'I would suggest that the Royal Commission inquiry can probably only point out alternatives and possibilities and often is unable to make judgements as between competing alternatives or inter-system relations . . .'. (p. 838).

I agree with that point so far as it concerns general planning. This report cannot do more in the wider field of planning in so far as that includes, as an integral part, planning for urban passenger transportation, than draw attention to the kind of on-going planning processes that appear to be required in this State. Particularly is this so inasmuch as details of the proposed State planning body have not yet been announced.

think it should be, and the member should be preferably one who has had substantial operational Union experience in the field of Tasmanian public urban passenger transport. The evidence given before this Commission by a number of Union officials shows how much can be contributed from the employee side.

I think also that it is desirable, generally speaking, for the State Treasury to be represented on the Trust, but I do not recommend that such representation be mandatory. At present, the statute provides that one member shall so far as practicable be a person who has had wide experience and has shown capacity in financial matters; and in fact one of the present members, Mr P. T. Williams, the Deputy Chairman, is a senior officer of the Treasury. I would leave that present requirement as it is.

I think also it is desirable to retain the provision that one member of the Trust should be a person who has had wide experience in the management of a transport undertaking.

I have stated six interests which in my view should be represented, so far as practicable, on the M.T.T. The present membership of the Trust is required to be not less than three nor more than five, and in fact consists of five members including the Chairman and Deputy Chairman. I would recommend that a reconstituted Trust consist of not less than four and not more than six members.

(*d*) *Trust should be made Subject to Ministerial Direction*

At present there is no provision in the Metropolitan Transport Act, 1954 making the Trust subject to direction by the State Minister for Transport, but the evidence makes it clear that the Trust in general so regards itself (see the evidence of the General Manager at pp. 36, 56, and 743). Evidence came from the M.T.T. that Ministerial directions were given to and obeyed by the Trust from the Ministers for Transport in both of the last two State Government (Sub. No. 10, p. 81, and see pp. 26, 44, and 45).

In my opinion it is right and proper that the Trust should be subject to Ministerial direction. That the Trust is so subject should be specified by statute, as appears to be the approved rule in other States (see para. 24.1.1 above). I recommend accordingly.

One particular reason for so recommending is that the scheme which is being advocated in this report is, basically, that policy and operational planning should emanate from the Transport Commission, which has the resources for that task, and that the M.T.T. should be the operational instrument. Where issues arise, as they are bound to do, whether particular policy recommendations of substance should be implemented by the M.T.T. or not, it should be clear that the Minister of the day has the right of final decision so far as the Trust is concerned.

(*e*) *Recommendation as to Structure*

In relation to the structure of the M.T.T., therefore, I recommend:—

That the Constitution of the Trust under section 3 of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954, should be altered so as to embody the following changes—

The Trust should consist of not less than four or more than six members appointed by the Governor.

Of the members of the Trust—

The Chairman of the Trust should be the person holding office as Commissioner for Transport;

One member should be a person who is nominated by the Hobart City Council;

One should be a person who is nominated by the Launceston City Council;

One should be appointed as a representative of employee organisations involved in Tasmanian public urban passenger transport.

In addition, so far as is practicable, of the members of the Trust—

One should be a person who appears to the Governor to have had wide experience and to have shown capacity in the management of a transport undertaking;

One should be a person who appears to the Governor to have had wide experience and to have shown capacity in financial matters.

Of the members of the Trust other than the Chairman, one should be appointed as the Deputy Chairman.

One can say, however, as a result of having heard a great deal of evidence on the subject during the Commission hearings, that planning processes in this State to date appear to have lacked ' teeth ', so that reports and recommendations can apparently be ignored at will by the local authorities to whom they are directed. And further, that liaison between State authorities closely connected with land-use patterns, city parking development, traffic management, and the like, has been fragmentary and sporadic.

An example may be given from the evidence of Mr Allwinton, the Director of Housing. The activities of the Housing Department are obviously very important in relation to the provision of public transport services to people living in State housing developments. One criticism made by Mr Calver was that the Housing Department has tended in practice to locate its housing developments in remote parts of the metropolitan area, at considerable distance from the major employment areas, and where the cost of transportation is at or near its maximum. If inter-suburb bus travel is necessary, he said, the cost is made even more unendurable (see Sub. No. 5, pp. 7 and 8). Housing Department policies therefore have a direct effect on the cost of providing public bus services to families in, generally speaking, the lower income groups, and thus contribute to the unprofitability of the M.T.T. services.

One would therefore have said it was self-evident that representatives of those authorities closely involved with the affairs of residents of proposed Housing Department subdivisions—e.g., the Public Works Department, the planning bodies (Southern Metropolitan Master Planning Authority, the Town and Country Planning Commissioner), the Hydro-Electric Commission, the Education Department, the Police Department, the Metropolitan Transport Trust, should closely co-ordinate during planning stages.

However, the evidence of Mr Allwinton was that when he took over the position of Director of Housing early in 1968, one of his first impressions was that there existed a lack of communication, co-operation and co-ordination between these various authorities. He took the initiative in calling a meeting of high level representatives of the authorities so concerned, to discuss the establishment of some permanent form of liaison which would improve the situation. The idea suggested was a regular monthly meeting of officers from all authorities affected, at a policy level, to discuss mutual activities and problems and to co-ordinate activities (see Housing Department Submission No. 31. p. 1). He said that although all the authorities recognised the value of regular exchanges of information, it was generally considered that no more than two meetings a year were necessary to achieve the purpose. Such meetings have taken place at approximately half-yearly intervals since that time, but the meetings have been occupied with little more than the Housing Department disseminating information about its activities. There has been very little feed-back to the Housing Department of information on the activities of the other authorities, and evidently no co-ordinated planning during the developmental stages of preparing for new Housing subdivisions (*Ibid.*, p. 1. See Mr Allwinton's evidence at pp. 583 and following).

I would have said that when the new State Planning Authority is constituted, positive attention should be given to *ensuring*, by Cabinet direction or by whatever other device is necessary, that the elementary requirement of co-ordinating planning between the various public authorities and departments takes place on a regular basis. However, I regard it as outside the terms of reference of my Commission to make specific recommendations. *I do however propose to make certain recommendations in relation to transportation planning.*

(*b*) *Urban Transportation planning should be at two levels*

There are two levels at which urban transportation planning should be conducted—one general, the other particular.

(i) *General*—I entirely endorse the suggestion of Professor Scott that appropriate machinery should be set up to co-ordinate transport planning and development in Tasmanian urban areas (Sub. No. 48, pp. 1 and 2). Professor Scott suggests two or three possible ways of doing so. It could be done as a branch or a part of the proposed State Planning Authority; or by the establishment of a Metropolitan Transport Committee, or the like, resembling the committee of similar name which apparently functions in Melbourne. Professor Scott suggests it might include the Minister for Transport and/or the Minister for Lands and Works, and representatives of the Treasury, the Transport Commission, the Public Works Department, the M.T.T., the Planning Authorities and Municipal Councils (Sub. No. 48, p. 3). It would be essential, he says, to include representatives of Glenorchy and Clarence as well as of Hobart in the south; and in the north, representatives of municipalities surrounding Launceston, and the Tamar

Valley Planning Authority (*Ibid.*, p. 3). A primary objective of such a body would be to co-ordinate transport and land-use planning, parking control in the cities, and all transport and traffic planning and development within the metropolitan region (*Ibid.*, p. 3).

I do not regard it as either possible or desirable to make specific recommendations as to the form that such a transportation planning authority should take. Much depends upon the make-up of the proposed State Planning Authority. But I recommend that such a general transport planning and development group be set-up in whatever may be considered by the Government to be an appropriate form.

(ii) *Particular*: *In relation to the M.T.T. and the Transport Commission.*—Here I shall make specific recommendations. The M.T.T. lacks planning resources to produce present and forward policy recommendations, to review existing operations, and to conduct short and long-term analysis and research. The Transport Commission has such resources, and furthermore, has suitable powers under its Act to carry out such functions (see Transport Act 1938, Sec. 9 17 (*g*). It may be that such powers will need to be expanded. The Transport Commission could, with perhaps some augmentation by outside expertise, set up a group or unit to devote a substantial part of its time to planning of this kind for the benefit of the Metropolitan Transport Trust. *The sorts of studies it might make include the following*—

Legislation and industrial awards controlling services provided by the Trust and private operators;
Co-ordination of public and private urban passenger transport services;
Revenue from and costs of providing services;
Public attitudes;
Origin and destination patterns;
Bus loading counts;
Bus routes and route coverage;
Bus speeds and delays;
Fare structure;
Method of fare collection;
Time tables;
Types of buses;
City bus terminals;
Garaging and servicing;
Rostering of crews;
Kerb space requirements;
Present system deficiencies;
Future passenger demand;
Possible innovations in technology;
Planning and testing of improvements;
Implications of city growth, planned developments, parking restrictions, staggering of working and school hours, pedestrian malls and highway plans;
Public relations and advertising; and
Recommended improvements (see Gelling Report R.C. 18, pp. 42 and 43).

This group could also prepare and submit to the Trust draft cases for financial assistance from the Commonwealth Government, as required from time to time.

I recommend that such a group be set up within the Transport Commission. A reason why I recommend that this group should be established within the Transport Commission instead of the M.T.T., in addition to the fact that the Transport Commission has the resources which the Trust has not, is that in my opinion *it is desirable to separate planning from operation.* That is to say, if the operational authority controls the planning group, the likely result will be that planning recommendations will tend to have too little influence on the implementation of policy. Naturally enough, an operational authority such as the M.T.T., having the responsibility of providing an economical service, especially against the Grants Commission background, tends to be over-conservative and to find reasons why a suggested innovation which carries some attendant risk would not work and should not be pursued.

One has in mind that if a real effort is to be made tc up-grade the bus services in all areas of operation, planning recommendations must be fully and responsibly considered on their merits, without the inhibition of an in-built bias against innovation in the authority which controls the planners. A similar divided set-up exists in South Australia, according to my understanding of Dr Scrafton's evidence (see pp. 829-833).

Dr Scrafton was good enough to send me a summary of the staff which operates under the Director-General of Transport, and an organisation chart. I have in mind that the local planning group should be along similar lines, but should be much smaller (see Ex. No. R.C. 105). The suggested planning group within the Transport Commission should, I think, have as a basis at least the following experts—a transport planning engineer, an economist, a research assistant, the general manager of the M.T.T. as an ex-officio member.

Mr Gelling in his report suggests a separation of planning and operational responsibility, and says that type of authority carrying that principle into effect is already in existence in parts of the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany (see Ex. R.C. 18, pp. 52 and 53).

Mr Webb, the Commissioner for Transport, suggests a separation of the policy and operational functions of the M.T.T. (Sub. No. 23 (*o*), p. 4).

A similar line of policy was also recommended by the report by Messrs C. B. Maclennan and W. T. Tobin to the Perth Regional Transport Co-ordinating Committee (Ex. R.C. 110, pp. 41-43).

My suggested separation of the planning and operational aspects of the public urban bus services is therefore not a concept which is new or untried. In recommending the setting up of such a planning and research group within the Transport Commission I have well in mind the question of taking positive steps to improve the organisation and operation of the public bus services without incurring any greater cost than is necessary.

PART G

MATTERS CONNECTED WITH AND RELATED TO THE FOREGOING GROUNDS OF ENQUIRY

25. THE NORTHSIDE FREEWAY

25.1 General

I have included some discussion and expression of opinion on the subject of the Northside Freeway Proposal in this Report because:—

(*a*) It is an important factor in relation to the future traffic congestion within the central city area and the eastern approaches, and so is of importance to urban public passenger transport. Accordingly, in my opinion, it is a subject within the terms of reference, being a matter connected with and related to the specific grounds of inquiry.

(*b*) A substantial body of evidence concerning this freeway proposal has accumulated during the Commission hearings from a number of expert witnesses, both for and against. The question whether it is to proceed or not, and if so, when and in what form, are matters of public discussion, and a contribution to the debate as a result of the evidence given to the Commission seems appropriate.

25.2 Short History of the Northside Freeway Proposal

(For a more detailed account see Sub. No. 19A by the Hobart City Council).

25.2.1 The Hobart Area Transportation Study, prepared by consulting engineers, Messrs Wilbur Smith and Associates of New Haven, Connecticut, and presented in April 1965, recommended a comprehensive highway construction programme for the Hobart area, related to expected transportation needs by the design year 1985. Included in this programme was the 'Northside Freeway', to extend from the Southern Outlet at Davey Street, crossing Park Street between Melville and Brisbane Streets to the Tasman Highway. The purpose of this facility, as expressed in H.A.T.S. 1964, was to improve access to the city centre by relieving local streets of traffic loads caused by through movements (see H.A.T.S. 1964, para. 741 (3)).

25.2.2 Subsequent to publication, the H.A.T.S. 1964 report and its recommendations were adopted in principle by the Government of the day and by the Hobart City Council (see Sub. No. 19A, para. 7.4).

25.2.3 In 1969, the firm of P. G. Pak Poy & Associates, consulting engineers and planners of Adelaide, were engaged to direct a formal revision of H.A.T.S. 1964. This revision involved supplying a study manager on a part-time basis, and other assistance as required.

The study so directed was carried out by a revision team formed by officers from the Department of Public Works, consisting principally of a traffic engineer, an urban geographer, a computer programmer, and a highway planner. The revision team was provided with technical guidance and direction by an executive technical committee comprising senior engineers from the Department of Public Works, Transport Commission, Hobart City Council, Glenorchy City Council and Clarence Municipal Association. In addition, an advisory technical committee was formed to assist the revision. This committee included a geographer, several town planners, a traffic engineer; representatives from the Metropolitan Transport Trust, the City Development Association, and the Housing Department. The people engaged in the revision, therefore, either in a direct or an advisory capacity, were not confined to highway and traffic engineers and planners. They encompassed a variety of skills (see H.T.R. 1970, paras. 115-118).

H.T.R. 1970 reported that the rate of population growth in the Hobart area estimated by H.A.T.S. 1964, namely 2·9%, had not eventuated (H.T.R. 1970, paras. 219-223).

Accordingly, it revised the population of 228 000 estimated by the 1964 study to be expected by 1985 back to 185 000 by 1990 (H.T.R. 1970, para. 225).

25.2.4 In carrying out H.T.R. 1970, the study team was advised that the Northside Freeway should be considered a committed project, but it was required to examine the impact of that freeway on the city, both in total and in the various stages of construction (*Ibid.*, para. 422).

It reported as follows, in respect of the Northside Freeway:—

(*a*) The 1970 revision had confirmed the need for a high capacity facility so located as to carry traffic around the core of the central business district between the South and East and the South and North.

(*b*) The ultimate effects of the Northside Freeway in traversing the central business district had not as yet been fully assessed. It recommended that a plan for the total development of the area affected, considering together both land use and traffic, be drawn up.

(*c*) It foresaw that part of the land may be used for landscaped open space, car parking and selected redevelopment by buildings; but final decisions as to design of the Freeway and the redevelopment of the land would depend upon a detailed study of the project.

(*d*) Both the construction of the Freeway itself and consequential redevelopment of land would be staged over the next two decades, but all changes permitted to buildings and the use of land during this period should be so directed that the ultimate environmental objectives of the community were progressively achieved (*Ibid.*, paras. 422-425).

25.2.5 In about November 1971, doubts having been cast on the validity of the Northside Freeway proposal, Pak Poy & Associates were asked by the Government to re-examine the recommendations of H.A.T.S. 1964 concerning it (see Sub. No. 19A, paras. 7.7 and 7.9). The report on this Review was produced in April 1972, (it will be referred to herein as ' the 1972 Review '). The objectives of the 1972 Review are described in its para. 1.2 as follows:—

' 1.2 OBJECTIVES

The basic objective of the review described in this Report was to determine the desirability and necessity of the Northside Freeway.

More specifically it was desired to establish the following:—

(*a*) What alternatives are there to the Northside Freeway which, in the short term (1980), in the intermediate term (1990) and in the longer term (beyond 1990), will accommodate all the traffic, both in kind and quantity, forecast by the Hobart Transportation Review 1970, and which do not affect other elements of the 1970 Revision Plan outside the central area?

(*b*) What are the costs of these alternatives, and the benefits and dis-benefits in quantifiable terms?

(*c*) What are the environmental aspects of these alternatives?

(*d*) How do these alternatives compare with the Northside Freeway?'.

25.2.6 It will be observed that the objectives of the 1972 Review assumed the necessity of building either the Northside Freeway or an alternative freeway to accomplish the same purpose.

That is to say, the ' desirability and necessity of the Northside Freeway ' was only considered by the Review in comparison with other possible alternative freeway schemes.

25.2.7 The 1972 Review considered the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the Northside Freeway and two possible alternatives, which were as follows:—

' SCHEME 1

A railway viaduct scheme instead of the eastern link of the Northside Freeway, combined with a " western by-pass " approximately along the lines of Burnett and Harrington Streets.

SCHEME 2

Using the eastern link of the Northside Freeway (i.e., across the lower end of the Domain above the Olympic Pool) instead of the railway viaduct scheme, together with the western by-pass.

25.2.8 The 1972 Review examined and reported in considerable depth on the comparisons between the three schemes in respect of—

Total costs (construction and acquisition);
Highway planning factors;
Environmental aspects;
Social effects;
Town Planning; and
Public attitude.

The 1972 Review rated each scheme in respect of each factor, but made no definitive recommendations as between them. It did, however, report that the railway viaduct scheme (Scheme 1) is less attractive than either the Northside Freeway or Scheme 2.

25.2.9 In October 1972, the Hobart City Council, having considered the 1972 Review and the advice of its officers thereon, and having conferred with the Public Works Department, advised the Government as follows (in summary):—

(*a*) The Council supported the implementation of the Northside Freeway proposal on the basis of the Government's financial responsibility as set out in a letter by the then Premier dated 10 January 1971, to the Lord Mayor.

(*b*) Uncertainty as to the location of the Freeway having been a ' bugbear to property owners and developers ', this uncertainty could now be brought to an end, and in the general interest the owners of property to be acquired should be notified, and work commenced at the earliest possible date.

(*c*) The Council should be consulted in order to be able to express views from time to time as to the structure of the Freeway itself, and the consequential redevelopment (see Sub. No. 19A, para. 7.12).

25.2.10 The Public Works Department, in a submission to this Commission (Sub. No. P.W. 2) has analysed the 1972 Revision Report, and for reasons explained in that submission states the view that consideration of all relevant factors heavily favours the Northside Freeway as against either of the other two possibilities.

25.3 Criticisms of the Northside Freeway Proposal

The three principal critics of this freeway proposal (in the order in which their evidence was given to the Commission) have been Mr R. W. Baker, M.H.A., Professor Scott, and Mr R. D. Cotgrove. A brief review only of the general lines of their arguments is possible here.

25.3.1 *Mr R. W. Baker, M.H.A.*

Mr Baker's concern is primarily environmental. He is not opposed to the eastern link of the freeway (i.e., across the southern end of the Domain (p. 610) but he does object most strongly to an elevated multi-lane concrete structure being built across the middle of the city, as he expresses it.

He said that it will be an eyesore and has not been shown to be necessary by any of the reports, in that in his view no traffic statistics which have been produced give a satisfactory estimate of future traffic passing through the city at peak hours. He regards off-peak through traffic as being of little importance in relation to possible justification for the freeway (see pp. 610-613).

Mr Baker's view may be summarised by a sentence in his written submission ' I say that in my view this proposed freeway would constitute an ugly, noisy, unnecessary, running sore across the city ' (see Sub. No. 34).

25.3.2 *Professor Scott*

(*a*) I have referred to the evidence of Professor Scott in other parts of this report. He dealt with the broader aspects of planning in Tasmania and particularly the Hobart area, with particular emphasis upon the place of transportation planning as part of the whole planning context. As Professor of Geography at the University of Tasmania since 1956 he has been closely interested in Tasmanian development and has been involved in an advisory or consultative capacity in a number of planning studies.

(*b*) In his evidence, Professor Scott was very critical of the almost complete absence of forward planning for urban development in Tasmania in the sense of developing alternative strategies for the future, so that goals can be chosen and positive action taken to influence development along chosen lines.

What has been done, on the contrary, he said, is that planning has concentrated upon projecting present trends and devising measures to accommodate them in the future.

(*c*) Applying that observation to the 1963-64 Wilbur Smith Study (which produced H.A.T.S. 1964), Professor Scott said that it employed ' extremely crude measures of projection and analysis ' (p. 876). By that I understand him to mean that techniques of traffic projection and analysis have become increasingly more sophisticated over the last decade; and also that the objectives of that study were far too limited, in that development and evaluation of alternative planning goals for the future had little or no part in it.

Notwithstanding that criticism, Professor Scott pointed out that he is a strong advocate of sophisticated methods of analysis and projection being employed wherever possible and wherever appropriate (p. 877); and was very much in favour of the methods used by the Wilbur Smith Study at the time it came into existence. However, ' there were very serious constraints built into the H.A.T.S. They were given the existence of the northern, eastern and southern outlets, . . .' (p. 877).

The witness stated that in 1963 evidence had been given before a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works raising the question whether or not the Southern Outlet was the most appropriate way to use valuable funds in the immediate future for highway construction. It seemed to him then that there was a case for looking at the possibility of extending the Brooker Highway northwards, and perhaps reconstructing the Bridgewater Bridge and building the eastern outlet. ' It may be argued ', the witness said, ' that if the southern outlet had not been built at that stage the demand for the northern outlet would not now be an issue ' (p. 877). He went on to say that he, in giving evidence to the Parliamentary Committee, had said that since there was to be a Transportation Study the following year it would be desirable if any decision on the southern outlet be delayed a year until the benefits of the study were to hand. He understood this proposal was adopted and the construction of the southern outlet was delayed a year, but he was not then aware that the consultants, Wilbur Smith & Associates, would be told, as in fact they were, that the southern outlet was to be accepted as a given feature. In his view, it is a significant point in relation to the H.A.T.S. operation that since the consultants were given ' these three links, (i.e., the Brooker Highway, the Eastern approach via the bridge, and the southern outlet) they obviously had to solve the problem of how to connect those in a way that could be suitable to the public. The whole of the process means that in time you are simply projecting what has happened in the late fifties and early sixties into the future and you are, in fact, producing a constraint on Hobart growth so that, in fact, the very planning process was imposing rigidities and constraints on the possibilities for future growth ' (p. 878).

(*d*) Professor Scott there touched upon a central point in the discussion about the Northside Freeway. The southern outlet has in fact been built, and we now have three major radial approaches to a city which is severely constrained by its topography in respect of traffic arteries which can be built *through or around it.*

We also see plainly how one planning commitment based upon accepting and projecting present trends into the future leads to another, in a seemingly inevitable process. Thus, the 1963 study team was told that the Southern Outlet was to be considered a committed project. (I cannot find this specifically stated in H.A.T.S. 1964, but various references indicate that it was so. Construction of the facility had actually commenced by the time the report was presented (see e.g., para. 777). Accepting the Southern Outlet as a committed project, H.A.T.S. 1964 recommended (*inter alia*) the Northside Freeway as a through connector between the northern and eastern approaches and the southern outlet, as well as a more efficient distributor of traffic to and from the central city area. The 1970 revision study team was in its turn told to accept the Northside Freeway as a committed project. The 1972 Revision considered, not whether there should be a northside freeway, but whether there are any feasible alternatives to achieve the same objectives, and to evaluate them. (To refer to these matters is not to criticise, but to observe how things have been, and how they are).

That brief review of Professor Scott's general position as I understand it leads to his specific criticism of the Northside Freeway proposal. Inevitably I must over-condense, but these appear to be the main points:—

(*a*) The case for the Northside Freeway rests upon an unsatisfactory basis, because ' scant attention (has been) given to the central area traffic problem in relation to a balanced provision of public and private transport and in relation to alternative land-use strategies for the metropolitan area ' (Sub. No. 48, p. 4).

(*b*) ' The 1972 Review by Pak Poy & Associates was much too narrowly conceived, since it sought to assess various alternatives as measures for accommodating all the traffic, both in kind and in quantity, forecast by the Hobart Transportation Study 1970. These projections take no account of possible changes in traffic generation that are possible as a result of a balanced transport provision and from alternative land-use strategies ' (Sub. No. 48, p. 4).

(*c*) The northside freeway proposal is ' a quite remarkable example of sectional planning exclusively for the motor vehicle, even to the extent of meeting its maximum needs at whatever the cost '. It is ' an unimaginative attempt at central area aggrandisement and appeasement of unlimited vehicular demand ' (Sub. No. 48, p. 5). It is a product of the 1964, 1970 and 1972 studies, in respect of which, ' it might not perhaps be too cynical nor too harsh to say that such studies merely provide the means by which an otherwise informed electorate can be bemused by seemingly rigorous but inefficient techniques to enable political objectives to be achieved with the minimum of controversy ' (Sub. No. 48, p. 4).

(*d*) The advantages of building a second Derwent Bridge instead of widening the present bridge ought to be considered in conjunction with (as I understand the argument) development of a planning goal of expanding urban development to the north of the city rather than continuing to orient development towards the city centre (p. 881).

25.3.3 *Mr R. D. M. Cotgrove*

Mr Cotgrove made a written submission upon invitation from Counsel assisting the Commission. He is a senior tutor in Geography at the University of Tasmania, and is the only person lecturing specifically on the subject of urban transportation at the University. He set out his criticisms of the Northside Freeway project under eight points, which I summarise:—

(*a*) The increases in population and traffic predicted by H.A.T.S. 1964 and H.T.R. 1970 have not materialised. H.A.T.S. 1964 predicted a 1985 population for the Hobart urban area of 228 000. Compare the H.T.R. 1970 comparable figure of 170 000. The 1971 Census showed an actual population of just under 130 000. Population trends thus suggest that the 1985 population may not exceed 150 000. The Hobart City Council's argument that the Kingston/Blackman's Bay/Margate area has a potential population of 100 000 is totally invalid, having regard to the overall Hobart population picture. The population trend since 1964 indicates that construction of the Northside Freeway should be deferred until such time, if ever, that Hobart's population growth trends are sufficiently clear to warrant construction (Sub. No. 62, p. 2).

(*b*) The Northside Freeway was conceived and planned for the sole consideration of facilitating through traffic needs of the private motor vehicle. Social and environmental consequences and integration with public transport have never been seriously considered. Hobart City Council planning objectives are over-whelmingly oriented to serve the interests of the retail and commercial functions of the central city area (Sub. No. 62, pp. 2-3).

(*c*) The adverse social consequences of the Northside Freeway upon pensioners, residents in general and resident workers and those who depend most heavily on close proximity to the city centre, i.e., the poor, the aged, and the car-less, have not been adequately considered. ' Such lower social groups lack both the means of acquiring access to information and the means to articulate their interests in a way which is acceptable to the professional decision makers ' (Sub. No. 62, p. 3).

(*d*) The Northside Freeway will produce serious and permanent environmental disadvantages, i.e., noise, air pollution, overshadowing, aesthetic ugliness.

(*e*) The Freeway, together with associated works and acquisition costs will by the time it is completed be enormously expensive (*Ibid.*, p. 4).

(*f*) The volume of through traffic for which the Northside Freeway has been specifically designed has been grossly over-estimated by the studies as a result of the incorrect population forecast. In addition, through traffic is not the problem it has been represented, as it mostly occurs at other than peak periods. ' Relatively simple and inexpensive measures ' to facilitate traffic flows in the city are recommended (*Ibid.*, pp. 4-5).

(*g*) Sensible planning requires that proposals for the movement of private motor vehicles be integrated with other forms of transportation (*Ibid.*, p. 5).

Since the original H.A.T.S. recommendations, there have been two major changes in community attitudes relevant to this proposal. First, a growing awareness of social and environmental considerations in all aspects of planning, and increasing concern for the development of alternative transport modes to the private vehicle. Second, world wide experience with urban freeways shows that they cause more troubles than they solve.

25.4 **Arguments in Favour of the Northside Freeway**

The two principal protagonists are the Hobart City Council and the Public Works Department.

25.4.1 *The Hobart City Council*

(*a*) I was provided with a detailed written submission (Sub. No. 19A) and oral evidence from three officers of the Council—the City Engineer, Mr P. G. Crawford; Mr J. E. Tiller, Chief Design Engineer for the Hobart City Council; and Mr K. N. Harris, Development Engineer with the City Council. The evidence was that of those officers and not of the City Council, but I assume that their views represent, generally speaking, the views of the City Council.

(*b*) The overall view of the Northside Freeway held by these key engineering and planning officers of the Council is stated in a passage from the City Engineer's report to the City Council on the recommendations contained in H.T.R. 1970. After referring to ' the highway framework for the growth of the metropolitan area ', this is stated:—

> ' The " king-pin " in this system is the Northside Freeway, which carries in the nature of a ring road across the north of the central business district traffic which has need to by-pass the centre, and also that which distributes itself into or from the central business district street system '.
>
> ' It can be seen that without a north-south corridor, the three existing expressways—Tasman, Brooker and Southern Expressways will pour their traffic into a concentrated area of the central business district to its detriment. The central area must have accessibility if it is to survive and must not be choked by traffic which has no business there '.
>
> ' The economic health of the city depends on the construction of a ring road, just to the north of the central business district ' (Sub. 19A, p. 14).

As they developed this overall view, these witnesses made the following point (which I briefly summarise):—

(i) Mr Harris, who is virtually the City Planner, sees the Northside Freeway (p. 1002), in addition to its traffic distribution advantages, as ' a great opportunity which won't recur again for a long period of time, to undertake a total re-development planning scheme for the whole broad corridor north of the central area '. He foresees an opportunity for the whole of the city from the central area up to Warwick Street, and from the Brooker Highway to Elizabeth Street to be reconstructed in respect of land uses appropriate to transport—e.g., Fire Brigade, Ambulance Services, Airways and Bus Terminals, etc. Having upgraded the area in this way he foresees in the long view additional improvement by high grade buildings (p. 1002). These officers say that as planners they deal with ' proven forces ' (p. 992).

That means in this context that they expect continued growth of private motor vehicle use. They say that nothing in their reading or experience gives them any reliable indication as to how many car users can be weaned away to public transport no matter how much the latter is improved, and so they expect continued growth in motor traffic in and out of the city. In our social and political climate, they say, Hobart is likely to remain ' auto-dominated ' for a long time yet.

In that situation, they believe it is essential to plan ahead for what almost certainly will happen, no matter how much some planners would prefer it otherwise.

(ii) They answer criticism based upon the failure of the Hobart area population to live up to the expectations of H.A.T.S. 1964 in the following way:—

First, that the H.T.R. 1970 population trend estimates were reduced appropriately. Second, that while the 1964 study over-estimated population trends, it under-estimated growth of motor vehicle ownership per head (p. 999). Similar under-estimation has occurred elsewhere, they say, as shown by New Zealand studies (p. 1000).

A diagram was produced based upon the H.T.R. 1970 figures, showing expected rates of traffic growth on the various arterial roads in and around Hobart between 1970 and 1990 (p. 998). These included an expected growth on the southern outlet of 4·1 times (Ex. No. H.C. 4). They also say that Hobart's growth has been for some time self-generating, since a population of 60 000 is about the watershed point beyond which growth is self-generating (p. 999).

(iii) The city planners regard the Northside Freeway as having another major function in addition to its role as a through traffic facility—that is, as a distributor and collector of traffic entering and leaving the city (p. 997).

' Traffic ', they say, ' will be able to flow easily and very easily get into and out from the city with a minimum disruption of the city streets onto this major arterial route, and . . . this is of fundamental importance to the city centre and to the protection of the environment of the central area, where pedestrians should enjoy themselves and be able to shop in comfort ' (p. 997).

The traffic estimates produced by H.T.R. 1970, it was said, show that the Northside Freeway in its dual purpose of by-pass road and traffic distributor will take 60 000 vehicles per day which need not be there off the city streets (p. 1001). (I have, since the evidence was given, drawn that figure of 60 000 to the attention of the City Engineer, and he agrees that according to H.T.R. 1970 the figure should be 50 000). It was also said that when the Northside Freeway is built it is expected to be strongly coupled with both Macquarie and Davey Streets, which will then, together with it, become a sort of ring road around the city (p. 997). Other integral parts of the overall scheme are Grosvenor Expressway, and a re-ordering of the directions of traffic flow within the city area. This re-ordering of central city traffic flow, which is described in paras. 439-441 and is shown on plan 4.4 of H.T.R. 1970, for the 1990 circulation, ' will enable better accessibility to business places, better conditions for pedestrians and the ability to introduce, if so desired, pedestrian malls (Sub. No. 19A, p. 12 (1))—particularly in Collins Street between Murray and Argyle Streets, and in Elizabeth Street between Macquarie and Liverpool ' (see H.T.R. 1970, fig. 2).

As a by-pass road, the city planners argued, H.T.R. 1970 figures show that 31 500 vehicles per day, out of a total of about 142 000 vehicle per day (approximately 20 per cent of the total), would be expected by 1990 to be enabled by the Northside Freeway to pass between east to south and between north to south through Hobart without cluttering the city streets. This is about the same volume as that which now passes over the Tasman Bridge per day Sub. No. 19A, p. 17, para. 9).

Thus, the remaining 101 500 vehicles per day will be terminating traffic (i.e., in the city); but as mentioned in the previous sub-paragraphs, the freeway would also take a substantial portion of these off many of the city streets which they would otherwise traverse if the freeway were not there. As to the effect of the Northside Freeway on public transport, it was said that a great deal of study in relation to re-routing, possible establishment of city terminals and the like would need to take place; that the public transport system will have to be modified to conform with the freeway pattern; and that the freeways and expressways will greatly facilitate the flow of public transport into and out of the city (p. 998).

(c) The submission by the three officers, and the evidence of Mr Harris, referred to the argument sometimes advanced that the community cannot afford to pay for the proposed highway system (see for example, the thoughtful submission of Mr M. F. Lillas, Sub. No. 33). Reference was made to H.A.T.S. 1964, in which it is pointed out (paras 892-902) ' that measurable direct benefits to the community in terms of accident savings, operational savings and time savings derived from the system amount to $9·4 million per annum at 1985 traffic estimates, against a capital outlay of $50 million. This represents a return on investment of 19 per cent to the community. In addition there are indirect benefits ' (quoted from Sub. No. 19A, p. 8, para. 6.1).

Mr Harris said that in transportation planning generally, 10 per cent is considered to be above the threshhold of this cost-benefit ratio, and ' when it goes about 10 per cent it is quite overwhelmingly acceptable and necessary in order to avoid the misery of accidents and give the community the facility which they are entitled to enjoy when using their own private car, and the same sort of facility for the public transport system ' (pp. 996-997).

The point he was making was that even if the 1985 traffic figures do not come up to the 1964 estimates, the cost-benefit ratio in relation to the then proposed highway network, including the Northside Freeway, would be very clearly in favour of going ahead.

(*d*) The City Council officers recognise the importance of avoiding least-cost solutions in fitting the freeway into the environment, and they argued that if a reasonable amount of money is made available this can be done so that the freeway would not be the eye-sore which critics aver. They said also:—

(1) that the city end of the Southern Outlet in the Fitzroy Gardens area is a good example of what can be done;

(2) that a depressed instead of an elevated roadway would be desirable, but this is not feasible because of the engineering problems (p. 1003);

(3) that most of the central link of the freeway will be supported by embankment, and elevated in isolation from ground level only where it crosses the north-south streets; and

(4) that the width of the freeway, being probably of the order of 100 feet set in a strip some 400 feet wide (i.e., the distance between Melville and Brisbane Streets) will leave ample room for landscaping and beautification in various ways (p. 1004).

The Council officers deposed that when in 1964 the best practicable route was being considered, one quite feasible route would have been across the waterfront and around the harbour, but it was considered that this would have been intolerable aesthetically; and one of the principal reasons for choosing the suggested route of the freeway was that when viewed from a distance from any direction it will not break the skyline, but on the contrary will be largely ' tucked into the surrounding hills ' (p. 1005).

(*e*) It was also pointed out that the Northside Freeway and the Grosvenor Expressway conceptions are designed to by-pass the two major commercial areas in the central city and in Sandy Bay respectively. The topography of Hobart, it was said, requires both of these centres to be by-passed if they are to remain viable (Sub. No. 19A, p. 21, para. 7.16).

(*f*) Finally, the City Council officers deposed that the Northside Freeway project (as the major work in the overall city highway programme) has been related to and complies with standards laid down by the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads (' the C.B.R.') after conducting Australian Roads Needs Surveys. They briefly described the major points of the ' tolerability concept ' adopted by the C.B.R., as applied to arterial, sub-arterial, and residential streets. The principal points of assessment as a result of which a given intersection road, street, etc., is found to be deficient or otherwise are—

(A) operational;

(B) structural; and

(C) safety (Sub. No. 19A, p. 23).

(*g*) As a result of the above exercise, the officers said, the following conclusions emerged:—

(i) The operational and safety deficiencies of the streets and intersections in the central city area, applying the criteria laid down by the C.B.R., are and/or will be by 1990 such that a by-pass of the central area is required which is fully access-controlled and does not involve widening an existing road. The only project which fits this is the Northside Freeway staged as recommended by H.T.R. 1970.

(ii) The same remarks apply to the Grosvenor Expressway built in stages as recommended by H.T.R. 1970.

(iii) No other expressways or freeways are required by 1990 in the inner urban area of Hobart.

(iv) The independent survey conducted by the C.B.R. using a different set of criteria from those used in the 1964 and 1970 Hobart studies supports the recommendations of the H.T.R. 1970 (Sub. No. 19A, p. 25, para. 8.17).

25.4.2 *The Public Works Department*

(NOTE: These points are additional to those made by the City Council).

(*a*) The following were the arguments put by the Public Works Department witnesses in the final submission made. The P.W.D. witnesses were Mr G. E. C. McKercher, Deputy Director of Public Works; Mr J. A. Watts, Planning Engineer of the Department since 1955; and Mr C. R. Willing, Assistant Chief Engineer, Road Planning and Design (see Ex. P.W.D., 2):—

(i) The Northside Freeway proposal is superior to the two alternative schemes formulated in the 1972 Review, and should be adopted. An early firm decision is essential in order to resolve the present uncertainty of property owners, developers, and the City Council.

(ii) About 60 per cent of the properties required for the Northside Freeway are already in public ownership, and the owners of other properties affected are pressing for a firm decision (P.W.D. 2, p. 1).

(iii) Detailed reasons are given for preferring the Northside Freeway proposal to either of the Western by-pass schemes.

(*b*) In a letter to the Commission dated 31 August 1973, following a request for further information, the Director of Public Works wrote ' our investigations indicate that the ramps of the fully developed Northside scheme would deliver in 1990 some 23 684 vehicles daily to the city centre. This is based on the premise that full car-parking facilities were available in that area to receive the vehicles. If, on the other hand, some restriction in car parking was in existence, and in particular a deficiency of 6 000 parking spaces were allowed to develop (*vide* para. 348 of H.T.R. 1970), then the number on the above basis would be reduced to 21 553. These figures should be related to the total arrivals to these central areas of an estimated 95 567 vehicles, and also to the fact that all these figures are based on person trips and that some distribution of real parking will inevitably take place '.

(*c*) The P.W.D. witnesses made the point that they do confer as much as possible with interested city and other public organisations in formulating their plans for road construction. Thus, in drawing up detailed plans for the central link of the freeway, the Public Works Department would propose to make a joint engineering, land-use and town planning study of the route in conjunction with the City Council, and would take care to use the best possible landscape architecture and the like (p. 975).

It is essential, in their view, to overpass the main north-south city streets, but at the far south-western end of the freeway it will become depressed—i.e., ' in cut '. At the present stage they envisage four possible types of treatment which may be used in different parts—for example, where the eastern link will junction into Melville and Brisbane Streets in the first stage there may be a garden development where the ramps link to present street level. Elsewhere there may be piers and spans to provide open space underneath, retaining walls with solid construction underneath, and in other areas the roadway structure may be integrated with a proposed building or buildings. No detailed planning of this sort has yet been done (p. 976).

(*d*) As do the City Council planners, the P.W.D. planners say that they are bound to anticipate likely future trends and make plans for them, based on judgments made according to all available past and present experience. None of this experience indicates to them that the number of cars being bought and used will not substantially increase (p. 977).

(*e*) These witnesses refute the criticism that the freeway will be a barrier separating the central business district from the northern suburbs. There will be no physical barrier because there will be no interference with the movements of vehicles or of people either north to south or east to west (p. 979). There will be a visual barrier, but, properly planned, the effects of this can be reduced. The P.W.D. proposes to proceed with the land-use and engineering study upon the basis that, assuming future trends show this facility to be required, the indicated route is the one it will take (p. 979).

25.5 Further Discussion of the Issues

25.5.1 *Visual aspect*

There is in my opinion no doubt that the central link of the Northside Freeway will, if and when built, detract from the visual and aesthetic aspects of the inner city. On the other hand, I do not think that with proper planning it will be the devastatingly ugly eyesore which the critics expect. A person moving around the city is likely to notice it most where it passes over north-south streets, because otherwise it will be obscured between blocks of buildings on either side. It will be visible in its entirety, generally speaking, only from high ground and from a distance; and its elevated aspect will not at a distance, I should think, be very noticeable (see 1972 Review, pp. 19-23). Wherever seen as a whole, however, it will certainly appear as a broad swathe of concrete.

25.5.2 *Noise*

There will be an increased noise problem for a number of buildings along the proposed route. The matter is dealt with in some detail by the 1972 Review (pp. 19-23 and figs 5, 6 and 7). But how the noise problem so experienced would compare with that already experienced by the occupants of office and commercial buildings around the central city block at present has not been determined by tests. It appears that tests carried out in a survey by the Acoustic Laboratory, Commonwealth Health Department in Hobart, show that noise levels measured in various parts of the Hobart Matriculation College facing the Brooker Highway are roughly equivalent to those which would be experienced by the affected buildings along the route of the proposed freeway (1972 Review, pp. 18 and 19).

25.5.3 *Mr Cotgrove's Criticisms*

In respect of these criticisms, I would make the following comments:—

(*a*) Mr Cotgrove says that construction of the freeway should be deferred until such time, if ever, that Hobart population trends warrant its construction (p. 979). As I understand the planners, they agree that construction of the central link should not be finally decided upon until future trends bear out present expectations. But they also say that population growth as such is not the vital factor, but growth in motor vehicle ownership and use is; and that the latter is growing faster than the former (para. 25.4.3 above). I agree that the vital factor is growth in motor vehicle ownership and use, but in any event no one suggests that a decision to commence construction of the central link is not some years off.

As I understand it, the present position of the State Government is that it supports and approves the construction of the Northside Freeway in stages and planned ' as and when the traffic data supported it ' (Sub. No. 19A, para. 7.13). A final decision to proceed with construction is therefore, as mentioned earlier, presumably some years away.

Paragraph 568 of H.T.R. 1970 says that by 1980 part of the western end of the Northside Freeway should be constructed in order to make a couplet of Barrack and Harrington Streets south of Melville Street. Fig. 4.6 of H.T.R. 1970 shows how this would be done so as to take the western part of the Northside Freeway across from Barrack to Harrington Streets through three city blocks between Goulburn and Brisbane Streets. However, para. 462 of H.T.R. 1970 says that ' because of the considerable back-log of the deficiencies already in existence in the study area, the majority of the works required by 1990 should have been commenced by 1980 '. Presumably this means that construction of the central link of the Northside Freeway should, according to that study, be commenced by 1980. If this timing were to be adhered to, it would seem that a final decision to construct at least the western end of the central link would be required within two or three years, but having regard to development up to date it seems virtually certain that the timing suggested by H.T.R. 1970 cannot be adhered to. In any event, it would seem wise for the Government of the day not to regard itself as bound by any particular planning timetable.

(*b*) It is not correct to say that the Northside Freeway was conceived and planned for one consideration only, that of facilitating the through-traffic needs of the private motor vehicle. An equally important planned function is that of acting as a distributor and collector of traffic entering and leaving the city (H.A.T.S. 1964, para. 741 (1); H.T.R. 1970, para. 422, but see paras 439-441; 1972 Review, paras 2, 3 and 2; para. 25.4.1 above).

(*c*) I don't think that adverse social consequences of the freeway will be such a grave problem as has been claimed. The interests of people affected must be treated carefully, and one would say generously, but the following points are of importance to this argument:—

(i) The displacement of persons from acquired buildings would take place over a period of some years. Displacement would therefore be a gradual process.

(ii) Sixty per cent of the buildings affected are already owned by public authorities (Ex. P.W.D. 2); and residents in those buildings will know already that their residential time there is limited. Commercial interests in the affected area can be adequately compensated.

(iii) The number of persons affected is relatively small (Sub. No. 62, p. 3).

(iv) Many of the residents and small businesses would be gone already if it were not for the fact that knowledge of the freeway proposal has inhibited normal commercial development in the area for ten years or so.

(v) In any event, the principle of compulsory acquisition of private property in the public interest has been accepted in principle and common in practice in England and Australia for well over a century.

(*d*) The environmental argument put by Mr Cotgrove is similar to Mr Baker's main criticism, already mentioned. However, Mr Cotgrove objects to the eastern link of the highway across the Domain as much as to the central link, whereas Mr Baker apparently does not find the eastern link objectionable. My own comment is that I do not think the eastern link will be of substantial detriment aesthetically. The P.W.D. model of the eastern link, which is the only model completed according to scale and showing the highway as it is proposed to be built, I believe supports this view. The eastern link will pass across the lower end of the Domain just above the Olympic Swimming Pool. It will not, as I understand it, restrict accessibility to the Domain.

(*e*) The financial cost of the freeway will be high, but I agree with the planners that this important question is one which in any event will be decided by Commonwealth rather than State authorities. The bulk of the finance must come from Federal sources, and the Commonwealth Government has made it plain that funds for freeway development will not be provided unless the Commonwealth is satisfied that proportionate public benefit will flow from expenditure of public funds in that way.

(*f*) Finally, Mr Cotgrove adverts to the growing awareness of social and environmental considerations in planning, and comments that the Northside Freeway would increase the amount of traffic wishing to stop at the city centre, with, it is suggested, inevitable consequences of overloaded intersections, ' limited or highly expensive parking areas and choked city streets '. My comment is that this aspect has not been overlooked by the planners (see paras 439-441 of H.T.R. 1970). I have set out the substance of the planners' views on this point para. 25.4 above.

25.5.4 *Professor Scott's Criticisms*

His arguments are placed in a more general planning context than Mr Cotgrove's. I have earlier made some comments upon the forward momentum that planning development engenders (see para. 7.2.1 above).

Professor Scott's criticisms concentrate upon the need to base specific planned developments upon alternative land-use strategies and broad overall planning—in effect, to develop strategic planning gaols and to base specific development goals upon them, rather than merely to project present trends into the future and plan accordingly. One cannot but agree with that; but at the same time, the decision-makers must cope with what has, in fact, occurred, as well as looking to improve future planning processes.

25.5.5 *Comments on the Arguments in Favour*

(*a*) I must say that the arguments put by the planners appear to me, as a layman, to be sound as far as they go. I think they are entirely right to use all their skill and experience to plan for a future which present and past trends tell them will come about. They are confident that what they predict on the basis of experience will, generally speaking, come to pass; but of course it may not. Everything depends upon the accuracy of their predictions.

Their techniques of constructing mathematical models and the like are continually improving *vide* Professor Scott's evidence; and, in fact, some of the 1964 predictions, e.g., as to population rise, have not occurred. The planners, of course, do not claim that their predictions are infallible—they advocate continuing study and updating of predictions.

(*b*) One point worth taking into account is that (and it is no disrespect or criticism to say so) the official planning experts who gave evidence have been committed to the validity of the Northside Freeway concept for up to ten years. This applies particularly to the City Council experts, and I think also to Mr Watts, the Planning Engineer of the Public Works Department. Mr Crawford was a member of the Policy Committee, and Messrs Watts and Harris members of the Executive Technical Committee for the 1964 Study.

In the 1970 study, Mr Watts was Chairman of both the Executive Technical Committee and the Advisory Technical Committee, and Mr Harris was a member of both Committees. Mr Tiller is primarily an engineer, and has been Chief Designer of the Hobart City Council since 1960. It might be advisable for the decision-makers to obtain some non-committed expert advice before the final decision to construct the central link is made.

25.6 **Conclusions**

(I reiterate that these suggestions are put forward as being no more than a contribution to the debate and for what they may be worth):—

(*a*) A decision should be made without delay as to the route which the central link of the freeway will take if constructed, in order to end uncertainty on the part of all those affected. The evidence strongly favours the Northside Freeway route as against the two alternative schemes examined by the 1972 Review.

(*b*) Acquisition of properties along the route should be continued, and a detailed land-use and development study of the central link should be put in hand by the Public Works Department in conjunction with the Hobart City Council. That is to say, all necessary preparation should be commenced and/or continued upon the assumption that a positive decision will be made to construct the freeway. Nevertheless, pressure to make prematurely a final commitment as to construction of the central link should be resisted. Further detailed study should be put in hand and continued, covering amongst other things the extent to which traffic growth in the city is in accordance with the expectation of the planners. This question seems to be the most vital one in the whole debate, and would seem to require very close attention over the next few years. Attention should also be given to the question how much through traffic occurs at peak hours as distinct from non-peak hours. It also seems from recent press reports from the United States that further information should be obtained as to the levels of lead and sulphur pollution emanating from busy freeways. The emerging energy crisis must also be watched.

(*c*) Particular care should be taken to see that people adversely affected by any decisions related to the Northside Freeway are advised of their rights, and given adequate opportunity to exercise them through legal aid and social service assistance, where appropriate.

(*d*) Effort should be made to make more information available to the public as to the case for and against the Freeway. The decision whether or not to build the central link is one of the most important this community will ever have to make in relation to the city of Hobart, but uninformed opinion is not very helpful, bearing in mind the complex issues involved.

(*e*) A final decision on construction of the central link should not be made before there is a full social benefit-cost evaluation of the central link of the Northside Freeway proposal made by a non-committed group of experts. (Perhaps this could be done by the Bureau of Transport Economics). It is understood that the Commonwealth Department of Urban and Regional Development proposes to have such a study carried out.

25.7 **The Eastern Link of the Northside Freeway**

25.7.1 *Mr Reber's Scheme not Recommended*

So far I have said little about the Eastern (Domain) link of the freeway, which is designed in the first stage to relieve the railway roundabout. Mr Grote Reber's submission suggests a trial of an alternative scheme which involves, amongst other things, changing the shape of the roundabout to a diamond, and lane reversal in Liverpool Street from 4.00-6.00 p.m. on weekdays. It is an interesting scheme, but I do not stay to describe

it in detail. I agree with the adverse comments of the Traffic Engineer, Mr Eaton, upon the scheme, and in particular with his point about the difficulty of making lane reversal in Liverpool Street work. I do not think the Draconian measures adopted in Columbus, Ohio, as described by Mr Reber, to keep offending parked vehicles off the street as the time for lane reversal approaches each day, would be acceptable in our socio-political climate. Nor should they be while they can be avoided by other reasonable measures which do not involve undue compulsion and repression of people.

25.7.2 *Sound case for Eastern Link*

I do not propose to discuss the eastern link in detail, but will say only that the evidence produced before the Commission shows, in my opinion, that a sound case exists now for the construction of the eastern link, independently of whether the central link is to proceed.

26. MATTERS NOT DEALT WITH

26.1 Raised by Commissioner for Transport

The Commissioner for Transport in various information papers put before the Commission, and in evidence, made a number of proposals for consideration, designed to improve local urban passenger transport. Time has not permitted a discussion of these in this report, but they or some of them may well be worth studying by the proposed planning group.

They include:—

Multiple taxi hiring on bus routes;
Dial a taxi for multiple hiring;
Club use of private cars;
Club use of licensed buses;
Free parking and bus rapid transit to city (see Ex. No. 23L, p. 10); and
Jitney Taxi Operations (Sub. No. 23 (*o*)).

26.2 Taxi and Hire Car Operations

I received a written submission from the Tasmanian Taxi and Hire Car Association concerning this matter (Sub. No. 59), a comment on that submission by the Assistant Administrator of Road Transport, Mr Allanby, (Sub. No. T.C. 30, App. (*a*)), and an information paper from the Commissioner for Transport on the subject (T.C. 2). However, the matter of taxi and hire car operations was peripheral to my terms of reference, and the press of other issues made it in my opinion impracticable to make any recommendations in this report.

26.3 Other Submissions

Similarly, a number of private persons and organisations wrote to Counsel assisting the Commission, Mr Coatman, making various suggestions and commenting about a number of particular and detailed aspects of various routes, services, and the like. Being unable to deal with these individually due to limitations of time, I have referred them to the M.T.T. A list of these persons and organisations is set out hereunder:—

Burnie Technical College;
St Michael's Collegiate School;
Tasmanian Council of State School Parents' and Friends' Association;
Launceston Church Grammar School;
Mount Stuart Progress Association;
Mr V. F. Peters;
St Mary's College Parents' and Friends' Association;
Mrs J. Pearson;
Mr F. Petty; and
Students' Association, Tasmanian College of Advanced Education.

PART H

27. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

27.1 Term 1 of Terms of Reference

A. GENERAL

1. The Grants Commission Background

Paragraph of Report

(*a*) *Fare Levels*

A strong effort should be made to convince the Commonwealth authorities that the Grants Commission principle that Tasmanian fares should conform in general with those of the standard States tends to perpetuate the downward spiral of passenger usage. This approach should be made both to the Grants Commission itself and to the Commonwealth through the appropriate Federal department. 13.6

(*b*) *Basic Policy Underlying M.T.T. Operation*

Financial efficiency and economy of the Trust should be judged in the light of providing a better and more attractive service than is now provided. This is necessary if the continual decrease in public usage is to be arrested. Such a change in emphasis in the interpretation of the Trust's function as laid down by Sec. 12 (2) of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954 involves a risk of adverse adjustments by the Grants Commission, but this risk should be faced, responsibly and with proper regard for State and Commonwealth finances. 13.6

2. The Efficiency and Facilities of, and Service Provided by the M.T.T.

(*a*) *Bus Standards*

Buses should be better designed, provide increased comfort for passengers and driver, and have better appearance.

A well-designed bus should conform in general with the following standards:—

All buses should be heated, with heating separately controlled for passenger compartment and driver's compartment.

They should be either automatic or semi-automatic, for greater flexibility in heavy traffic and for driving ease.

All buses should have provision for prams or strollers.

Some buses should be wired for public address, so as to facilitate use for charter work. 14.4

Appearance

This is a very important factor in relation to public appeal. A colour scheme for buses should be light rather than drab, striking in the sense that it attracts notice and helps to generate public awareness, and tasteful rather than garish.

Design of a colour scheme for a new bus fleet is a matter on which expert advice from a designer or colour consultant should be obtained.

The present colour scheme of the M.T.T. buses could and should be much improved.

Comfort

It is essential that new buses obtained by the Trust be designed and built to provide a much better standard of comfort for both driver and passenger. 14.4

(*b*) *Fare Structure*

The fare schedule should be converted into a silver coin structure—i.e., multiples of five cents. Pensioner fares should be increased to five cents. It would be difficult to either reduce or increase the present fare for children and scholars (7 cents) to a five cent multiple. 14.5

Paragraph of Report

(*c*) *Fare Collection and Recording*

The present M.T.T. system is very inefficient. Ticket machines are essential on all buses. Ticket issuing and fare collection and recording procedures should have the arrangement and design features set out. 14.6

(*d*) *Public Relations*

This area of M.T.T. operations should be much improved. 14 7

A city information and sales bureau or kiosk should be established for the following purposes:—

(i) to supply information on bus services;
(ii) distribute time-tables;
(iii) sell daily all-route tickets and other forms of concessional travel that may be approved in the future;
(iv) promote charter travel and Trust services generally; and
(v) handle queries, complaints, and other matters. 14.7

It is essential, if the bus services are to attract increased patronage, that the service should be advertised and sold to the public in the same way as any other product or service. 14.7

Public relations should be approached from two points of view, namely:—

(1) Space should be taken in press and on radio and T.V. according to a planned programme, in order to emphasise the advantages of bus travel over private car travel, such as—

Bus travel eliminates driving worries; is cheaper, is safer, eliminates parking difficulties.

(2) Information services should be free. The present small-printed guide is inadequate, and should be replaced by a simple map setting out routes and giving other necessary information.

(*e*) *Repair and Servicing Facilities*

The re-location and construction of a new Hobart city depot is urgently required, and should be given high priority for capital expenditure. 14.10

(*f*) *Bus Stops and Shelters*

The siting of bus stops needs frequent attention, and should be the subject of review from time to time by the proposed planning and research group. Many additional bus shelters need to be built throughout the metropolitan routes in all the urban areas. The design of such bus shelters needs close attention.

They should be so designed as to be removable to allow for alteration of siting. 14.11

3. The Future of Hobart Suburban Rail

(*a*) The Hobart suburban rail services should be closed down. 16.6

(*b*) Dislocation of railway employees and their families brought about by closing down of Hobart suburban rail services would be a serious matter for them, but the number of persons affected is relatively small. No employee should lose his job as a result of discontinuance, nor be transferred to a job in which his pay and conditions of service are less than they are at the time of discontinuance. Any employees who need to re-locate their place of residence by reason of discontinuance should be given every reasonable assistance to do so. 16.6

4. Private Operators

(1) *Role*

(*a*) The private operators should continue in the foreseeable future to play an important role in the provision of urban passenger transport facilities in Tasmania. 17.1

(*b*) The primary role for private operators should be the servicing of outer urban areas. 17.1

(*c*) The M.T.T. should continue to have the power to object to the grant or renewal of a private operator's licence where the same is to be operated within a metropolitan area as defined by the Act. 17.4

Paragraph of Report

(*d*) Where the M.T.T. does prevent such grant or renewal of a licence to operate wholly within a metropolitan area, the private operator so affected should have a statutory right to require the M.T.T. to acquire his undertaking or the relevant part of his undertaking, and to be paid full compensation, including compensation for goodwill, if any. 17.4

(*e*) The amount of compensation should be decided by arbitration in the event the parties cannot agree. 17.4

(2) *Licensing of Private Operators*

(*a*) The system of renewing and re-issuing licences every three years should be discontinued except in respect of a licence for a service which is operated wholly within a metropolitan area as defined by the Act.

(*b*) Such licences, with the exception of a licence for a service operated wholly within a metropolitan area, should be indefinite in duration, provided that the Transport Commission has power to cancel the licence for good reason on proper notice to the licensee to show cause, and subject to appeal.

(*c*) The system of paying licence fees at three-yearly intervals need not be disturbed by this suggested change in licensing procedures.

(*d*) All public vehicles licences in future should contain a condition endorsed thereon that if the operator to whom the licence has been issued is no longer able or willing to operate the licensed vehicle under the terms of the licence, the licence shall be returned to the Transport Commission for cancellation. 17.5

(*e*) A sale of the business of a private operator, including a sale of goodwill, which is made conditionally upon the Transport Commission being willing to transfer the licence to the purchaser, should be regarded as unobjectionable. It should be clear, however, that the Transport Commission is under no obligation to transfer the licence to the purchaser. 17.5

(*f*) Closer supervision should be exercised by the Transport Commission over the operations of private operators conducted wholly within a metropolitan area, in order to see that standards of service are being provided appropriate to the needs of the particular area. 17.6

5. Traffic Congestion—Control of the Motor Car

(*a*) *Parking of Motor Vehicles in City Areas*

(1) Long-term parking by commuter parkers should be further discouraged by gradually extending non-parking areas in Hobart, and to a lesser degree in Launceston. 18.3

(2) Short-term parking by shoppers and those wanting to do business in the cities should be encouraged by all reasonable means. It may become unreasonable to continue indefinitely to provide on and off-street parking in Hobart for all those who come into this category. This is an issue which should be the subject of planning by an expert body upon which the City Council has representation, but not a controlling voice. 18.3

(3) Parking control in Hobart should be made the subject of planning by an appropriate section or group within or in liaison with the State Planning Authority proposed to be set up by the State Government. 18.4

(4) This planning section or group should be part of appropriate planning machinery set up for the purpose of co-ordinating transport planning and development in Tasmanian urban areas. No specific recommendation is made as to the form which such planning section should take. It would advise the Government on the control of facilities for car parking in the Hobart urban area as one important aspect of transportation planning as a whole for this area.

One subject it should study is further progressive restriction upon long-term commuter on and off-street parking around the city of Hobart. 18.4

(5) Similar planning measures in relation to parking in and around the Launceston city area should be considered. 18.4

Paragraph of Report

(*b*) *Traffic Control Measures*

(1) *Give way to buses rule.*—Such a rule should be enacted, subject to the conditions set out in para. 18.6.1.

(2) *Prohibition of private vehicle parking around inside face of Hobart central block.*—Further trial of a no-parking ban around the inside face of the central city block should be conducted for a period of at least one month, with the object of installing the ban permanently if the further trial is successful. 18.6.2

(3) *Bus-only lane in Collins Street in evening peak hour.*—For a trial period the bus-only lane proposal made by Mr T. O. Eaton should be instituted with a view to permanent adoption if found satisfactory. This recommendation is that in the evening peak hours in Hobart there should be a bus-only lane on the northern side of Collins Street from Argyle Street as far as the railway roundabout. 18.6.3

(*c*) *Central Bus terminal in Hobart*

A central bus station close to the inner core of Hobart would be a substantial advantage to bus service patrons, and would make the services more attractive to the potential customer. However, it would not be practicable to establish such a bus station on the ground floor of the proposed West End parking station. The question of a central bus terminal for Hobart should be kept under review by the transport planning authorities. 18.7.6

(*d*) *Some Launceston Problems*

(1) The Launceston Traffic Advisory Committee should be reconstituted. 18.8.1

(2) The registered owner of a motor vehicle parked in breach of the regulations prohibiting parking of motor vehicles on bus stops should be made liable for such contravention unless he can show that some other person was responsible, in the same way as is done in relation to offences against the parking meters laws. This should apply in Hobart also. 18.8.3

(3) The question of a central bus terminal for Launceston requires further study, which should be put in hand by the proposed planning and research group, together with Launceston City Council experts and the Launceston Traffic Advisory Committee. 18.8.4

(*e*) *River Ferries*

No justification exists for establishing a Derwent River Ferry Service by a public transport authority; but every reasonable assistance should be given to the present operator of the ferry service by way of assisting in the provision of ancillary facilities, and the like. 18.9

(*f*) *Staggered Working Hours*

It has not been established that benefits of staggered working hours in the public service would outweigh disadvantages, but the subject should be further studied. Developments in other parts of Australia and overseas should be kept under review.

B. SPECIFIC

TERM 1 (*a*) AND 1 (*b*)

These are covered in the general recommendations, and specific recommendations set out below.

TERM 1 (*c*)

(*a*) *Proposed Extension of Hobart Service Area of Metropolitan Transport Trust*

The proposed extension of the Hobart Metropolitan Transport Trust Service Area to 20 kilometres from the General Post Office should be proceeded with, in accordance with the 1973 Draft Bill. 21.4

(*b*) *Proposed Extension of Launceston Service Area of Metropolitan Transport Trust*

The Service Area of the M.T.T. in Launceston should not be extended at present. 21.5

Paragraph of Report

(*c*) *Whether M.T.T. Services should be extended in the Hobart Area* 21.6

(1) *Bridgewater and the Northern extension area.*—The bus service to the Bridgewater Housing Subdivision should continue to be operated exclusively by the M.T.T.

The M.T.T. should not object to renewal of the existing Ace Bus licences for the Northern extension area at the expiration of the current licence period. 21.6.1

(2) *Rokeby.*—The M.T.T. should extend its Tranmere service to the Housing Department development north of the township of Rokeby from the conclusion of the present licence period of Tasmanian Coach Lines in respect of that area. 21.6.2

(3) *Kingston/Blackmans Bay.*—The M.T.T. should not extend its services to the Kingston/Blackmans Bay area for a period of three years after the expiration of the current period of Tasmanian Coach Lines in relation to that area. Whether the Trust should so extend its services at the expiration of that three year period or thereafter should depend on future developments in the area. 21.6.3

(*d*) *Whether M.T.T. Services should be extended in the Launceston Area*

(1) *Ravenswood.*—The M.T.T. should not extend its services into the Ravenswood area at the end of the private operator's current licence period. 21.7.1

(2) *St Leonards.*—Extension of M.T.T. Services into the St Leonards area is not recommended. 21.7.2

(*e*) *Possible Extension of M.T.T. Services on the North-West Coast*

The only area on the North-West Coast in respect of which extension of M.T.T. services at the present time should be considered is the Burnie area. The principal need so far as the North-West Coast is concerned in respect of passenger transportation needs is that transportation planning should be instituted, on two levels—

(i) specific planning for the operational and growth aspects of the M.T.T. in the Burnie area; and any other areas on the Coast in which a need may in the future be shown for the services of the Trust; and

(ii) broader transportation planning for the needs of the region; to include, for example, trunk services through the coastal area, commuter needs within the towns, and also between dormitory centres and industry.

The specific planning under (i) should be co-ordinated with the broader transportation planning under (ii), and the latter should be co-ordinated and integrated with the general planning for the North-West Coast region.

TERM 1 (d)

(*a*) *Commonwealth Assistance for Planning and Research Programme*

A programme for financial assistance for planning and research in the field of Tasmanian urban transport should be drawn up and submitted to the Commonwealth authorities for the period 1974-75. 22.4

(*b*) *Projects Warranting Submissions for Future Commonwealth Assistance*

A list of projects warranting future submissions for Commonwealth financial assistance to Tasmanian urban transport is set out as follows:—

Continuation of the bus replacement and bus shelter programme.
Continuing adequate planning and research programmes.
Completion of the ticket machine programme.
The establishment of adequate public information facilities.
The construction of an adequate repair and servicing facility in Hobart. 22.7

Paragraph of Report

(*c*) *Commonwealth Assistance to Launceston*

The State Government should continue to press upon the Commonwealth Government the case for extending assistance for urban public transport to Launceston in addition to Hobart, in view of the special circumstances applying in this State.

However, on the assumption that Commonwealth policy will continue to be that assistance should be confined to capital cities, the beneficial effect of Commonwealth financial assistance to urban transport operations in the Hobart area should be enabled to flow on as much as possible to the Launceston and Burnie operations of the M.T.T. 22.8

(*d*) *Commonwealth Bureau of Transport Economics*

The resources of this bureau should be kept in mind by Tasmanian transport authorities in respect of the possibility of studies being made by the bureau of proposed public transport improvements and developments in this State. 22.9

TERM 1 (e)

Possible need for future development of passenger transport services

The following transportation systems involving advanced technology should be kept under review, but for the foreseeable future are not practicable in Tasmania on account of low density population and the costs involved:—

Mono rail system proposed by Mr K. R. Dixon. 23.2
Dallas, Fort Worth Mass Transit system. 23.3
Professor Carey's Underground Ring Railway Proposal. 23.4

27.2 **Term 2 of Terms of Reference: Whether the M.T.T. should be incorporated within the Transport Commission and operate as a branch of the Commission**

(*a*) *Recommendation against incorporation*

The M.T.T. should not be incorporated in the Transport Commission, but should continue as a separate entity, subject to the alterations of structure and in planning and management facilities recommended. 24.4.9

(*b*) *Proposed alterations in respect of M.T.T.*

(1) *The Chairman.*—The person holding the office of Commissioner for Transport for the time being should be designated as Chairman of the Metropolitan Transport Trust. 24.5 (*b*)

(2) *Trust should be made subject to Ministerial direction.*—It should be specified by Statute that the M.T.T. is subject to Ministerial direction by the Minister for Transport of the day. 24.5 (*d*)

(3) *Recommendation as to structure of M.T.T.*—The constitution of the M.T.T. under Section 3 of the Metropolitan Transport Act 1954 should be altered so as to embody the following changes—

The Trust should consist of not less than four nor more than six members appointed by the Governor.

Of the members of the Trust—

The Chairman should be the person holding office as Commissioner for Transport;
One member should be a person who is nominated by the Hobart City Council;
One person should be a person who is nominated by the Launceston City Council; and
One should be appointed as a representative of employee organisations involved in Tasmanian public urban passenger transport.

In addition, so far as practicable, of the members of the Trust—

One should be a person who appears to the Governor to have had wide experience and to have shown capacity in the management of a transport undertaking;
One should be a person who appears to the Governor to have had wide experience and to have shown capacity in financial matters; and
Of the members of the Trust other than the Chairman, one should be appointed as Deputy Chairman. 24.5.1 (*e*)

(4) *The General Manager.*—The position of General Manager of the M.T.T. should be separated from that of Manager of the Southern Branch of the Trust, and the two positions should be occupied by separate individuals. 24.5.1 (*f*)

(*c*) *Policy, Operational, and Forward Planning*

(1) *Co-ordination.*—When the new State Planning Authority is constituted, positive attention should be given to ensuring, by Cabinet direction or by whatever other device is necessary, that co-ordinated planning having in mind the needs of urban public passenger transportation take place between the various public authorities and departments whose activities affect such transportation. A primary objective of such planning machinery should be to co-ordinate transport and land use planning, parking control in the cities, and all transport and traffic planning and development within the metropolitan regions. No specific recommendation is made as to the form of such a planning body. This principle should be kept in mind in relation to the constitution of the proposed State Planning Authority. 24.5.2 (*b*)

(2) *Planning in relation to the M.T.T. and the Transport Commission.*—A planning unit or group should be set up within the Transport Commission for the purpose of making recommendations for present and forward policy of the M.T.T., to review the existing operations of the Trust, and to conduct short and long term analysis and research for the benefit of the M.T.T., and the co-ordination of the Trust's activities with other public activities associated therewith.

27.3 **Matters Connected with and Related to the Terms of Reference**

A short study is made of the Hobart Northside Freeway proposal, and some tentative conclusions are suggested. 25

APPENDIX A

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibits put in by Counsel assisting the Commission

R.C. 1	M.T.T.—Report and Statement of Accounts for year ended 30 June 1968.
R.C. 2	M.T.T.—Report and Statement of Accounts for year ending 30 June 1969.
R.C. 3	M.T.T.—Report and Statement of Accounts for year ending 30 June 1970.
R.C. 4	M.T.T.—Report and Statement of Accounts for year ending 30 June 1971.
R.C. 5	M.T.T.—Report and Statement of Accounts for year ending 30 June 1972.
R.C. 6	Report of Auditor-General—30 June 1968.
R.C. 7	Report of Auditor-General—30 June 1969.
R.C. 8	Report of Auditor-General—30 June 1970.
R.C. 9	Report of Auditor-General—30 June 1971.
R.C. 10	Report of Auditor-General—30 June 1972.
R.C. 11	Transport Commission Annual Report—30 June 1969.
R.C. 11A	Report of Transport Commission—30 June 1966.
R.C. 12	Report of Transport Commission—30 June 1968.
R.C. 13	Report of Transport Commission—30 June 1970.
R.C. 14	Report of Transport Commission—30 June 1971.
R.C. 15	Report of Transport Commission—30 June 1972.
R.C. 16	'Urban Transport Planning for the Future'—Speech to Transport Industries Advisory Council by Robert S. Nielson, May 1972.
R.C. 17	'What should be done with the State Government Railways' by G. T. Webb, Hobart, November 1972.
R.C. 18	Tasmanian Institute of Urban Studies—Report of Public Transport to Urban Transport Advisory Committee, Hobart. (Gelling).
R.C. 19	A case for an Adelaide Metropolitan Public Transport Authority by R. J. Fitch, August 1972.
R.C. 20	Hobart Transportation Revision 1970—P.W.D.-Pak Poy.
R.C. 21	The Bell Bay Railway Product.
R.C. 22	Published Papers by G. T. Webb on the problems of Public Bus Services in Urban areas of Australia.
R.C. 23	Australian Urban Transport Problem—C.A.B., Vol. 34, No. 1 and the Department of Tutorial Classes in University of Sydney, May 1964.
R.C. 24	Economics of Urban Transport—Economic Monograph No. 254, New South Wales Branch of Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand, August 1963.
R.C. 25	Second Reading Speech on the Transport Bill 1938 by the Premier the Honourable A. G. Ogilvie.
R.C. 26	Second Reading Metropolitan Transport Bill 1954 by the Honourable the Premier.
R.C. 27	Sydney Area Transportation Study: The role of the Private Bus Operator in the Urban Passenger Transport System by R. Brain, Deputy Director, Sydney Area Transportation Study, Paper to Australian Road Transport Federation, Canberra, 1971.
R.C. 27A	Commonwealth Assistance for Urban Transport—Statement by Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation, 16 February 1973.
R.C. 28	Urban Transport Planning—How it relates to Road Transport Authority by Wilbur S. Smith.
R.C. 29	Information regarding taxi and hire car operations in Tasmania.
R.C. 30	Report from P.W.D. *re* School Holiday Traffic.
R.C. 31	Transport Department—Notes on Road Transport by R. H. Barnes, February 1958.
R.C. 32	Information Paper supplied by Commissioner for Transport—Hobart Suburban Rail Services.
R.C. 32A	Hobart Suburban Rail Services—Report on Operations. (Additional to R.C. 32).
R.C. 33	Transport Commission—Review of Railway Passenger Services.
R.C. 34	Adelaide Advertiser, 24 March 1973—'Dial a Bus Service'.

R.C. 35	Advisory Committee Report on Urban Transport Problems—File 351/15/72.
R.C. 36	Newspaper clipping from ' Australian ', 30 March 1973 *re* Freeway.
R.C. 37	Letters from Claremont High School, Parents and Friends' Association *re* travel of school children on M.T.T. bus and reply by Education Department, dated 21 March 1973.
R.C. 38	Suburban Passenger Fares Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales.
R.C. 39	Letter from Transport Department, dated 30 March 1973 *re* Precedence of buses leaving kerb.
R.C. 40	Letter from Mrs E. E. Bennett dated 6 April 1973 *re* Ace Bus Service.
R.C. 41	Report from Hydro-Electric Commission on proposal before the Commission on submission by Carey and Dixon.
R.C. 42	Report from Hobart City Council—One Week Parking Ban City Block.
R.C. 43	Letter dated 9 April 1973 from B. Robinson *re* Kingston Bus Service.
R.C. 44	Letter dated 26 April 1973 commenting on R.C. 43.
R.C. 45	Letter dated 27 April 1973 from P.W.D. *re* construction of road from Lenah Valley to Cascades.
R.C. 46 (3 parts)	Urban Transport Planning—U.K. Environment and Home Office Sub Committee—Minutes of Evidence.
R.C. 47	Letter dated 28 April 1973 from Student Association T.C.A.E. of suggestions of students within college.
R.C. 48	Letter from Hobart City Council 2 May 1973—Off-Street Parking, Hobart Area.
R.C. 49	Plan, Central Retail Area—Kerbside allocation.
R.C. 50	Pak Poy study of Public Transport for Canberra.
R.C 51	Launceston Area Transportation Study—Pak Poy.
R.C. 52	Launceston Central Area Study—Perrott, Lyon, Timlock & Kesa, Town Planners.
R.C. 53	Outline Development Plan of Tamar Region showing Launceston suburban area boundaries.
R.C. 54	Map of Launceston showing proposed bus terminal.
R.C. 55	Photograph of lorry and two cars parked on Norwood bus stop, Brisbane Street, Launceston.
R.C. 56	Photograph of two cars parked on Coles bus stop, Charles Street.
R.C. 57	Map of Launceston showing circular routes of buses.
R.C. 58	Letter from D. Thomas, Launceston.
R.C. 59	Letter from T. Petty, Mayfield.
R.C. 60	Letter dated 15 May 1973 from Mrs J. Pearson.
R.C. 61	Map of Launceston—Existing bus stops.
R.C. 62	Three buses on stop designed for two.
R.C. 63	Waverley bus trying to pull in behind bus at Kingsway.
R.C. 64	Driver trying to change lanes.
R.C. 65	Two buses in centre lane stopping to allow bus to pull out.
R.C. 66	Driver having to change lanes at intersection.
R.C. 67	Lack of verandahs in Patterson Street.
R.C. 68	Driver attempting to pull out in Patterson Street.
R.C. 69	Driver leaving City stop in traffic.
R.C. 70	' The Polluted Planet '—Los Angeles.
R.C. 71	Public Transport Attitude Survey (page 8).
R.C. 72	State A.L.P. Conference 1972—Resolution.
R.C. 73A	Map of Transport Services—South Australia.
R.C. 73B	Municipal Tramways Trust, South Australia—Annual Report 1971-72.
R.C. 73C	South Australian Municipal Tramways Trust Act 1935-1952 plus Amendments 40/65 and 80/71.
R.C. 73D	South Australian Road and Railway Transport Act 1930-1963 plus Amendments 43/64 and 13/71.
R.C. 74	Letter from Australian Railways Union dated 24 May 1973 regarding resolution by the Railways Union opposing the abolition of Suburban Rail Services.
R.C. 75	Plan of suggested contra-flow system of traffic through Liverpool Street and Collins Street—made by Gelling.

R.C. 75A	Bridgewater Bus Service—Cresswell—Tribunal's comments on appeal *re* refusal to authorise.
R.C. 76	New Directions in State Planning by Thad L. Beyle, Sureva Seligson and Dail S. Wright.
R.C. 76A	Letter from M.T.T. dated 30 May 1973 on Commonwealth Financial Assistance.
R.C. 77	Regional Planning Process Chart.
R.C. 78	State Planning Process Chart.
R.C. 79	Planning—A Political Process.
R.C. 80	Bus tickets—Canberra services.
R.C. 81	Staggered working hours—Public Service.
R.C. 82	Cars, Roads—Nottingham ' The Listener ', June 1973.
R.C. 83	Bus: Rapid Transport—Canberra, by D. R. Eyles.
R.C. 84	Public Transport and the Planning Process, Perth, Western Australia.
R.C. 85	Map Outline Development Plan—Tamar Region, North East Tasmania and Tamar Development Plan.
R.C. 86	Functions and Requirements of State Bus Licensing Authorities—Prepared by Bus Proprietors Association of Victoria.
R.C. 87	Transport Acts (State)—Six parts—New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, West Australia, South Australia and Northern Territory.
R.C. 88	Australian Road Federation—Uniform State Public Passenger Transport Licensing and Regulatory System in Australia.
R.C. 89	Withdrawn.
R.C. 90	Gilmour Report.
R.C. 91	Conclusions—Fortieth International Congress—The Hague 1973.
R.C. 92	Conclusions—Thirty-ninth International Congress—Rome 1971.
R.C. 93	Report of Committee of Inquiry into Urban Passenger Transport, February 1970—New Zealand.
R.C. 94	Bus Stops—M.T.T.—Launceston.
R.C. 95	Submission from Beaconsfield District School Parents' and Friends'.
R.C. 96	Letter from Church Grammar School, Launceston to Royal Commission.
R.C. 97	Speech by Mr T. Uren—' Are Freeways Really Necessary?'
R.C. 98	Northside Freeway—Letter from City Engineer dated 22 October 1973—comments on criticism.
R.C. 99	Northside Freeway—Comments by Public Works Department on City Streets Traffic—Letter dated 18 October 1973.
R.C. 100	Bureau of Transport Economics—Economic Capital Investment in Urban Public Transport—Report, June 1972.
R.C. 101	Hobart Central Business District—Defining Boundaries—Hobart City Council—Letter dated 7 September 1973.
R.C. 102	Urban Transport, Tasmania—Commonwealth Assistance—Correspondence between State and Commonwealth Transport Ministers.
R.C. 103	Sullivans Cove Ferry—Correspondence—M.T.T., Premier's Department, Sullivans.
R.C. 104	Perth, Western Australia—Metropolitan Passenger Transport Trust—Correspondence.
R.C. 105	South Australian Department of Transport—Organisation and Staff Summary.
R.C. 106	New Zealand—Committee of Enquiry, Report into Urban Transport.
R.C. 107	Speech by Minister for Urban and Regional Development—Comments by City Engineer.
R.C. 108	Public Transport in Metropolitan Adelaide.
R.C. 109	Traffic—Towns—Report of Steering Group—Minister for Transport, U.K., Book 656.02 G.R.E., State Library.
R.C. 110	Organisational Framework of Transport—Perth Regional Areas.
R.C. 111	Statement by Mr Jones, Minister for Transport on Cheaper Fares—' Australian ', 2 November 1973.

R.C. 112 Comment by Mr Calver on Professor Carey's Submission.

R.C. 113 Paper—'The use of the Passenger Car for Public Transit'—Dr N. Jouzy—Transportation Conference, Belgium.

R.C. 114 Hobart Suburban Railway Statistics—July to October 1972 and 1973.

R.C. 115 Report on fringe parking in cities in U.S.A.

R.C. 116 Report on construction of bus shelters in U.S.A.

R.C. 117 Report by U.S.A. Department of Transportation—Low Cost Urban Transportation Alternatives: A study of ways to increase the effectiveness of existing Transportation facilities.

R.C. 118 U.S.A. Reports—

(*a*) Carpools and Buses.
(*b*) Commuter 'Club Bus' Operations.
(*c*) Car and Bus Pool Matching Guide.

Exhibits put in by Transport Commission

T.C. 1 Hobart Suburban Rail Services—Review of present position.

T.C. 2 Taxi and Hire Car Operators.

T.C. 3 Passengers carried—Hobart and other Australian Capital Cities.

T.C. 4 Traffic Regulations—Public Vehicles 1967—Regulations 32 and 42.

T.C. 5 Traffic Act 1925—Section 17 and Application for Coach Service.

T.C. 6 Transport Act 1938.

T.C. 7 Railway Management Act 1935.

T.C. 8 Licences for Private Bus Operators.

T.C. 9 Supplementary Submission by Commissioner for Transport on Bus Services for Bridgewater.

T.C. 10 Statement by Commissioner for Transport on Passenger Services to Bridgewater.

T.C. 11 Application by Ace Bus Service to Transport Commission for a Coach Licence for Tasmanian Bureau and Target Tours and Exemption for Omnibus in Area 1.

T.C. 11A Diary and Desk Pad—Mr Webb.

T.C. 12 Summary amended suburban and Derwent Valley Line passenger train service as from 30 October 1972.

T.C. 13 Railway suburban time-table and fares— Hobart, Brighton and New Norfolk, January 1972.

T.C. 14 Passengers—Bridgewater-Hobart and average number of passengers per day per workers' train.

T.C. 15 Commonwealth Grants Commission—

(*a*) Submission by Commissioner for Transport.
(*b*) Supplementary statements—Losses by branch lines—Tasmania, Victoria and New South Wales.
(*c*) Supplementary statements estimated revenue and expenditure—Bell Bay Railway.

T.C. 16 Conditions of Coach Licences—Ace Bus Services.

T.C. 17 Decision of Tribunal on application of Ace Bus Service for Bridgewater Service distributed 8 December 1972.

T.C. 18 Application for Coach Service by Ace Bus Service—City to Bridgewater—dated 10 November 1972.

T.C. 19 Letter from Administrator, Road Transport, dated 16 January 1973 to Ace Bus Service refusing application for Bridgewater Service.

T.C. 20 Omnibus in use by the Municipal Tramways Trust, Adelaide.

T.C. 21 Public Vehicle Licensing Control.

T.C. 22 Computer Operations—Transport Commission and M.T.T.

T.C. 23 Proposals for Commonwealth Government—Financial Assistance.

T.C. 24	Coach Licences in Launceston.
T.C. 25	Map of Tasmania showing Bell Bay Railway.
T.C. 26	Supplementary submission by Commissioner for Transport (No. 6)—Employment, Railway Branch.
T.C. 27	Supplementary Submission by Commissioner for Transport (No. 8)—Comments by Minister for Urban and Regional Development published in the 'Australian', May 1973.
T.C. 28	Report by Maunsell on Hobart Suburban Rail System and leaflet describing Silver Eagle Coach Manufacturers in Belgium.
T.C. 29	Supplementary Submission by Commissioner for Transport (No. 9)—International Conference on Transportation Research, Belgium, June 1973.
T.C. 30	Supplementary Submission by Commissioner for Transport (No. 11)—Transport Review.
T.C. 31	Zurich Bus/Tram Pamphlet.
T.C. 32	Western Australia—Director General of Transport—Annual Reports.
T.C. 33	Supplementary Submission by Commissioner for Transport (No. 10)—Bus Operations: Burnie, Devonport and Latrobe.
T.C. 34	Letter regarding responsibilities of the Director General of Transport, South Australia.
T.C. 35	(*a*) Proposed changes—Taxi stands, Hobart, 6 November 1968. (*b*) Proposed changes—Taxi stands, Launceston, 25 November 1969. (*c*) Preliminary proposal—Bus lanes, Hobart. (*d*) West End Car Park.
T.C. 36	Supplementary Submission (No. 7) Organisation—Transport Commission.

Exhibits put in by Southern Metropolitan Master Planning Authority

S.M.P. 1	Comments by Mr Calver on Professor Carey's Submission.
S.M.P. 2	Comments by Mr Calver on P.W.D. Submission.
S.M.P. 3	Facts relating to population growth of Hobart, Glenorchy, Clarence, Kingborough and Brighton.
S.M.P. 4	Reports referred to in submission by S.M.M.P.A.

Exhibits put in by Ace Bus Service

A.B. 1	Letters dated 10 July, 21 October 1969 from Ace Bus Service to Transport Department and reply dated 18 September 1969 *re* Bridgewater Service.
A.B. 2	Extract from Parliamentary Committee Report No. 18/66 and 57/65.
A.B. 3	Daily Train Service—Weekly to and from Cadbury-Schweppes.
A.B. 4	Transport Commission Reports 1970-71, 1969-70 ending June 1969 and ending June 1968. (Already put in as Exhibits R.C. 11 to 14).
A.B. 5	(*a*) Preliminary submission by the Honourable G. T. Virgo, Minister for Transport. (*b*) Guidelines to a Uniform Public Passenger Transport Licensing and Regulatory System in Australia. (*c*) Privately owned mass media transportation by Mr K. Grenda.
A.B. 6	Letter dated 23 February 1972 from Administrator of Road Transport to M. D. & N. D. Cresswell.
A.B. 7A	Plan of present operation Ace Bus Service.
A.B. 7B	Plan of sub-division Abbotsfield, Claremont.
A.B. 7C	Plan of Hilton Hill Sub-division.
A.B. 7D	Plan of Bridgewater Sub-division showing present and future routes.

A.B. 8 Petition of passengers carried on Ace Bus Service and Northern Bus Services to Royal Commission.

A.B. 9 Sample sheet—Daily list of passengers carried Austin's Ferry to City and return 30 March 1973.

A.B. 10 Photostat copy of letter from Ace Bus Service to Administrator of Road Transport, dated 1 November 1972.

A.B. 11 Letter from Transport Commission to Cresswell, dated 16 November 1973.

A.B. 12 Letter from Transport Department to Ace Bus Service, dated 30 November 1972 *re* Bridgewater Service.

Exhibits put in by Metropolitan Transport Trust

M.T.T. 1 *M T T. Act* 1954 No. 77 of 1954 and Amendments: No. 55 of 1955, No. 18 of 1959, No. 40 of 1961.

M.T.T. 2 M.T.T. By-laws 1973, *Statutory Rules* 1973, No. 9, Government Printer, January 1973.

M.T.T. 3 Binns, K. J., Casey, N.E., Cole, H. J. R., and Hutton, N. G. *M.T.*: Report pp. 59, 1954.

M.T.T. 4 Binns, K. J., Casey, N. E., Staubi, C. S., and Edwards, B. J. *M.T. Launceston: Interim Report* pp. 16, 1955.

M.T.T. 5 Binns, K. J., Casey, N. E., Staubi, C. S., and Edwards, B. J. *M.T. Launceston: Report*, 1955.

M.T.T. 6 *Rules and Regulations* M.T.T. Tasmania, February 1966.

M.T.T. 7 *Section and Fare Schedule*—M.T.T., Hobart, Government Printer, September 1971.

M.T.T. 8 *Fares and Sections*—M.T.T., Burnie, September 1971.

M.T.T. 9 *M T T Timetables*—

Hobart—' Moore's Guide ', Revised Edition, December 1972.
Launceston—Timetable and Route Map as from 8 November 1972.
Burnie—Timetable as from 1 February 1972.

M.T.T. 10 *Maps*—

(*a*) *Hobart and Suburbs, Tasmania*: First Edition, 1973, compiled by P. Broughton, printed by Mercury-Walsh. (Bus routes shown).
(*b*) *Hobart Metropolitan Area, Tasmania.* Produced in the Office of the Southern Metropolitan Master Planning Authority, Hobart, 1970.
(*c*) *South Esk Sheet* 831A, Tasmania. First Edition, Tasmania map publication, 1972.

M.T.T. 11 *Graphs*—

A Receipts, Expenditure and Loss—Totals for State (Hobart, Launceston and Burnie).
B Vehicle Registrations—Tasmania.
C Total Passengers Carried—State.
D Passengers Carried per Year—Hobart.
E Passengers Carried per Year—Launceston.
F Passengers Carried per Year—Burnie.
G Passengers per Mile—Hobart.
H Vehicle Mileage—Hobart, Launceston, Burnie and State Total.
I Number of Buses in Service—Weekdays—Launceston, 6 March 1973.
J Route Mileage—Hobart, Launceston, Burnie and State Total.
K Number of Buses in Service—Weekdays—Hobart—29 June 1972.
L Passengers Boarding Buses—Weekdays—Hobart, 29 June 1972.
M Employees—Hobart, Launceston, Burnie and State Total.

M.T.T. 12 *Seven-monthly Summaries* for thirty weeks to 27 January 1973 with Actual, Adjusted and Estimated Figures—Hobart, Launceston and Burnie.

M.T.T. 13	*Organisation Charts* for Hobart (Chart No. 2078/C and Launceston and Burnie (Chart No. 2098).
M.T.T. 14	Master Fare Schedule—Australian Capital Cities and Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin and Wellington, New Zealand, 1972.
M.T.T. 15	Example calculation showing the relative severity of fares between Tasmania and the Standard States.
M.T.T. 16	Source and disposition of Revenue Funds. Source and disposition of Capital Funds. Estimate of Revenue and Expenditure 1972-73—Hobart, Launceston, Burnie and Summary for State. Depreciation Investment Fund.
M.T.T. 17	Report on Timetable alterations—July and December 1971.
M.T.T. 18	Comparison of six routes between 1957 and 1973. Average Trip Loading—all routes—Hobart, 29 June 1972.
M.T.T. 19	Letters in February 1972, showing Scholars' concessionary arrangements (except Brisbane) and correspondence in 1955 arising out of a request from the Campbell Street School Parents' and Friends' Association.
M.T.T. 20	Sunday Services—Launceston—Report 1964.
M.T.T. 21	Draft Bill for Act to amend M.T. Act 1954.
M.T.T. 22	M.T.T. Minutes of Trust Meeting held on 20 September 1972.
M.T.T. 23	M.T.T. Minutes of Trust Meeting held on 13 December 1972 (Bridgewater Service).
M.T.T. 24	M.T.T. Minutes of Trust Meeting held on 21 February 1973 (Bridgewater Service).
M.T.T. 25	Correspondence *re* additional bus for Bridgewater Service.
M.T.T. 26	Timetable and fare structure for Bridgewater Service.
M.T.T. 27	M.T.T. Rates of Pay.
M.T.T. 28	Correspondence regarding issue of Bus Licence to provide service between Hobart and Housing Department at Bridgewater.
M.T.T. 29	Passenger Statistics—Bridgewater Bus Service.
M.T.T. 30	Argyle Street Car Park—Income and Expenditure 1971-72 and Estimated Income 1972-73.
M.T.T. 31	Information *re* Bridgewater Service (pages 372 and 373 of Transcript).
M.T.T. 32	Report on effect of Hobart Bridge traffic hold-up in April 1973 when three lane system was not operating.
M.T.T. 33	Summary of length, width, seating and standing arrangements of buses—Adelaide, Melbourne and Hobart.
M.T.T. 34	Breakdown of vehicle operating costs requested by Commission (page 68 of Transcript).
M.T.T. 35	Comments of evidence of Mr Peters of Bellerive (page 409 of Transcript).
M.T.T. 36	Prams—Statement on carriage (pages 448 and 449 of Transcript).
M.T.T. 37	Report on vandalism on buses (page 535 of Transcript).
M.T.T. 38	Information concerning bus services at Rosetta which serve the Claremont Village Shopping Centre.
M.T.T. 39	Statement of Route Numbering.
M.T.T. 40	Responsibility of Planning New Routes—Letter from General Manager (page 535 of Transcript).
M.T.T. 40A	Question and Answers on Trust's Computer N.C.R. 500.
M.T.T. 41	Plan of Hobart City Centre indicating possible amendments to starting points and bus stops, based on assumption that the Trust can utilise to the maximum the inner kerb-side space of Hobart City Block.
M.T.T. 42	Plan showing existing bus stops.
M.T.T. 43	Passenger loading survey—Vehicle statistics (page 45 of M.T.T. Submission).
M.T.T. 44	Summary of events in City Transport in Launceston.
M.T.T. 45	M.T.T. comments on submission made by Church Grammar School, Launceston.
M.T.T. 46	Letter from M.T.T. to R.C., dated 30 July 1973 regarding feeder services to Hobart Ferry.

M.T.T. 47	(*a*) Leyland Bus Material—Photographs—Specifications. (*b*) Bus Lanes—Europe. (*c*) Moving People in Cities—Produced by Leyland. (*d*) Planning for the Bus—By Leyland.
M.T.T. 48	Submission of Transport Commission (No. 3) as annotated by M.T.T.
M.T.T. 49	List of buses leaving depot in City—Times also.
M.T.T. 50	Letter from Perth M.T.T. to Hobart M.T.T.
M.T.T. 51	M.T.T. report on operations and facilities at Burnie and map of bus routes, Burnie.
M.T.T. 52	Vehicle records M.T.T.—Burnie and Launceston.
M.T.T. 53	Bus Routes M.T.T.—Hobart.

Exhibits put in by Hobart City Council

H.C. 1	Parking—Up-dating Study—City of Hobart, 1971.
H.C. 2	Parking Guide—City of Hobart.
H.C. 3	West-End Car Parking Station—Comparison of costs, etc., with Bathurst and Victoria Parking Station.
H.C. 4	Chart showing Forecast Traffic Growth—Hobart, 1970-1990.
H.C. 5	Accident Black Spot Survey—Hobart.
H.C. 6	Proceedings—Sixth Conference, Australian Road Research Board, Canberra, 1972—Balanced Transportation.
H.C. 7	Map of Hobart—Short term and long term parkers—1971 and 1990.

Exhibit put in by Mr V. Peters

V.P. 1	Newspaper clippings—Hobart ' Mercury ', 30 March 1973 and 28 February 1973.

Exhibit put in by Municipality of Ulverstone

M.V. 1	Photograph—Office of Tasmanian Coach Lines and Passenger Depot at Ulverstone.

Exhibit put in by the Under-Treasurer

U.T. 1	Comments on the ' Commonwealth Grants Commission and its effects on State Transport Policies '.

Exhibits put in by Mr M. J. Gelling

M.G. 1	Article from publication ' Surveyor ', 8 December 1971—' Are we Over-designing ', Urban roads unjustifiable.
M.G. 2	Map of Adelaide—Public Transport.
M.G. 3	Article by Dr C. C. Kissling on Demand Responsive Buses.
M.G. 4	Article by Professor A. Goss—A Case Study of Stevenage.
M.G. 5	Canberra—Shows way in planning and action—Ian Cooper.
M.G. 6	Transportation Policy for Nottingham, England.

Exhibits put in by Public Works Department

P.W.D. 1	Annual Report—Co-Ordinator General's Department, Queensland.
P.W.D. 2	Copy of Survey of Northside Freeway prepared by Pak-Poy (together with P.W.D.'s comments on Northside Freeway).

Exhibit put in by Mr L. G. Giffard

L.G. 1	Map—Hobart Metropolitan Area.

Exhibits put in by National Union of Railwaymen

N.U.R. 1	Page 7 from 'Railway Review' November-December 1969.
N.U.R. 2	Page from 'Railways of Australia Network', May 1971 (page 2).
N.U.R. 3	Page 4—July 1971.
N.U.R. 4	Page 1—October 1971.
N.U.R. 5	Page 2 'Railways of Australia Network', December 1971.
N.U.R. 6	Modernisation of Railway System.
N.U.R. 7	Page 11—(No. 7) of unidentified publication.
N.U.R. 8	Page 43—(No. 7).
N.U.R. 9	Page 48—(No. 7).
N.U.R. 10	Page 23—August 1953—Report by C. Wayne.
N.U.R. 11	Page 4—August 1953—Report by C. Wayne.

Appendix B

LIST OF SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED

Submission No.	
18	Australian Railways Union.
34	Baker, R. W.
42	Beaconsfield District School Parents' and Friends' Association (Mrs Roach).
42A	Beaconsfield District School.
42B	Beaconsfield Council.
28	Burnie Technical College.
50	Bus Proprietors Association of Tasmania (Mountjoy).
1	Carey, Professor.
8	Claremont High Parents' and Friends' Association.
30	Clarence Commission.
62	Cotgrove, R. D. M., University of Tasmania (Geography).
12	Collegiate School.
17	Dixon, K. R.
46	Exeter District School Parents' and Friends' Association.
22	Friends' School.
29	Glenorchy Council.
32	Green, J. (Commonwealth Grants Commission).
35	Giffard, L. G.
19	Hobart City Council.
19A	Hobart City Council (Supplementary Submission).

Submission No.

20 Hobart Chamber of Commerce.
31 Housing Department.
52 Hebblethwaite, J.
25 Kingborough Commission.
3 Lower Sandy Bay Progress Association.
14 Launceston Church Grammar School.
33 Lillas, M.
41 Launceston City Council.
53 Lord, T.
10 Metropolitan Transport Trust.
13 Minister for State Transport.
39 Mount Stuart Progress Association.
43 Manion, Stoward and Larissey.
54 Marshall, R.
7 McNab, Secretary, Tramways Union.
16 Northern Suburbs and Ace Bus Service.
26 National Union of Railwaymen.
27 North West P. and Citizens and Association.
2 Public Works Department, Hobart.
4 Peters, V. F.
55 Pattern, A., L.T.V. Aerospace Corporation.
56 Powell, C. R.
57 Reber, G.
5 Southern Metropolitan Master Planning Authority.
15 St Marys College Parents' and Friends' Association.
38 Scrafton, D., Director General of Transport, Adelaide.
40 St Leonards Municipality.
48 Scott, P., Professor.
49 Sullivan Cove Ferry Co. Pty Ltd.
6 Tasmanian Conservation Trust, Hobart.
9 Town and Country Planning Commission.
21 Tasmanian Council of State Schools.
24 Tasmanian Coach Lines.
44 Tucker, D. R. & C.M.
47 Tasmanian College of Advanced Education (Northern Division).
51 Tasmanian School Bus Association (Furmage).
58 Tamar Master Planning Authority.
59 Tasmanian Taxi and Hire Car Association.
61 Tasmanian College of Advanced Education (McNeill).
23 (*a*) Transport Commission:—

(*b*) Financial Assistance (Exhibit T.C. 23).
(*c*) Administration of Transport Commission (No. 3).
(*d*) Bus Services to Bridgewater (Exhibit T.C. 9).
(*e*) Bell Bay Railway, Precision Tool Annexe, East Coast Shipping, Bruny Island Ferry (Exhibit T.C. 15).
(*f*) Freight Rates, Uneconomical Branch Lines and Passenger Services (Exhibit T.C. 15B).
(*g*) (No. 5) Omnibus in use by M.T.T., Adelaide (Exhibit T.C. 20).
(*h*) (No. 2) Public Vehicle Licensing Control (Exhibit T.C. 21).
(*i*) (No. 4) Computer Operations T.C. and M.T.T. (Exhibit T.C. 22).
(*j*) (No. 6) Employment in Railway Branch, Transport Commission (Exhibit T.C. 26).
(*k*) (No. 8) Comments by Transport Commissoner on 'Mercury' article (Exhibit T.C. 27).

Submission No.

(*l*) (No. 9) International Conference, Transportation Research, Belgium 1973 (Exhibit T.C. 29).

(*m*) (No. 11) Transport Review (Exhibit T.C. 30).

(*n*) (No. 10) Bus Operations, Burnie (Exhibit T.C. 33).

(*o*) Final Submission.

(*p*) Proposals for Australian Government, Financial Assistance, Northern Tasmania.

37 Under Treasurer (Mr K. Binns).

60 Ulverstone Council.

45 Whittle, L., Tramways and Motor Bus Association.

APPENDIX C

LIST OF PERSONS WHO APPEARED AND GAVE EVIDENCE ON THEIR OWN BEHALF, OR ON BEHALF OF THE ORGANISATIONS NAMED

Witness		*Transcript Page No.*
Mr W. D. Ayers, Hobart	Managing Director, Tasmanian Coach Lines	496– 515
Mr L. F. Allwinton, Battery Point	Director of Housing	583– 596
Mr N. L. Boatwright, Hobart	General Manager, Metropolitan Transport Trust	1– 116 121– 135 736– 741 753– 766 1066–1067 1115–1122
Mr T. C. Badcock, Ulverstone	Warden, Municipality of Ulverstone	B874-B878
Mr H. W. Braid, Penguin	North West Municipal League	B878–B885
Mr R. W. Baker, Sandy Bay	Legal Practitioner	610– 615
Mr K. J. Binns, Hobart	Under Treasurer	691– 708
Mr W. H. N. Calver, Fern Tree	Chief Planning Officer, Southern Metropolitan Master Planning Authority	175– 196 197– 246
Mr M. D. Cresswell, Hobart	Director, Ace Bus Service	428– 484
Professor S. W. Carey, Dynnyrne	Professor of Geology, University of Tasmania	485– 495
Mr M. R. J. Court, New Town	Architect	527– 530
Mr R. F. Clifford, Sandy Bay	Director, Sullivans Cove Ferry Company	926– 931
Mr P. G. Crawford, Sandy Bay	City Engineer, Hobart City Council	985–1016
Mr K. R. Dixon, Lindisfarne	Retired Engineer	516– 526
Mr M. G. Doyle, Taroona	Council Clerk, Kingborough Municipality	546– 553
Mr J. Duckworth, Launceston	Personal Assistant to General Manager for Railways	813– 821
Mr F. C. G. Duffy, Launceston	Planning Director, Tamar Regional Master Planning Authority	1069–1074
Mr R. K. Elliott, Taroona	General Manager, Royal Automobile Club of Tasmania	897– 907 916
Mr T. O. Eaton, Rokeby	Traffic Branch, Transport Commission	808– 917
Dr H. M. Fisher, Launceston	Mayor of Launceston	777– 798
Mr T. B. Frier, Bellerive	Tasmanian Taxi and Hire Car Association	1017–1025
Mr D. R. Furmage, Deloraine	Secretary, Tasmanian School Bus Association	1076–1078
Mr J. O. Green, Campania	Articled Law Clerk	597
Mr B. G. Giffard, Glenorchy	Engineer	628– 656
Mr M. J. Gelling, Howrah	Engineer	684– 691 709– 724 931– 936

Mr I. J. Godfrey, Ravenswood	Councillor, St Leonards Municipality	836
Mr J. E. Hebblethwaite, South Hobart	Teacher	602– 604
Mr R. W. Hilder, Exeter	Chairman, Exeter District School Parents' and Friends' Association	766– 772
Mr J. A. Inman, Hobart	Taxi Driver, City Cabs	1017–1025
Mr B. R. A. Jennings, North Hobart	Manager, Hobart Chamber of Commerce	535– 542
Mr J. Locke, Hobart	Traffic Engineer, Public Works Department	426– 428 666– 684
Mr K. F. Lowrie, New Town	Mayor of Glenorchy	554– 575
Mr N. L. Lyneham, Mt Stuart	Deputy Commissioner for Town and Country Planning	892– 896
Mr M. F. Lillas, Battery Point	Apprentice at Law	597– 602
Mr F. J. Larissey, Launceston	Proprietor, Red Line Coaches	801– 810
Mr H. H. McNab, Sandy Bay	Part-time Secretary, Australian Tramway and Motor Omnibus Employees Association	136– 175
Mr G. E. C. McKercher, Sandy Bay	Deputy Director, Public Works Department	410– 425
Mr B. H. McNeill, Mt Nelson	Director of Department of Environment Design, Tasmanian College of Advanced Education	938– 963
Mr P. Monaghan, Launceston	State Secretary, Australian Railway Union	530– 533
Mr R. L. Marriott, Lindisfarne	Council Clerk, Municipality of Clarence	576– 582
Mr B. J. Manion, Beaconsfield	Proprietor, Manions Transport	801– 810
Mr P. A. Meyer, Launceston	District Engineer, Public Works Department, North East Area	838
Mr K. A. Moore, West Hobart	Student	946– 956
Mr E. E. Mullen, Winkleigh	Warden, Municipality of Beaconsfield	1074–1076
Mr G. T. Mountjoy, Templestowe, Victoria	Executive Councillor of Bus Proprietors Association of Victoria	1079–1099
Mr J. A. R. Owens, Penguin	Deputy Warden, Municipality of Penguin	878
Mr V. F. Peters, Bellerive	Retired	390– 409
Mr A. L. Patten, Garran, A.C.T.	Manager, Australian Operations for LTV Aerospace Corporation	918– 926
Mr C. R. Powell, Moonah	Southern Branch Secretary, Australian Federated Union Locomotive Engineers	936– 937
Captain T. W. Ross, Sandy Bay	Lower Sandy Bay Progress Association	605– 609
Mr R. C. Robertson, Launceston	State Secretary, National Union of Railwaymen of Australia	615– 627 773– 776
Mr D. G. Riley, Norwood	Engineer	837
Mr T. A. Rapier, Burnie	Municipal Engineer, Burnie Municipal Council	B885–B889
Mr R. G. Soundy, New Town	Lord Mayor of Hobart	375– 389
Mr R. J. Saunders, Bellerive	Accountant, Metropolitan Transport Trust	657– 665
Mr S. E. Stoward, Gravelly Beach	Proprietor, Stoward's Motors	801– 810
Dr D. Scrafton, Adelaide, S.A.	Director-General of Transport, South Australia	821– 835 838– 859
Professor P. Scott, Sandy Bay	Professor of Geography, University of Tasmania	874– 892
Mr G. D. Tyson, Robigana	Social Worker	770– 772
Mr R. D. Tucker, Ravenswood	Proprietors, D. R. and C. M. Tucker	810– 813
Mr J. E. Tiller, West Hobart	Chief Designer, Hobart City Council	985–1016
Mr G. T. Webb, Sandy Bay	Commissioner of Transport	247– 375 1026–1065 1100–1116
Mr M. R. Wilson, Taroona	Administration Assistant, Road Transport Branch, Transport Commission	725– 735
Mr J. L. Walton, Riverside	Assistant City Engineer, Launceston Council	787– 796

Mr L. Whittle, Launceston	Part-time Secretary, Launceston Branch, Australian Tramways and Motor Omnibus Association	860– 872
Senator K. S. Wreidt, Howrah	Australian Senator	964– 973
Mr J. A. Watts, Taroona	Planning Engineer, Public Works Department	974– 984
Mr C. R. Willing, Sandy Bay	Assistant Chief Engineer, Public Works Department	974– 985
Mr J. D. Yaxley, Launceston	Deputy Town Clerk, Launceston Council	787– 793
Mr V. G. Yaxley, Upper Burnie	Council Clerk, Burnie	B885–B889

APPENDIX D

REFERENCES NOT TENDERED IN EVIDENCE

BUCHANAN, C., *et al.* *The Conurbations* London: British Road Federation, 1969—Headley Bros. Ltd, Kent, U.K.

CREIGHTON, R. L. *Urban Transport Planning*: University of Illinois Press, 1970.

JOHNSTON, W. B. ed., *Traffic in a New Zealand City. Christchurch*: Christchurch Regional Planning Authority, 1965.

MEYER, J. R. *et al.* *The Urban Transportation Problem*—

London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

United States: *Tomorrow's Transportation: New system for the urban future.* Washington: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1968.

United States: National Committee on Urban Transportation. *Better Transportation for Your City.* Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1958.

United States: National Committee on Urban Transportation. *Determining Street Use.* Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1958.

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